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Abstract
The contribution of this thesis is to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically
to the sub-field called knowledge engineering. Knowledge engineering involves the
computer representation and use of the knowledge and opinions of human experts.
In real world controversies, disagreements can be treated as opportunities for
exploring the beliefs and reasoning of experts via a process called argumentation.
The central claim of this thesis is that a formal computer-based framework for
argumentation is a useful solution to the problem of representing and reasoning with
multiple conflicting viewpoints.
The problem which this thesis addresses is how to represent arguments in domains in
which there is controversy and disagreement between many relevant points of view.
The reason that this is a problem is that most knowledge based systems are founded in
logics, such as first order predicate logic, in which inconsistencies must be eliminated
from a theory in order for meaningful inference to be possible from it.
I argue that it is possible to devise an argumentation framework by describing one
(FORA : Framework for Opposition and Reasoning about Arguments). FORA
contains a language for representing the views of multiple experts who disagree or
have differing opinions. FORA also contains a suite of software tools which can
facilitate debate, exploration of multiple viewpoints, and construction and revision of
knowledge bases which are challenged by opposing opinions or evidence.
A fundamental part of this thesis is the claim that arguments are meta-level structures
which describe the relationships between statements contained in knowledge bases. It
is important to make a clear distinction between representations in knowledge bases
(the object-level) and representations of the arguments implicit in knowledge bases
(the meta-level). FORA has been developed to make this distinction clear and its main
benefit is that the argument representations are independent of the object-level
representation language. This is useful because it facilitates integration of arguments
from multiple sources using different representation languages, and because it enables
knowledge engineering decisions to be made about how to structure arguments and
chains of reasoning, independently of object-level representation decisions.
I argue that abstract argument representations are useful because they can facilitate a
variety of knowledge engineering tasks. These include knowledge acquisition;
automatic abstraction from existing formal knowledge bases; and construction, re-
representation, evaluation and criticism of object-level knowledge bases. Examples
of software tools contained within FORA are used to illustrate these uses of
argumentation structures. The utility of a meta-level framework for argumentation,
and FORA in particular, is demonstrated in terms of an important real world
controversy concerning the health risks of a group of toxic compounds called
aflatoxins.
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"I know what you're thinking about, " said Tweedledum :
"but it isn 't so, nohow. "
"Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee,
"if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be : but as it isn't, it ain't.
That's logic."
Through the Looking Glass. Lewis Carroll. 1887.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The contribution of this thesis is to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically
to the sub-field called knowledge engineering. Knowledge engineering involves the
computer representation and use of the knowledge and opinions of human experts.
This document presents a framework called FORA (Framework for Opposition and
Reasoning about Arguments) for use in situations when we wish to represent the
views of many people who disagree or have differing opinions, and when we wish to
use a computer to facilitate debate, exploration of multiple viewpoints, or revision of
knowledge bases which are challenged by opposing opinions or evidence.
The conclusion of this thesis is that arguments are meta-level structures, and I argue
that it is useful to represent them as such in a computer-based framework. I show that
this is possible by presenting an argumentation framework, called FORA, and I argue
that it is useful by demonstrating that FORA can facilitate a variety of knowledge
engineering tasks.
1.1 Motivation, context, and background
Many knowledge bases in knowledge based systems only include representations of
knowledge from one person, usually an expert in a domain such as medicine, law or
chemistry. When knowledge bases need to represent multiple experts' knowledge,
the knowledge is almost always constrained to be consistent. Techniques such as the
Delphi Method (IDelbecq el al 75], [Ng 90]) are used during knowledge acquisition,
to iron-out inconsistencies and disagreements between the experts, but only the
resulting consensus viewpoint is explicitly represented in the knowledge base to be
used for inference. The over-riding tendency in most Al and knowledge engineering
methodologies is to see conflict as a problem and try to resolve or remove it.
The aim of this thesis is to explore whether we can instead view conflict as an
opportunity for interesting reasoning. In the real world, absolute consensus or
consistency is very rare. People have their own opinions and differing viewpoints,
and as a result people commonly disagree with one another. A great deal of intelligent
activity - discussions and debates, learning and teaching, legal trials, democratic
decision making - could not occur if the people involved did not have differing
viewpoints.
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Some good examples of the importance of multiple viewpoints can be found in natural
resource management. When decisions have to be made which involve changes to
natural resources such as oceans, forests or the atmosphere, the interests of various
parties need to be weighed up. These parties include land-owners, environmental
pressure groups, wildlife biologists, governments and industries. Industries are
currently under increasing pressure to carry out environmental impact assessments of
their proposed development plans, and to integrate their results into their decision
making processes. However, ecosystems are highly complex phenomena and often a
range of relevant specialists will produce conflicting predictions of the effects of
environmental changes (the controversy surrounding the greenhouse theory of global
warming is a particularly interesting example, see section 4.3 and [Kellogg 91]). In
addition, conflicts can arise due to differing interests or goals, for example,
conservation of particular wildlife habitats versus economic development (see section
4.2, for an example of a conflict of interests surrounding oil industry development in
Alaska). Conflicts can also result from the use of different terminologies by people
from different disciplines - such conflicts are sometimes hard to untangle as both
agreement and disagreement can be obscured by differing language use (see for
example [Shaw & Gaines 91]).
Similarly complex examples of multiple viewpoints exist in the domain of health risk
assessment, in which the views of policy makers, food and drug administrations,
food and drug producers and suppliers, epidemiologists, medical experts, and the
general public, all need to be taken into account in making risk assessments. I will
use an example of such a risk assessment to illustrate many of the ideas described in
this document (see section 3.3).
The need to handle multiple viewpoints presents a problem to the developers of
knowledge based decision support systems. Single, consistent knowledge bases are
incapable of meeting the needs of situations such as these. Instead we require
systems containing multiple knowledge bases, each of which can represent a
particular viewpoint on a problem. We then need mechanisms for identifying,
exploring and evaluating conflicts within and between knowledge bases. The overall
aim of the research described in this document is to support the construction of such
knowledge based systems.
The users of such systems should be treated less like a novice asking a question of an
expert who knows the answer, and more like a responsible decision-maker who calls,
and chairs, a meeting of various relevant experts or interested parties who each argue
for various positions. A debate ensues in which relevant counter-arguments need to
be presented at appropriate times. By interacting with the system in this way, I
believe that users would become better informed and more aware of the nature of the
choices they have to make in order to make a wise decision. This model of system-
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user interaction accords with the ethical need for a human locus of responsibility
[Whitby 88], that is, a guarantee that computers or expert systems are not in a direct
line of responsibility for making decisions which may turn out to be safety-critical or
life threatening. In order to construct such systems we need better representational
models for arguments, and this document presents one such model.
1.2 Thesis message and contribution
The central claim of this thesis is that it is possible, and useful, to represent
knowledge in the form of arguments for points of view. Doing so facilitates the
handling of disagreements between experts without requiring that the conflicts be
resolved.
This document describes a computational framework called FORA for articulating
arguments at a high level of abstraction and exploring the resulting structures.
Arguments and debate involve reasoning about the relationships between the
statements and chains of inference we use, and so they involve meta-level knowledge.
Methods are provided in FORA for constructing such meta-level knowledge bases
both from scratch and by automatic abstraction (mark-up) from formal object-level
theories or knowledge bases. The usefulness of the meta-level argumentation
approach is also illustrated by describing how instantiation (mark-down) of argument
structures can support construction and criticism of object-level knowledge bases.
FORA, and the theory behind it, is a contribution to the field of argumentation. I
argue that it provides a more robust and rigorous set of structures for representing and
reasoning about arguments than argumentation techniques in current use such as IBIS
[Kunz & Rittel 70] [Conklin & Begeman 88], FORA's argument representation
language is more abstract than most formal argumentation approaches such as the logic
of argumentation, LA [Krause et al 95a]), and I argue that this confers some
important benefits for knowledge engineers. The suite of tools described in chapters
6 and 7 provide automated and semi-automated transformations between FORA and
other formal languages thus suggesting that the framework is general purpose and can
integrate into existing knowledge representation practices. These tools also provide
support for maintenance and adaptation of knowledge bases as their contents change or
are disputed. This thesis is thus also a contribution to the area of knowledge and
requirements engineering.
1.3 Overview
In chapter 2, I survey the related work on argumentation and disagreement and
explain the usefulness of a meta-level approach to inconsistency handling.
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In chapter 3, the FORA framework is introduced, along with an example of a debate
in the domain of health risk assessment which is used to illustrate the techniques
presented in the remainder of the document.
In chapter 4, the FORA representation language is defined. It enables arguments from
knowledge bases to be reasoned about independently of their object-level
representation. Four basic meta-level relations are introduced : disagreement,
equivalence, justification and elaboration, and arguments are also defined. Chapter 4
also addresses the question of how to construct knowledge bases in FORA.
Acquisition of knowledge from multiple viewpoints is discussed and two software
tools are described which help users to express arguments (mark them up) using the
formal structures of FORA.
Chapter 5 discusses how representations of arguments in FORA can be used to guide a
user in exploring the range of opinion in a collection of knowledge bases. The notion
of a conflict set is introduced to provide a focusscd roving 'window' on the particular
disagreements a user is interested in. The four primitive relations are used as the basis
of definitions of more complex argument constructs, such as those encountered in the
literature on argumentation. These argument constructs provide ways to automate
comparison and evaluation of knowledge bases.
In order to assess the usefulness of the framework it is necessary to consider how it
relates to other knowledge representation languages in which arguments can be
expressed. Chapter 6 addresses how the framework can be used for reasoning about
arguments in existing (legacy) knowledge bases, and describes how abstraction or
mark-up to FORA can be automated from knowledge bases expressed in a formal
logic. Two techniques for this are discussed and illustrated.
Chapter 7 tackles the converse issue, which is how to use representations of
arguments as a basis for construction of knowledge bases in an object-level language.
This transformation cannot be automated. Flowever, the meta-level framework can
provide guidance to a user who wishes to construct a formal object-level
representation. Software tools are described which can ensure that a chain of
reasoning is carried out by an object-level inference engine, by helping users to
formalise appropriately the reasoning steps represented by an argument in FORA. An
inference checker tool helps to verify that this has been successful and a knowledge
base critic uses FORA representations to suggest elements at the object-level which are
vulnerable to dispute.
Chapter 8 concludes by summarising the contribution of the research described in this




This chapter provides a survey of literature in the fields of logic, philosophy and
Artificial Intelligence (AI) which addresses the question of handling disagreements. It
is divided into two themes. First there is the issue of disagreement itself, and section
2.1 surveys the literature about conflict, inconsistency and multiple viewpoints. This
section characterises the 'problem'. Secondly, there is the field of argumentation.
Section 2.2 describes approaches to argument in philosophy, linguistics and AI.
This section describes the background to the 'solution' adopted here.
2.1 Disagreement
The study of disagreement is problematic because so many disciplines have a bearing
on the issue. The following survey is therefore eclectic and in many cases gives only
an overview of the work described. Full technical details can be found in the cited
literature.
2.1.1 Object-level logical approaches to disagreement
2.1.1.1 Classical logic
The notion of disagreement is central to logic, as logic is concerned with the analysis
of the soundness or unsoundness of arguments. Within logic the somewhat vague
notion of disagreement is replaced by a number of more formal concepts, the two
most important being contradiction and inconsistency. Although these notions are
generally accepted as fundamental to logic, there are surprising discrepancies between
different logicians' definitions of them.
Definitions
[Lemmon 65] defines a contradiction syntactically as 'a conjunction, the second
conjunct of which is the negation of the first conjunct'. An inconsistency is defined
as a semantic notion (ie: to do with the assignment of truth or falshood to
propositions). A formula is inconsistent 'if it takes the truth-value F for all possible
assignments of truth-values to its variables.'
[Hamilton 78] defines a contradiction as a statement which 'takes truth value F under
each possible assignment of truth values to the statement variables which occur in it',
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which is the same as Lemmon's interpretation of inconsistency. Hamilton reserves
the label inconsistent for formal systems in which both a proposition and its negation
are theorems.
Confusingly, the definitions in [Hodges 77] are different again - a set of beliefs is
inconsistent if they cannot all be true in any possible situation, and a contradiction is
defined as an inconsistent belief. This identification of inconsistency and
contradiction is repeated in more advanced logic texts such as [Kleene 67] in which 'a
formula E is called inconsistent or contradictory ... if it has a solid column of F's in its
truth table'.
Hence the central ideas seem to be firstly, declaring that both a proposition (formula)
and its negation hold simultaneously, and secondly, being unable to find a proposition
true in any possible situation. I will generally refer to the first situation as a
contradiction, following the generally accepted form of the Law of Non-Contradiction
(eg: [Lemmon 65, p50]) which states that 'it cannot be the case that P both holds and
does not hold, for any proposition P', (ie: r -.(P & ^P) ). Contradiction can be
thought of as primarily a syntactic clash, whereas inconsistency is a broader notion
which applies to whole systems of belief, or theories, in which a contradiction can be
generated. Contradictions are the syntactic manifestations of inconsistency of a belief
set or knowledge base.
The meaning of inconsistent theories
One thorny issue here concerns the semantics of contradiction and inconsistency, in
other words, what they mean, or how they should be interpreted. The most common
picture here is that no interpretation can be given for an inconsistent logical theory.
Inconsistent theories are incoherent and meaningless. More importantly any two
inconsistent theories are equally meaningless, and therefore indistinguishable
semantically. This picture has a long and noble tradition, being traceable back to
Socrates and Plato through much of western philosophy and logic. It is based on a
belief that the real world is self-consistent, that the law of non-contradiction applies to
it. There have, of course, always been philosophers and logicians who tried to give
coherent accounts of inconsistency, and thus there is a parallel tradition of philosophy
(from the Greek sceptics leading most notably to Hegel and Marx) in which it is held
that the world is really inconsistent, that the world contains real counter-examples to
the law of non-contradiction, and that we thus need to be able to give meaningful
interpretations of inconsistent theories.
The earliest examples of ontological inconsistencies as they are sometimes known
(see, for example [Rescher & Brandom 79]), came from the early Greek philosopher
Heraclitus, and concern movement and action. One of the famous examples is the
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'river fragments' quandary, in which when stepping through a river we are both in the
same river, and yet not in quite the same river at all because it is continuously
changing. The resurgence of philosophical interest in inconsistency in the twentieth
century has followed developments in modern physics, notably quantum theory, in
which the existence or non-existence of a moving particle at a particular place can be
problematic. The philosophical study of language use (particularly from the point of
view of Hegel's dialectic or Wittgenstein's language games) also encourages a more
open mind towards disagreement than normally demonstrated in classical logic.
Wittgenstein, for example, predicted a time when people would be 'proud to have
emancipated themselves from consistency', and tells us that 'we shall see a
contradiction in a quite different light if we look at its occurrence and its consequences
as it were anthropologically' rather than 'if we look at it from the point of view of the
mathematical law-giver' [Wittgenstein 67], Issues from the study of ethics (such as
the problem of moral relativism, see [Meiland & Krausz 82]), and the logical
paradoxes such as the Liar paradox [Martin 84], add pressure to these questions from
science and linguistics, and result in inconsistency being an issue of profound
philosophical interest.
A full survey of philosophical discussions of inconsistency throughout history is
impossible here, though it is a fascinating subject. Excellent accounts of the history
of ideas on inconsistency can be found elsewhere, one particularly good example
being [Priest et al 89], It is enough to note two points, firstly that there is a lack of
unambiguous definitions of 'inconsistency' and 'contradiction', and secondly that
there is great debate about how we should interpret these terms with respect to the real
world. The lack of consensus on these basic issues is somewhat surprising given
their importance in the practice of logic, and the confidence with which they are used
in it. This ambiguity will not be resolved here and is presented simply to demonstrate
the relevance of a systematic study of disagreements to mainstream logic. As further
demonstration of this relevance the next section will examine how important
contradictions and inconsistencies are in the practical business of logical proof.
The use of disagreement in proofs
There are two main uses of contradictions in logical reasoning. Firstly, there is proof
by contradiction, commonly known as reductio ad absurdum, and secondly, there is
the principle of ex falso quod libel, which allows the deduction of any proposition
from an inconsistent theory.
In reductio ad absurdum, a proposition can be proved to hold by assuming its
negation and deriving a contradiction from it. This is the main proof technique of
semantic tableaux : in order to prove a proposition P from a set of axioms (a theory),
its negation, not P, is added to the theory, and inference steps are applied until both a
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proposition and its negation are derived, thus forming a contradiction. Assuming that
the initial set of axioms cannot generate that contradiction alone, the proposition to
blame is therefore the assumed one, not P, which therefore cannot hold. Another
fundamental assumption of classical logic is now brought into play, which is the law
of the excluded middle (tertium non datur), which states that one of P or not P must
hold, in other words, there cannot be propositions which are neither true nor false.
In the proof by contradiction, the negated proposition, not P, fails to hold, as it
causes contradiction, and therefore we can conclude that P must follow from the
axioms.
The principle of cx falso quod libet demonstrates most clearly why disagreements are
unwelcome in classical logic. It states that any proposition follows from the existence
of a contradiction in a theory, ie: from an inconsistent theory. This is tantamount to
logical chaos, because as soon as a contradiction appears in a theory, all possible
syntactically correct propositions are immediately derivable thus making it impossible
to distinguish between sensible and nonsensical conclusions. Ex falso quod libet is
simple to prove using the rule of or-introduction and modus ponens.
(1) P Premiss I
(2) -P Premiss 2
(3) ^P v Q v-introduction on (2)
(4) P—> Q rewriting (3)
(5) Q by modus ponens from (!) and (4).
This proves that from the assumption of both P and its negation, any proposition
whatever (Q) can be derived.
It is in this sense that inconsistency is said to be fatal to a logical system. Allowing a
proposition to be both true and falso is not merely distasteful to logicians, much more
significantly it trivialities logical deduction in a classical logic system because anything
at all can be deduced. If we wish to investigate whether anything positive can be done
with contradictions, we will neod to find a way around ex falso quod libet. In the
following sections some possible approaches to this will be examined. This will take
us into the realm of what Quine calls Deviant Logics, in discussions of which he
claims 'neither party knows what ho is talking about' [Quine 70, p81], and most of
which he denies are really logics at all. However, there are several coherent accounts
of contradictions which successfully evade logical triviality and these arc described in
the following subsections (2.1.1.2-2.1.1.5).
2.1.1.2 Many-Valued and Intuitionistic Logic
One of the ways of rethinking inconsistency is to question the fundamental notions of
truth and falsity, and in particular to reject the dichotomy between them, denying that
any proposition must be exclusively either true or false. Some important branches of
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logic have taken this route, and they are usually characterised as having rejected the
law of the excluded middle (tertium non datur). Two of these branches are
particularly significant.
The first is the development of many-valued logics, the most straightforward of which
is a three-valued logic, in which a proposition may be either true, false, or something
between (unsure, unknown, or possible). It is straightforward to draw up truth-
tables for the standard logical connectives such as negation, conjunction etc. which
indicate how to combine propositions taking any of the three truth-values. A good
example of a three-valued logic which has 'undecided' as its third truth-value can be
found in [Kleene 52], Another famous three-valued logic is Lukasiewicz's attempt to
allow statements about the future to remain contingent [Lukasiewicz 1920]. [Haack
78] provides a comprehensive survey of many-valued logics and their philosophical
basis, and their computational tractability is discussed in [Turner 84].
The second branch of logic renowned for its rejection of the law of the excluded
middle is intuitionism. The basis of intuitionism is a belief that there is no platonic
realm of mathematical objects independent of us, about which mathematicians make
discoveries, but rather that mathematics is fundamentally dependent on human
thought. Mathematical objects cannot therefore be merely assumed to exist, they
must be demonstrated to exist or constructed with various named properties. Proofs
must also be constructive, in the sense that they cannot make references to
mathematical objects which cannot be constructed. This means that certain classical
set theoretic proofs (for example concerning infinite sets) are intuitionistically
unacceptable. If there are no constructive proofs for a proposition or its negation then
that proposition cannot be asserted to be either true or false, thus breaking the law of
the excluded middle.
In intuitionistic logic, propositions are assigned meaning, not by truth-functional
Tarskian semantics, but by explaining how they are to be proved or demonstrated.
In particular, the logical connectives are not given truth-functional definitions, so for
example, a disjunction P\i> holds only if one of P and Q is actually verifiable. Thus
for a proposition P for which no proof can be given for either it or its negation,
(Pv^P) does not hold. Negation is likewise defined in terms of proof (derivation), as
exemplified by the following statement from [Heyting 31] :
'The proposition 'C is not rational' signifies the expectation that one can
derive a contradiction from the assumption that C is rational. It is important
to note that the negation ofa proposition always refers to a proofprocedure
which leads to the contradiction.'
A full exposition of intuitionistic logic can be found in [Dumrnet 77], The importance
of constructive logic to computing, via type-theory, is presented in [Martin-Lbf 82].
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Many-valued logics and intuitionistic logic both result from the rejection of a
straightforward dichotomy between truth and falsehood. Although Quine complains
that 'it is hard to face up to the rejection of anything so basic', it is clear that doing so
opens up some rich avenues of logical exploration with important applications in
computer science and artificial intelligence. Before moving on to other more direct
approaches to the issue of inconsistency and contradiction, it is worth summing up the
reasons why the rejection of the truth falsity dichotomy is so attractive. A more
lengthy discussion of this issue can be found in [Quine 70],
1. The world is not always clear-cut, issues are often not black or white, there are
gradations in the world to which truth and falsity do not do justice.
2. Often our knowledge of the world is inexact or uncertain, and perhaps logic
should reflect that.
3. The truth-falsity dichotomy leads us into Russellian set theoretic paradoxes.
4. Modern science, and in particular quantum physics, requires logical techniques
which can handle multiple inconsistent possibilities.
5. There are mathematical assertions which can be neither properly proved nor
disproved. (This is the intuitionistic argument.)
Finally, while on the topic of many-valued logics, it is worth pointing out an
important area of work which is being deliberately omitted from this survey - that of
logics of uncertainty. The discussion above of many-valued logics was largely
limited to three-valued logics, but it is quite possible to have many more values, so,
for example, a seven-valued logic might have 'truth-values' of definitely true,
probably true, possibly true, unknown, possibly false, probably false and definitely
false. We can see from this that the study of many-valued logics borders on the study
of uncertainty and that the substitution of numbers for truth values lcuds into the study
of probability. However the intention here is to focus on the issue of disagreement
and inconsistency, rather than clouding the issue with certuinty factors and levels of
doubt. The work on uncertainty of most relevance to this thesis involves the use of
argumentation to handle uncertainty, for details of which see section 2.2.2.
2.1.1.3 A Logic of Inconsistency
Some logicians have tackled the question of inconsistency directly, and in this section
one of the classic examples of this work will be discussed, namely Rescher and
Brandom's presentation of a logic which is deliberately permissive of inconsistency
[Rescher & Brandom 79]. We have seen that intuitionistic logics reject the law of the
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excluded middle, and Rescher and Brandom take the step of also rejecting the law of
non-contradiction, hence allowing both the situation when a proposition is neither
true nor false, and the situation when it is both true and false.
They start from the question 'What if the world is not ontologically consistent?' by
which they mean that a proposition about the world may be shown to hold, whilst
also being shown not to hold (or in their terminology, that a fact both obtains and
does not obtain). They are not suggesting here that we may be reasoning
inconsistently about the world, nor merely holding inconsistent beliefs (which may
prove to be incorrect) but that the world may actually be inconsistent and thus it may
be impossible to provide an ontology of the world which can be consistently described
by a system of classical logic.
Although their work is presented on the basis of ontological inconsistency as a purely
philosophical supposition or hypothetical, they do provide some sketchy examples
that might lend support to the suggestion. One of these corresponds to the fourth
reason for rejection of the truth-falsity dichotomy, as given at the end of the last
section, namely that quantum physics is required to deal with indeterminism and the
possibility of inconsistent facts obtaining. Another example is that two computer-
based information systems which monitor and take measurements in the world may
simultaneously gather inconsistent information, whilst also remaining mostly
consistent in their coverage. In such situations we do not want exfalso quod libet to
nullify all inference on the consistent subsets of information. They deny that
inconsistency should be treated as automatically 'infectious' and assert that we can
abolish ex falso quod libet, thus eradicating the means of its transmission.
A fundamental idea in their logic is that of overlapping or overlaying descriptions of
the world, theories, or information systems (in Al-speak we can talk of overlapping
knowledge bases). By taking the intersection of two consistent sets of sentences we
can find ourselves in a situation where some questions can no longer be answered. If
one set contains 'It is raining' and the other 'It is not raining', we no longer know
from the intersection whether or not it is raining. They describe this as the world
being under-determined. On the other hand if we take the union of the sets some
questions have more than one answer, so we can for example claim that it is both
raining and not raining. The world this time is over-determined.
If the sentence 'Grass is a plant' is in both sets of sentences, in both the intersection
and union of the sentences this sentence remains reliable, and they then claim that the
inconsistency in the over-determined world description is local and does not propagate
doubt to the remaining sentences. Using an analogy from physics they describe the
existence of P and not P in a theory as a singularity of over-determinism and the
absence of either as a singularity of under-determinism. Their rejection of ex falso
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quod libet is expressed neatly in these terms : 'It is a key thesis of our present analysis
that semantical singularity can be a local phenomenon that does not invariably have
global ramifications - that the occurrence of a singularity does NOT entail its
recurrence everywhere.' The proof of this thesis can be found in [Rescher &
Brandom 80, pp21 -22].
They provide both a proof theory and a model theory for their logic. The proof theory
deserves a closer examination, as some of the ideas in it are instructive in how to
selectively dismantle the reasoning framework of classical logic in order to broaden its
applicability.
The logic of inconsistency differs from classical first-order predicate logic with respect
to the interpretation of conjunction and what they call the 'Fundamental Rule of Valid
Inference' (interestingly, negation remains unchanged). Rescher and Brandom make
an important distinction between conjunction (the 'and' of classical logic, written
P&Q), which indicates that both P and Q hold in the same world description, and
juxtaposition, which is a weaker notion (written P,Q) indicating that P and Q hold
independently, usually in different world descriptions. Conjunction is thus a strong
notion, that two statements arc claimed to be true together, at the same time, or in the
same place, or according to one source. Juxtaposition is the weaker notion that two
statements are both claimed to be true, but that this is the result of two separate claims,
not a single claim of joint truth as needed for conjunction to apply. From a claim P
and a separate claim Q wo can deduce P,Q but we cannot in general deduce P&Q.
In overlaying (which they call superposing) two world descriptions they reject the
notion that all resulting descriptions are true collectively, and instead view them as
being true distributively. P and Q may thus hold in two different world descriptions,
and be juxtaposed giving P.Q. This does not entail that they are conjoined, ie: that
P&Q is now also true. This interpretation of conjunction leads to a rejection of the
Fundamental Rule of Valid Inference (R), as follows :
R : Whenever PI, P2 Pn f Q is a valid inference principle ofclassical
logic, and TW(PI), TW(P2) Tw(Pn), then TW(Q).
(T,V(P) indicates that P is true in superposed world description w)
They replace R with the following :
Rl : Whenever PI, P2 Pn t Q is a valid inference principle of classical
logic, and Tw(Pl & P2 &....& Pn), then TW(Q).
R and Rl are meta-principles about the applicability of rules of inference. The
significance of Rl is that it outlaws the application of ex falso quod libet in situations
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where P and not P are merely juxtaposed, thus if a contradiction arises between two
sets of sentences, it is not possible to derive any proposition. This is only allowed if
the conjunction P & ^P is present in one set. (Note that it also limits the applicability
of 'and-introduction' to the trivial case). Thus if the sets of sentences are internally
consistent any singularities which arise from their superposition will be localised.
One of the interesting aspects of Rescher and Brandom's work is its recognition that it
represents a radical shift in what they call the 'ideology' of logic - and in particular a
rejection of the notion of a single, objective, consistent view of the world which they
call 'the myth of the God's eye view'. Their alternative ideology embraces both the
notion that different people have different views of the world, providing a rich
tapestry of multiple perspectives, and also that the existence of inconsistencies
between these perspectives is a positive thing.
'Man's mind does not thrive on consistency alone : the blockage to order
that results from conflicting images is a crucial goad to inquiry and a
pivotal motivefor enlarging our information. Intellectual disequilibrium is
a powerful constructive force.'
In the next section we will examine another logic falling under the same ideology,
which has had significant impact on the thinking of logicians who attempt to handle
inconsistency in computer systems.
2.1.1.4 Paraconsistent Logic
In [da Costa 74] a theory of inconsistent formal systems is presented as a variant of the
classical logic in [Kleene 52], Da Costa sees the development of a theory of
inconsistent calculi as analogous to the development of non-euclidean geometry, and
in particular interprets the existence of paradoxes (such as those of set theory) as
similar to the points at infinity in euclidean plane geometry. This is a good analogy
because his presentation simply denies two basic postulates or axioms of classical
logic and investigates what happens from there, in the same way that non-euclidean
geometries start from a subset of Euclid's axioms. The two outlawed postulates of
logic are the law of non-contradiction and ex falsa quod libel. The law of excluded
middle and the law of double negation remain, as do most of the other basic
principles, though some, such as reductio ad absurdum, have added premises which
check for non-contradiction. To give a flavour of how this is done, here is the
statement of reductio ad absurdum (where B° stands for -,(fi & ^B), i e: there is no
contradiction about B) :
B° -* ((A -> B) -> ((A -> -,B) - -A)))
In other words, if B is not contradicted in the system, yet a contradiction about B can
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be deduced by assuming A, then deduce -A.
Da Costa defines a series of logical calculi, progressing from propositional logic to
full predicate logic with equality, and finally to a set theory based on a theory of
Quine's. In each case he defines an infinite series of calculi. For propositional logic,
the base calculus CO is classical propositional logic, CI is the restricted inconsistent
form with some axioms qualified by a check for non contradiction as in the case of
reductio ad absurdum above. C2 is then derived by qualifying these axioms with
A°&A°°, ie: -(A & -A) & -(-(A & -A) & ^A & -A)).
This recursive application of non-contradiction tests escalates to infinity, resulting in a
series corresponding to the natural numbers of successively stronger and stronger
logics. In addition, a form of 'strong' negation is defined (as -.A & A") which is
shown to correspond exactly to classical negation, and to which the law of non¬
contradiction does apply.
In [da Costa et al 90] the question of how to implement a computational paraconsistent
logic is addressed. The problem with the paraconsistent logic presented above is that
it has a large number of inference rules, thus making automated inference extremely
inefficient, and difficult to restrict to relevant inferences Resolution theorem proving
[Robinson 65] is a technique involving only one inference rule (resolution) on a
restricted syntactic form of logic (conjunctive normal form) which is extremely popular
for automated theorem proving [da Costa et al 90] presents a resolution style proof
procedure for a paraconsistent logic, in which formulae are annotated with a truth
value from a lattice of many possible values. These are used, together with a
unification algorithm, to restrict the use of contradictions in generating trivial
inferences (thus effectively limiting the applicability of exfalso quod libet.)- The
proof procedure is proven to be sound and complete. The implementation of this
proof procedure is illustrated by an example, and an extension is defined which is
computationally more efficient.
A semantic tableau proof procedure for da Costa's puruconsistcnt logic is presented in
[Carnielli & Marques 90], and its completeness is proven. Some examples
demonstrate how their tubleuu method can be used, not only to reason over
inconsistent sets of premises, but also to indicate which premises are involved in
contradictions. This technique thus generates useful information about which subsets
of a knowledge base are 'controversial' which can aid a user in making adjustments to
that knowledge base. This approach is shown to be able to handle default information
in a useful manner, and to be able to point out precisely where the use of defaults
causes contradictions when reasoning with them.
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2.1.1.5 Restricted Access Logics
In [Gabbay & Hunter 93b] an object-level logic called a Restricted Access (RA) Logic
is presented which could underlie a meta-level system such as that discussed in
[Gabbay & Hunter 91, 93a]. The RA logic is designed as an extension of classical
logic (ie: all theorems of classical logic still hold) with a restricted form of ex falso
quod lihet. It is based on a labelled deduction system (LDS [Gabbay 90]). Gabbay
and Hunter start from the common criticism of paraconsistent logics such as [Da Costa
74] which is that they outlaw certain inference rules and thus certain intuitively
obvious tautologies in classical logic are not theorems of paraconsistent logic. Instead
of restricting the proof rules or possible inferences, Gabbay and Hunter allow all the
proof rules of classical logic, but restrict the access of these rules to the axioms,
effectively restricting inference to consistent subsets of the theory. They do this by
means of a restriction function which uses the labels of labelled formulae in the theory
to determine the consistency of theory subsets. Ex falso quod libel, reductio ad
absurdum and not-introduction incorporate this restriction function to check that any
contradiction used in reasoning is localised to the most recent assumptions. This
prevents contradictions in the theory from propagating as they would in classical logic.
In [Elvang-Goransson & Hunter 93], there is a further extension of the RA logic of
[Gabbay & Hunter 93b] in which a modified form of the restriction function is used to
partition the inference rules into three subsets. These are: the basic rules (b-rules)
such as and-introduction, or-introduction and or-elimination; the paraconsistent rules
(p-rules) such as the law of excluded middle, the law of double negation and the basic
axioms of natural deduction involving negation; and the non-paraconsistent rules (c-
rules) namely ex falso quod libel, reductio ad absurdum and not-elimination. For
each subset there are 'sideconditions' which restrict the applicability of the rules to
those propositions in the theory whose labels satisfy a certain form of the restriction
function. These prevent the propagation of trivial inferences which have been
generated from contradictions, whilst allowing for normal classical logical inferences
over any consistent subset of the theory. This logic is thus more 'adventurous' than
the paraconsistent logic of da Costa. In the second part of this paper, Elvang-
Goransson and Hunter discuss how thinking of the labels of propositions as
arguments for them allows for analysis of how acceptable a proposition is on the
basis of the argument which is presented for it. Arguments involving inconsistencies
can thus be regarded as less useful or acceptable than arguments from consistent
information. A similar analysis can be found in [Elvang-Goransson et al 93].
A different technique for restricting access to subsets of an inconsistent theory is
presented in [Naqvi and Rossi 90]. They start from a basic heuristic that propositions
more recently added to a theory should override contradictory information already in
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the theory. To facilitate inference in such a system a 'priority structure' is generated
in which clauses added to the theory are assigned a 'priority level' which is higher the
more recent the addition of the clause. A resolution theorem proving technique
(SLIL-resolution) is then defined which incorporates a check for contradictions at any
higher priority level when making inferences on lower priority information - if such
contradictions exist then the inference step is blocked. Inferences involving the newer
information, however, are not blocked by the existence of older contradictory
information. This approach is extended to a temporal reasoner, and there is a
discussion of how it can be used for hypothetical ('what-if P?' where P is consistent
with the theory) or counter-factual ('what-if P?' where P is inconsistent with the
theory) reasoning. Gabbay and Hunter acknowledge that their approach is extremely
inefficient, however the principal problem with this system is the arbitrary decision
that older information will always be over-ridden by newer information if they
conflict. This may not generally be desirable, and in some extreme cases, it may
simply not be possible to assign a temporal ordering to the items in a theory
(particularly, for example, if they come from various different sources).
All of the logics examined so far have been attempts to cope with inconsistent theories
within the logic by adapting the inference mechanism to avoid trivialising deduction in
the face of inconsistent information. In the next section I turn to approaches which
have involved stepping back from the logic and reasoning about the inconsistency at
the meta-level.
2.1.2 Meta-level approaches to disagreement
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in inconsistency in databases and
knowledge bases and some enthusiastic papers embracing it as an opportunity. For
some logicians the distinction between object-level reasoning and meta-level reasoning
(reasoning about the object-level propositions and inferences) provides a framework
for isolating and exploiting inconsistencies. A good example is [Gabbay & Hunter
91] in which they claim :
'For Artificial Intelligence there is an urgent need to revise the view that
inconsistency is a 'bad' thing, and instead view it as mostly a 'good'
thing... There is a need to develop a framework in which inconsistency can
be viewed according to context, as a vital trigger for actions, for learning,
and as an important source ofdirection in argumentation.'
In this paper they give various examples of people in normal situations being able to
live quite happily with inconsistencies, and being able to reason at the meta-level from
the existence of object-level inconsistency to appropriate actions or to express a belief
in one or other of the conficting positions depending on the circumstances. We can
exploit our ability to be aware of inconsistencies and either suspend judgement until
some point when one or other position is obviously stronger or actively use the
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inconsistency to provide us with a greater range of possible responses to various
situations.
One of their examples is of Professor Nobody who sees his research assistant, Dr
Incompetent, sunbathing in the park while absent from work. When Dr Incompetent
returns to work he claims to have been ill in bed. Professor Nobody acts as if he
believes Dr Incompetent despite having information which contradicts his claim. Only
later, after several repetitions of this incident, does Professor Nobody act on the
inconsistency and sack Dr Incompetent. Gabbay and Hunter give several other
examples of situations in which people express their belief in a position while
simultaneously holding beliefs which manifestly disagree or conflict with that position.
This is not merely deceit, as we often deliberately withhold our commitment to a belief
until we are quite sure that we should change our mind, and, importantly, the factors
that will persuade us to do so are often far removed from logical considerations.
We seem, Gabbay and Hunter suggest, to cope quite happily with overlapping,
inconsistent belief systems without having to resolve the conflict at once - and
intelligent computer systems would need to do likewise. They describe a meta-level
framework which incorporates meta-level rules stating how to reason about, or take
action according to, inconsistencies at the object-level.
In [Gabbay & Hunter 93a] this framework is explored further using an airline booking
system as an example, and a meta-language is defined called DA (standing for Data
and Action). The framework consists of an information system, defined as a pair
(M, O) where M is a meta-level database and O is an object-level database. O is
deliberately under-defined, as the meta-language is intended to support a variety of
possible object-level languages. The meta-level syntax is defined in terms of the
object-level variables, predicate names and logical symbols, and a set of constructors
for the meta-level formulae, including the temporal operators, SINCE and UNTIL.
One meta-level predicate is central to their system : it is called Holds and is defined to
reflect all of the object-level theorems into the meta-level, ie : if A is an object-level
formula, M the meta-level database and O the object-level database, then
M h Holds(A) iff O /- A.
Various temporal operators are defined in terms of SINCE and UNTIL and are in place
to represent the evolution of the database over time and the effects of actions on the
database triggered by meta-level rules.
The interpretation (semantics) of the meta-language is defined as a tuple (D, N, >=, h)
where D is the domain, defined as the Herbrand Universe generated by the meta-level
rules of syntax. (The Herbrand Universe consists of all the ground terms in the
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language, and a Herbrand interpretation assigns each term to be its own meaning, ie:
each ground term in the meta-language is interpreted as itself. For more details see
[Deville 90]. ) N and >= represent the 'flow of time', N being the set of natural
numbers, h is a truth assignment function mapping every term, at any instant of time,
to a truth value of 0 or 1. The temporal aspect thus allows an interpretation of a meta-
level formula such as 'P has held since X and will continue to hold until J".
They propose a temporal interpretation of propositions at the meta-level as being
declarative for the past and present, and imperative for the future 'based on the
intuition that a statement about the future can be imperative, initiating steps of action to
ensure it becoming true'. They introduce executable temporal specifications which
are consequents of the form
'If X then make Y true'.
In their conclusion they claim a complete and sound proof theory for the logic and also
semi-decidability.
Oabbay and Hunter's approach can be contrasted with the paraconsisierii logic
approuch as there is no need for blanket bans on certain types of logical inference at the
object-level. The meta-level rules allow for much greater subtlety in selecting
inference steps, or actions, depending on the nature and context of an inconsistency.
Their approach can also bo favourably contrasted with truth maintenance systems and
belief revision systems (see section 2.1.3), as a proposition can be involved in an
inference without necessarily outlawing other propositions which disagree with it from
the belief set.
There are three main differences between DA and FOR A (the framework presented in
this document), the principle one being that Gabbay and Hunter only consider a single
object level theory, whereas the contents of a FORA knowledge base reflect the
contents of multiple potentially inconsistent knowledge buses. The second difference
is that there is no Holds predicate in FORA These two points are related, as a Holds
predicate in FORA would be profoundly inconsistent (reflecting all the differences of
opinion in the knowledge bases) unless a different Holds predicate was defined for
each knowledge base. More importantly, in FORA there is no notion of truth values
of propositions (which the Holds predicate represents), as all that is recorded are the
relations between the propositions. FORA does not adjudicate between opinions, it
merely states how they relate to each other. Another difference is the lack of a
temporal component in FORA. One way of integrating these two languages may be to
interpret the single Holds predicate as representing 'the speaker's view over time'
which in a systein such as FORA, would be expected to change every time a new
opinion is expressed. Thus the total history of the predicate Holds, over time, could
be used to represent the 'floor' of a debate.
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In general their work is extremely relevant to this thesis, as demonstrated by this
statement from the conclusion of [Gabbay & Hunter 93] which accurately sums up my
position:
'We give up a requirement to make the object-level database consistent, and
rather accept such situations as inevitable. We abstract away from the
object-level, and shift the requirement of consistency to the level of the
meta-level being consistent.'
Only the details of the two meta-languages differ.
A preliminary application of the DA framework is discussed in [Finkelstein et al 93] in
which it is used to identify and handle inconsistencies in the development of software
specifications. Finkelstein is concerned with the construction of software
specifications from multiple perspectives (Viewpoints) and is constructing a distributed
software specification environment. Consistency checks can be provided to ensure
consistency within a single viewpoint and also to detect inconsistencies between
viewpoints. The meta-level action framework thus allows for appropriate actions to
be taken in the case of inconsistencies, such as checking for spelling or typing errors,
and ultimately asking the system users for clarification. The existence of multiple
object-level viewpoints (each of which can use different representation languages)
makes this work highly relevant to this thesis. It is interesting to note that they
identify as a major difficulty the axiomatisation of inconsistency detection at the meta-
level. They have also not investigated ways of exploiting inconsistencies (once
detected) to drive interaction with users, other than the extremely simple examples of
asking about spelling errors. They earmark this task as requiring further work, and
state the need for protocols for inter-viewpoint interactions. This thesis contains some
ideas which may meet this need.
2.1.3 AI Approaches to Conflict
Negation as failure
There are problems with practical computation using logics with classical negation.
The usual practical solution to this is to use a form of negation known as negation as
failure, however, this inference strategy is both unsound and incomplete (see eg:
[Lloyd 84], [Deville 90] for more details).
Conflict resolution
inference engines and interpreters in knowledge based systems need to handle
situtations when more than one possible inference or problem solution is applicable
which may provide conflicting conclusions. Strategies for handling such choice
points are usually referred to as conflict resolution strategies. Examples are to accept
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options on the basis of criteria such as recency of data, specificity of possible
solutions, refractoriness or obstinance in refusing to retry possible solution paths
which have been attempted previously, and so forth. Such strategies are routinely
built into interpreters for rule-based systems, see, for example [Jackson 90] for
details.
Default logics and non-monotonic logics
If change in the world is to be taken seriously in AI systems, conflicts must be
addressed as changes frequently create situations where a statement previously held to
be true is contradicted by the current state of uffairs. If addition of new propositions
to a logical theory docs not invalidate any of the previous items in that theory, then it
is said to be monotonic. As more inference is carried out the knowledge base just
grows and grows. However, if the addition of new propositions requires other
propositions to be removed in order to restore consistency, then we have nan
monotonicity, where a knowledge base may either expand or shrink with the addition
of new information. The problem of providing logically rigorous characterisations of
this process is an important endeavour in AI, and a rich seam of research exists from
early work on the frame problem (which aspects of our knowledge do we need to
adjust in the light of changes in the world, and what is persistent? [McCarthy &
Hayes 69], [Raphael 71], [Pylyshyn 78]), common-sense reasoning,
circumscription (from [McCarthy 80] onwards), default logics ([Rcitcr 80], [Rciter
85] and onwards to [Etherington 88]) and now in the mature work on non monotonic
and defeasible logics (eg: [Ginsberg 87], [Brewka 91]).
Truth and Reason Maintenance Systems
It has been recognised for some time within AI that it is useful to record the
justifications for a belief in a proposition so that if certain assumptions used in those
justifications are found to be false, the belief system or knowledge base can be
adjusted. One way of doing this is to think of propositions as nodes in a network,
with each node labelled to indicate which assumptions are used to support it. In this
way a belief in a proposition is recorded with reference to its dependencies on other
propositions. A useful analogy sometimes used here is to think of these dependencies
as a lattice of scaffolding which supports all the various propositions in a theory. If
there is some reason to doubt a proposition, this is analogous to taking some of the
scaffolding down, which may cause other propositions to become unsupported.
Likewise, adding a new piece of scaffolding to support proposition P may have the
knock-on effect of increasing the support for another proposition Q, if P is used in a
justification for Q. The job of a truth maintenance system is to maintain the
scaffolding so that each node is supported by a consistent set of other nodes, and no
contradictions are supported.
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Conflict is handled in truth maintenance systems by explicitly recording which sets of
assumptions lead to contradictions, and taking apart any scaffolding which supports a
contradiction. In [Doyle 79] and [McAllester 80], assumptions which are guilty of
supporting contradictions are found using dependency-directed backtracking, in
which the scaffolding is traced to its 'roots', and the user of the system is then asked
which assumptions will be removed, thus removing the support for one of the two
contradictory propositions. See below, in the section of belief revision, for some
criticisms of the way this happens in practice.
In de Kleer's ATMS (assumption-based truth maintenance system) [de Kleer 86], this
scaffolding is not removed, but rather maintained for various possible scenarios, any
one of which may hold depending on which assumptions are currently believed.
There is a special node called 'nogood' or FALSE, which represents a state of
inconsistency. Any set of assumptions which leads to an inconsistency becomes a
label for the 'nogood' node, and this set of labels is used to maintain the consistency
of the others, by removing assumptions which lead to inconsistencies from the
justificatory labels of proposition nodes. De Kleer's terminology for his truth
maintenance is rather unintuitive, as he describes the label for a proposition node as
the list of all the consistent environments in which the proposition holds, where an
environment is a set of assumptions. A somewhat clearer explanation is given by
[Ginsberg 93] in which a label is said to contain the explanations for a proposition.
The most coherent way of thinking about such labels in the context of this thesis is as
arguments for the proposition, though being merely lists of assumptions, they
contain less structure (less of the proof tree) than some of the argumentation
approaches we will examine later.
De Kleer's work is sometimes described (eg: in [Jackson 90]) as allowing hypothetical
reasoning over more than one possible world. We can usefully compare this approach
with Rescher & Brandom's Logic of Inconsistency (see section 2.1.1.3), in which
possible world descriptions are superposed. In the case where the worlds are
mutually consistent, superposing their descriptions simply produces a further, more
highly specific, world description. However, if the worlds are each internally
consistent (as all of Rescher & Brandom's are), but mutually inconsistent, in de
Kleer's system the superposition of the two descriptions is 'nogood' and ruled out
altogether lie: becomes the label for the 'nogood' or FALSE node). Rescher &
Brandom's logic is thus much more flexible, allowing certain inferences still to be
allowed from the inconsistent world description. Another way of seeing this is to
note that in an ATMS all contradictory sets of assumptions are labels of the one node
'nogood', and thus all inconsistent theories are thus treated as equivalent (and
equally useless). In Rescher & Brandom's logic, each inconsistent theory remains
distinct.
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An important feature of the ATMS should be noted here, which is that the
'scaffolding' structure is a mcta level representation of the inferences and justification
which is carried out on an underlying database using some sort of object level theorem
prover. The operations of the truth maintenance system are thus meta-level
deductions, and are theoretically independent of the particular object-level theorem
prover or object-level representation language. For more detailed studies of truth
maintenance systems see [Ginsberg 87].
Belief Revision
The truth maintenance systems of Doyle and de Kleer were the precursors to a
significant body of recent work aimed at providing epistemologically meaningful and
computationally feasible approaches to the problem of theory change or belief
revision. This work is interesting because it explicitly acknowledges that as the
wot Id around us changes, old beliefs may contradict mote leteul expei ieiice, thus
causing inconsistencies in our belief systems. As Nebel succintly explains [Nebel
92], 'belief revision is the process of incorporating new information into a knowledge
base while preserving consistency'. It is thus important for researchers into belief
revision to understand how beliefs can be represented in stteh as way as to enable
detection of inconsistencies. In addition, inconsistencies need to be isolated or
localised so that it is possible to sec directly where an inconsistency arises. There is a
recognition of the fact that conflicts in our belief systems arc not all-pervasive, and
that it is important to be able to recognise which beliefs need not be affected by a
particular belief change. For example, a change in our beliefs about the current
weather may affect our belief in what is a good plan for an outing today, but will not
affect out beliefs in physical laws such as those about gtavity 01 even in changable
beliefs about wider issues such as the current politicul situation, or the leader of the
country. This is really a reiteration of the familiar old frame problem.
Gardenfors [Gardenfors 92] identifies two main approaches to belief revision. The
foundations approach has developed from the work described above on truth
maintenance and it is characterised by explicit representations of the reasons for
holding each belief, which are used as the structural basis for organising changes to
the belief base and maintaining consistency.
The coherence approach [Harman 86], [Gardenfors 88] is characterised by
representations of 'epistemic entrenchment' which provide an ordering of items in the
belief base, according to which beliefs are more or less entrenched and difficult to
retract (this is along the lines of Quine and Ullian's analysis of the criteria by which we
should revise scientific hypotheses, more details of which are given in the discussion
of argumentation in section 2.2.1.3 [Quine & Ullian 78]). In the coherence approach,
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revision is analysed in (erms of the entire belief base, rather than particular reason or
argument structures, according to general principles such as changing the belief base
minimally. An important contribution to this area are the 'AGM Postulates' which
are a set of general postulates describing the desirable properties of belief revision,
belief set expansion and belief set contraction, [Gardenfors 92] contains several
theoretical and algorithmic extensions to this work. An important theoretical question
here is how to represent and generate epistemic entrenchment orderings and how to
use them to handle inconsistency. [Dubois & Prade 90] present a possibilistic logic
approach to this problem, providing numerical measures of entrenchment.
Doyle's reason maintenance system (RMS), described above, is a classic example of
the foundations approach. In [Doyle 92], Doyle responds to claims that the
foundations approach is inferior (in both inferential plausibility and computational
expense) to the coherence approach, by offering an analysis which suggests that it
may not be possible to draw such a clear distinction between the two approaches, and
also providing some interesting revelations about the practical matter of implementing
belief revision systems. The logical and computational expense of testing belief bases
for consistency on the basis of either reason structures or entrenchment orderings is
potentially astronomical. Consistency checks are at worst undecidable in any
interesting logical representation. In addition, most of the theoretical work in belief
revision deals with belief sets which are closed under logical consequence.
Determining logical closures of belief bases is itself a potentially infinite operation.
Hence Doyle concludes that in practice, both approaches 'must abandon most
requirements of logical consistency and closure to be useful in practical
mechanisations'. He makes some particularly relevant remarks about how these
requirements are overridden in his system :
'RMS, for example, lacks any knowledge of what its nodes mean,
depends on the reasoner to tell it when some node represents a
contradiction, and leaves the conflicting beliefs in place if they do not
depend on defeasible assumptions'.
Some research bridges the foundations and coherence approaches, taking useful ideas
from each and thus organising revisions according to local reasons for propositions
and more global aspects of belief base coherence. A good example is Galliers' theory
of autonomous belief revision for cooperating agents whose beliefs come into conflict
during communication [Galliers 92]. Her analysis provides grounds for deciding
whether to accept a statement and revise beliefs accordingly, as well as how to carry
out that revision.
[Hansson 92] also provides an agent-based analysis of belief revision by a dyadic
represention of belief sets - the dyad is a pair of logical structures, one representing
the set of core beliefs of an agent (the belief base) and the other representing the
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inferences which that agent considers to be valid (possibly in terms of a simple
consequence operator). This provides the grounds for an interesting, though brief,
discussion of disagreement which is defined in terms of an agent as an inconsistency
relative to their consequence operator or inference set. Inconsistencies in belief bases
are called factual disagreements, and inconsistencies in the set of derivable
conclusions are called inferential disagreements. One nice aspect of this work is that
it provides a way of capturing differences between different agents' perceptions of
inconsistency, and makes explicit 'how two individuals may, even with full
knowledge of each others' beliefs, have different opinions on whether they disagree
or not'. They unfortunately do not indicate how this analysis of disagreement could
be used.
There are some similarities between belief revision systems and FORA, largely due to
the use of meta-level relations between propositions. In the foundations approach
there are explicit representations of arguments (or at least justifications) while in the
coherence approach there is room for other relations which support epistemic
entrenchment orderings. The equivalence and elaboration relations in FORA would
look at home here. A main difference is the lack of anything corresponding to the
disagreement relation. The exploration of conflict sets in FORA is related to the
notions of belief set expansion and contraction FORA's higher-order argument
structures could provide valuable support for the coherence approach to belief
revision.
In summary, roccarch in belief revision is relevant to this thesis because it starts from
the same basic question : 'What to do in the face of inconsistency in a knowledge
base?', and thus requires similar logical machinery for analysing conflicts.
However, most of the research in belief revision differs strongly in attitude from this
thesis in that the principal answer to the question is 'eradicate the inconsistency',
however some of the detailed reports summarised above suggest that in practice this i3
an untonablo aim and is heavily compromised when building working computational
systems. This thesis can thus be seen as a contribution to the belief revision debate by
attempting to make a virtue out of this necessity. Rather than weakening the theory
when it comos to implementation due to the inability to escape from inconsistency in
practice, I have built the existence of such conflicts into the theory.
Having completed this survey on approaches to the problem of handling




The second body of literature relevant to the study of disagreements concerns the way
in which we produce arguments for our various points of view. The construction
and criticism of arguments is the fundamental activity of debate and is thus crucial to
any computer-based debating system.
2.2.1 Argumentation in philosophy
2.2.1.1 Traditions of argumentation
Greek beginnings
Any survey of the argumentation literature must begin with Aristotle (see, for example,
[Aristotle 84] and [Evans 77]), the first great logician, who first systematically laid
out the form of valid argument in the shape of the four syllogisms. A recognition of
Aristotle's work is relevant here for two reasons, not only because his work
concerned the structure of arguments, but also because the spirit of his enterprise was
closer to the spirit of this one than much of twentieth century logic. Aristotle was
concerned with argument structures, not as a purely formal and abstract study, but
because he sought to strengthen and facilitate the practice of debate in Greek society.
To Aristotle, the syllogistic forms were not idealisations, nor rules for manipulating
symbols, they were clarifications of the real, practical arguments used in everyday
fora of criminal justice, land allocation, political decision making and theological
debate1.
Thus the early days of logic provided structures for assessing the arguments and
disagreements of the real world. Only comparatively recently has logic become a
formal study in its own right.
The formalist tradition
This practical emphasis in Aristotle's work has been largely neglected by later
generations of formal logicians, in particular since the 'mathematisation' of logic by
Boole and of linguistic argumentation by Frege. Frege's Begriffsschrift (concept-
script) was an explicit attempt to subsume all sound reasoning by a function-theoretic
calculus [Frege 50], By comparison, natural language appeared defective, as the
following commentary on Frege's work makes clear:
'Natural language, [Frege] thought, is rife with vagueness, ambiguity, lack
of logical perspicuity, and, indeed, logical incoherence. To a large degree
he identified as 'logical defects' in a language those features of it which fail
to correspond with the articulations of his concept-script. The logical
' The name of the FORA system is intended to acknowledge this origin.
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powers of concept-script in the presentation of arguments so far
outstripped anything hitherto available that Frege unwittingly employed his
invention as a yardstick against which to measure natural language' [Baker
6 Hacker 84],
The same view still appears to be held by many artificial intelligence researchers today,
and is reflected by the efforts of the natural language processing research community
to capture the structure and semantics of natural language in formal logics which
enable language to be processed (both understood and generated) by computer
programs.
The elegance of Frege's formal systems led increasingly to a perception of natural
language as inadequate for the expression of conclusive arguments and to the
Russellian cult of the 'logically perfect language', of which Russell said 'a language
of that sort will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure
of the facts asserted or denied' [Russell 56]. The implication is that the practical
business of wrangling over disagreements lies outwith the boundaries of logic,
because the very existence of disputes is rooted in the imperfections and vaguaries of
the natural language used to express them. It is thus unsurprising to read Russell's
dismissal of Aristotle's conception of logic:
7 conclude that the Aristotelian doctrines .. are wholly false with the
exception of the formal theory of the syllogism, which is unimportant.
Any person in the present day who wishes to learn logic will be wasting
his time ifhe reads Aristotle or any of his disciples.' [Russell 46],
The interpretivist tradition
Fortunately, the story does not end there. Throughout Western Philosophy there has
been an interest in debate or dialectic, and a dialectic tradition of philosophical
discussion championed by philosophers such as Kant and Hegel. Kant was the first
great meta-philosopher. At a time (the eighteenth century) when all great philosophers
produced monumental theories to explain the way the world is, Kant created his own
treatise on 'Pure Reason' [Kant 33]. But as well as being a conventional philosopher
in this sense, he was also a professor and historian of philosophy, and thus also
wrote about how others explain the world, and how those explanations relate to each
other via the process or dialectic or argumentation. Kant aimed at untangling the huge
philosophical controversy between the Rationalist tradition (headed by Descartes) who
believed in the primacy of reason in our search for explanations of the world, and the
Empiricist tradition (led by Locke and Hume) who believed that we must base our
understanding of the world on our senses and experience. Kant's lasting contribution
to this debate was to articulate the two sides of the argument, and although he also
proposed an alternative way of explaining the world, this is less important here than
the fact that he talked about the debate itself.
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Hegel directly continued this enterprise of meta-philosophy, denying the existence of
any 'truth of the matter', asserting instead that all truth is subjective, and relative to
the time, place and culture in which we find ourselves. To Hegel, truth flows and
changes through history by dialectic (see [Rosen 82]), which is a movement from a
claim (or thesis) via its rebuttal (or antithesis) to a new position (or synthesis). He
was the first interpretivist, claiming that no fact holds merely in itself but rather its
truth must be determined relative to some context. Later interpretivists such as
Heidegger go further, claiming that not only the truth, but also the meaning of
statements is relative to a historical or personal context within which it must be
interpreted before it can be understood.
Thus in much twentieth century philosophy, the role of disagreement is important,
and the occurrence of different points of view is considered a part of the human
condition, necessarily the case due to the variety of cultures and historical perspectives
in human society. Argumentation and dialectic are central to our reasoning faculties.
But in forrpal logic and mathematical philosophy as articulated by Russell,
disagreements and inconsistencies are deeply problematic. The work of Wittgenstein
spans these two schools of thought. His early work in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus [Wittgenstein 22] demonstrates his formalist philosophical beginnings,
whilst his later work and particularly Philosophical Investigations [Wittgenstein 58]
represents a radical shift towards an interpretivist stance with its emphasis on the
instrinsic importance of the immediate context (or language game) to the meaning of
everything we say.
The explosion of the study of knowledge, reasoning, logic and artificial intelligence,
in the second half of the twentieth century, is rooted in the dynamic and controversy
resulting from these two competing approaches - interpretivism and formalism.
2.2.1.2 Toulmin's practical reasoning
In the 1950s there was a backlash against the formalist monopoly of logic, led by the
philosopher of science, Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin's central concern is the needs of
professionals in fields such as law and the natural sciences to assess the
conclusiveness of arguments in their domain and to carry out rigorous debate.
Toulmin believes that the mathematical trends of formal logic have short-changed
lawyers, scientists and certainly ordinary people, and in his book The Uses of
Argument [Toulmin 58] he reasserts the practical nature of the logical enterprise.
His principal focus of attack is the Russellian claim that the only valid arguments are
analytic ones, which when expressed in a 'logically perfect language' can be seen at a
glance (or by a computer) to be sound. Instead he asserts the need for logic to
encompass non-analytic, or substantive arguments which can significantly add to our
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knowledge of the world. An important effect of the artificial constraint of analyticity
of arguments in logic, he says, is that this has caused apparantly insurmountable
problems in the field of epistemology, or the study of knowledge. Those things
which we claim to know, yet can justify only by substantive, non-analytic arguments
(for example, results of induction in science or the reports of eye-witnesses in court)
appear epistemologically dubious when our yardstick for accepting them are the
analytic arguments of formal logic. Toulmin's claim is that this should cast doubt not
on the substantive arguments but on the claims of formal logicians to be accounting for
sound reasoning. 'The only real way out of these epistemological difficulties is ..
giving up the analytic ideal.'
The reason that Toulmin's work is important to this thesis is partly because his vision
of a new field of logic is remarkably close to the reality of what is now studied in
artificial intelligence. This new field has the following three requirements:
'(i) the needfor a rapprochement between logic and epistemology,
which will become not two subjects but one only;
(ii) the importance in logic of the comparative method - treating
arguments in all fields as of equal interest and propriety, and so
comparing and constrasting their structures without any suggestion
that arguments in one field are 'superior' to those in another; and
(Hi) the re introduction ofhistorical, empirical and even - in a sense -
anthropological considerations into the subject. '[Toulmin 58]
The importance of logic in AI and the claim that it is 'experimental epistemology' are
indicators that AI is meeting the first need. The explicit and expanding level of
interest in practical applications of AI, for example the representation of arguments
from medicine, law, chemistry, geology and resource management in knowledge
based systems, is an indication that the second requirement is also being met. The
third claim, of the need for empirical, historical or anthropological study is being
vindicated by recent interest in the situtatedness of intelligent behaviour and the cultural
aspects of communication.
Having established the relevance of Toulmin's work to AI, it is worth looking more
closely at his analysis of the structure of arguments, and his criticisms of the
approaches of mathematical logic. Like Wittgenstein, Toulmin grounds his
investigation in our everyday language, and thus many of his most telling points
derive from close scrutiny of the idiomatic way in which we express ourselves. It is
this sort of scrutiny which leads him in his essay 'The Layout of Arguments' [Toulmin
58] to challenge some of the unjustified simplifications he believes pervade logicians'
work.
He starts with a metaphor : 'An argument is like an organism. It has both a gross
anatomical structure, and a finer, as-it-were physiological one'. Toulmin wishes to
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challenge some of the assumptions made at the 'physiological level', in particular the
notion of logical form and the traditional way in which we carve up and label the parts
of arguments. The result is an alternative model of the structure of an argument to the
'premiss set leading to conclusion' model which pervades the study of logic.
Take the syllogism:
(!) Wendy war born in the Falkland Islands.
(2) All people bom in the Falkland Islands are British Citizens.
(3) Therefore. Wendy is a British Citizen.
Traditionally, (3) would be called the conclusion, (1) the minor premiss (being about
a specific named individual) and (2) the major premiss (being a general rule).
Although Toulmin does not press the point, most formal logics (and rule-based
systems) retain this structure, and provide general inference rules (for example,
elimination of the universal quantifier, followed by modus ponens) which enable this
argument to be classed as valid by virtue of its form. The syntactic structure of the
argument is emphasised, and the fact that it is about the Falkland Islands, Wendy and
notions of citizenship is sidelined as irrelevant to its validity.
Toulmin introduces a more complex representation of this sort of argument by which
he points out distinctions between different argument-types, which are lost under the
syllogistic or classical interpretation. The following terminology is introduced :
A claim is the conclusion of the argument, the statement for which justification is
required, in this case 'Wendy is a British Citizen.'
A datum is a statement of fact offered in evidence for some claim, in this case,
'Wendy was born in the Falkland Islands'.
A warrant is a general rule or principle which is used to support the step from a datum
to a claim, it is a justification that such a step is legitimate, in this case 'All people
born in the Falkland Islands are British citizens'.
A backing is a support for a warrant, for example, a reference to some Act of
Paliament which states the citizenship of Falkland Islanders. A crucial factor for
Toulmin in distinguishing warrants from backings is that backings vary widely
depending on the field of discourse - so general warrants about legal matters should be
expected to have backings of a very different sort to the backings for a general warrant
in the physical sciences.
A rebuttal condition is a statement of the condition under which we would not expect a
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general warrant to hold, for example 'unless Wendy is a naturalised citizen of another
country'.
A qualifier is a modal expression describing the applicability of the warrant, for
example 'necessarily', 'presumably', or 'possibly'.
Thus Toulmin would lay the argument out as follows :
Wendy was born in > so, presumably, Wendy is a British citizen
the Falkland Islands I I
I I
Since Unless
Anybody born in the she is a naturalised





This fits a general template as follows :








This layout serves an important purpose which is to enable Toulmin to demonstrate
how the distinction between warrant and backing reveals subtle differences between
arguments which would be represented as the same in classical or syllogistic logic (or
indeed, in rule-based systems). He is particularly suspicious of the use of universal
quantification in conflating two different sorts of generality those resulting from past
experience or empirical study ('according to a survey, 95% of Falkland Islanders are
British citizens') as opposed to claims about appropriate deduction ('You can safely
assume anyone born in the Falklands is entitled to Critish citizenship'). The former is
a backing, whereas the latter is a warrant. To Toulmin it is vital to make this
distinction because it will depend on the circumstances of a particular argument
whether the former could be accepted as an appropriate backing for the warrant 'All
people born in the Falkland Islands are British Citizens'. In a court of law, for
example, it is unlikely to stand up. In a demographic study it might suffice. Most
importantly in these two cases we would apply different criteria in assessing its
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veracity. (As an aside, it is also worth noting how closely the notions of warrants and
rebuttal conditions correspond to the notions within AI of defaults and exceptions.)
In summary, then, Toulmin was led to doubt whether 'the traditional pattern for
analysing micro-arguments - 'Minor Premiss, Major Premiss, so Conclusion' - was
complex enough to reflect all the distinctions forced upon us in the actual practice of
argument-assessment' and to conclude that many fundamental problems in the logical
tradition (for example the problem of attaining knowledge from non-analytic
arguments) result from 'this vast initial over-simplification'.
Toulmin's position has been presented at length here for various reasons. Firstly, it
has influenced several researchers in AI recently, as will be seen below. Secondly,
Toulmin's work is rarely articulated in any detail and thus is not as well known as it
should be, perhaps due to its radical stance (the same can be said of Wittgenstein).
Thirdly, this thesis contains analysis of higher-order argumentation structures which
capture some of Toulmin's requirements, for details of which see section 5.3.
2.2.1.3 Quine's Rationalism
Toulmin would perhaps be pleased by Quine and Ullian's attempt [Quine & Ullian 78]
to bring logical analysis to the notice of people involved in real world argumentation.
Their book, however, is a rather unsettling mixture of dogmatic rejection of 'anti-
scientific' projects such as theology, coupled with wise advice to be open to
arguments and changes to our belief systems. They provide detailed advice, in the
form of six 'virtues' which we should strive towards in our analysis of hypotheses
about the world. These six virtues have been cited by researchers into the coherence
approach to belief revision (see section2.1.3) as support for various characterisations
of epistemic entrenchment. They are :
1. Conservativity : aiming to make minimal changes to the overall belief set.
2. Modesty : hypotheses should be the minimal required to explain observations.
3. Simplicity : hypotheses which are simply statable should be preferred over complex
ones.
4. Generality : hypotheses which explain many observations should be preferred over
those which explain only particular observations.
5. Refutability : there should be ways of subsequently proving a hypothesis to be
false.
6. Precision : hypotheses which provide predictions which can be quantitatively tested
should be preferred over qualitative generalities.
There are obvious tensions between these virtues, as shown, for example, by
Einstein's theory of relativity which though simple and general, was neither modest
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nor conservative at the time, as it involved revising many basic physical beliefs about
the nature of time and space, the ether and the applicability of Newtonian mechanics.
Quine and Ullian relate situations in which their first two virtues can be over-ridden to
Kuhn's notion of scientific revolution or paradigm shift [Kuhn 62].
In the final chapter of their book, Quine and Ullian provide some strategies for
arguments. For example, 'To convince someone of something we work back to
beliefs he already holds and argue from them as premises'. However, 'often there is
also a negative element to contend with : actual disbelief of some of the needed
premises', ie: disagreement. In this case there are two strategies. We can either
attempt to overwhelm our listener by 'adducing] such abundant considerations in
favor of our thesis that we end up convincing the man in spite of his conflicting
belief.' This strategy relates to the generation of arguments, corroborations and
enlargements in the terminology of this thesis. The second strategy is to undermine
our listener's arguments. 'We must directly challenge his conflicting belief... If he
meets the challenge by mustering an argument in defense of that belief, then we attack
the weakest of the supporting beliefs on which he rests that argument'. This
corresponds directly to Toulmin's notion of undercutting of an argument. An
alternative characterisation of undermining, in terms of the more indirect attack on
elaborations of a position is given in section 5.3.
An interesting acknowledgement of the dynamism of debate is worth including here :
'What may occasionally happen is that our challenge to the conflicting belief is met by
so able a defense that we find ourselves persuaded. In this event we are led to give up
the very belief that we originally sought to propagate.' It is important to note that this
account begs some crucial questions, such as how we assess weakness of supports (in
order to aim our challenges where they are likely to succeed) and what factors
constitute a defense being strong enough to convince us to change our mind. These
are now central questions in belief revision research.
To conclude this section of some philosophical approaches to argument here is Quine
and Ullian's inspired 'gardening metaphor' for debate:
To maintain our beliefs properly even for home consumption we must
attend closely to how they are supported. A healthy garden of beliefs
requires well-nourished roots and tireless pruning. When we want to get a
beliefof ours to flourish in someone else's garden, the question of support
is doubled : we have to consider first what support sufficedfor it at home
and then how much of the same is readyfor it in the new setting.
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2.2.2 Argumentation in AI
Given the centrality of reasoning in artificial intelligence research, it is not surprising
that argumentation has received some attention in AI as a reasoning technique.
The first area of relevant work concerns the maintenance of consistency amongst large
sets of interrelated beliefs or propositions. The solutions to this problem presented in
[Doyle 79] and [de Kleer 86], ie: truth or reason maintenance systems, and also belief
revision systems, bear a strong similarity to the work presented in this thesis. They
involve reasoning, in the face of inconsistency, about the chains of justifications used
to support propositions in a network. They differ from the work here in that their aim
is always to restore consistency, so the existence of disagreements or inconsistencies
is always only fleeting, and always resolved away. To do this, all propositions
(with their justifications) are explicitly tagged as either believed or not, (IN or OUT is
the usual terminology - ie: in, or out of, the current set of believed, or well supported,
propositions). Two inconsistent propositions cannot both simultaneously be IN and
sophisticated truth maintenance algorithms have been devised to resolve such conflict
situations. This effectively restricts the network of propositions to a representation of
a single consistent viewpoint on the world, albeit one which knows about other
possible consistent views which could be, but which are not currently, believed. For
more discussion of such systems see section 2.1.3.
Another important concern of AI research is the problem of uncertainty. Since the
earliest expert systems, such as MYCIN [Buchanan & Shortliffe 84], were
developed, it has been realised that ways are needed to reason with information which
is uncertain, or with statements which are believed only to a certain degree, and that
conclusions which are drawn on the basis of such reasoning should be qualified
appropriately with some degree of belief or uncertainty. Most of the mainstream
approaches to this problem have used the mathematical tools of probability theory,
such as Bayes Theorem, Dempster-Schafer theory and so on, sometimes in modified
or simplified form (eg: the manipulation algorithms for uncertainty handling in
MYCIN). These require the level of belief in statements to be quantified, as some
kind of probability, and algorithms to be devised to manipulate these quantities as
reasoning is carried out, enabling the uncertainty levels of premises and inference
rules to be propagated so that conclusions reflect this uncertainty. Where multiple
conclusions can be drawn the numbers allow comparisons between them to be made as
to which is most reliable. Such quantitative approaches to uncertainty will not
concern us further here. Although they are useful in certain contexts, it has been
widely argued (see next section) that such quantitative approaches to reasoning about
uncertainty are limited, and that richer, symbolic and qualitative representation tools
can be used to provide a more plausible account of how we actually reason in the face
of uncertainty.
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2.2.2.1 Cohen's Model of Endorsements
An important example of an argument against the adequacy of probabilistic approaches
to uncertainty, and presentation of a qualitative uncertainty representation technique, is
provided by Cohen's work on endorsements [Cohen 85). My main interest here in
Cohen's technique is that it involves meta-level reasoning. He argues that it is not
sufficient merely to propagate numerical uncertainty factors whilst reasoning. Instead
he advocates reasoning about the nature of the uncertainty in order to facilitate
reasoning with the underlying uncertain statements. To do this, the uncertainty in a
statement or inference rule is not given a numerical degree, but instead it is described
by further statements (which Cohen calls endorsements) which give reasons for belief
or disbelief, such as qualitative descriptions of the reliability of the information used to
support the belief; they state to what degree and in what contexts the uncertainty is
important; and they provide techniques for reducing or resolving it.
Cohen's endorsements can thus be viewed as a representation which enables
argumentation amongst a set of possibilities. Indeed Cohen freely describes the
reasons for being more or less certain of a statement (ie: its endorsements) as
arguments for and against those beliefs, and he uses examples of arguments to
motivate his model and to provide him with examples of particular endorsements.
For example, he analyses in some detail the anthropological arguments presented by
Walker and Leakey in an article in Scientific American, addressing various hypotheses
about the number of different species represented in fossil remains found in East
Turkana in Kenya. Three types of skulls were found, described as robust, gracile
and erectus. The hypotheses are that these represent either one, two or three distinct
species. They provide evidence relevant to the decision and they combine subsets of
the evidence into arguments for and against the various hypotheses.
Cohen analyses these arguments according to how they contribute to the task of
weighing up the evidence for and against each hypothesis, which he claims is a
process like account-keeping.
'The two steps in analyzing arguments in the model ofendorsement are to
decide which column of the ledger-book an argument belongs in and to do
the 'accounting' ofarguments.'
To facilitate this he represents the arguments as conditionals in predicate logic, reasons
with them using a backward chaining rule interpreter, and attaches them as
endorsements to the statement representing their conclusion.
Arguments are only one aspect of endorsements. They provide good reason for
believing a conclusion. Cohen's endorsements also include statements of the
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reliability of information (eg: 'Premise is highly believable', 'data reliability = poor' )
and of relationships between arguments (eg: 'Corroboration between this argument
and the previous one') which are used by his system (SOLOMON) to rank
conclusions by comparing their endorsements. This is the main way in which
Cohen's system differs from truth maintenance systems (in which the kind of support
for a proposition is irrelevant). In Cohen's work, the nature of the support (or
endorsement) is crucial for this ranking process.
A key difference between Cohen's model of endorsements and FORA is that in FORA
arguments are not used for deciding the level of confidence we can have in their
conclusions. Another is that in FORA the representation of arguments is more
abstract - it does not involve representing them as conditionals in first order predicate
logic, nor restrict reasoning to backward chaining or any particular object-level
inference mechanism. There is a clearer distinction made here between object-level
decisions such as these and the meta-level representation of arguments. As a result of
this, notions such as corroboration between arguments, which Cohen represents as
just another form of endorsement, are defined formally and in general at the meta-level
and can thus be recognised automatically by the system, rather than having to be
tagged by hand onto conclusions in the rather inelegant way used in Cohen's model
('Corroboration between this argument and the previous one' is added as an
endorsement to a new conclusion identical to one drawn already using a different
argument, and Corroboration between this argument and the subsequent one' is
added to the first conclusion). It is thus possible that FORA could provide some
useful extra facilities in endorsement-style uncertainty handling, however this has not
been attempted in the current work.
To summarise, Cohen contends that faced with uncertain conclusions we do not
merely compare our levels of uncertainty in them, but that we jump to the meta-level
and reason about the uncertainty itself, in particular looking for ways in which we
could seek more information to strengthen or weaken our belief in one or other
conclusion. Cohen's work is similar to the work here in that it rejects the notion that
inconsistencies should be immediately resolved (by numerical comparison of
probabilities, for example), and advocates using them as an opportunity for further
reasoning about the point at issue. His work is also interesting because he recognises
that our levels of belief are not absolute and that reasons for believing a statement will
be convincing in one situation but not necessarily in another. An argument for a belief
is thus not instrinsically good or bad, it is more or less persuasive depending on the
context it is used in, who it is used by and so forth.
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2.2.2.2 Argumentation at the Imperial Cancer Research Fund
At the Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF) in London, there is a long standing
interest in using AI techniques to support the assessment of cancer risks, diagnosis of
cancer in patients and clinical treatment decision making. All three of these tasks
involve reasoning in the face of uncertain information. The ICRF's research has
produced a body of work which, like Cohen's, moves away from traditional
probability-based uncertainty handling, and instead attempts to bring rigour to the
process of reasoning with qualitative or semi-quantitative measures of uncertainty [Fox
and Krause 92], One thread which runs through this research is the use of
argumentation as a way of weighing up conflicting or inconclusive evidence about
alternative diagnoses, risk-assessements or treatment regimes (eg: [Fox and Clark
91]). They have successfully demonstrated that it is advantageous to move away
from classical decision theory (such as [Lindley 85]) in which which decisions are
made by weighing up quantitative probability and utility functions, towards a
qualitative, argument-based approach to decision making as advocated by Toulmin
[Fox et al 92). Some of their more recent research concerns the use of multiple
cooperating agents to represent the various points of view which need to be taken into
account when making rigorous medical decisions [Fox et al 94], [Huang et al 94],
(RED 94],
The most significant result of their research from the point of view of this thesis, is
the Logic ofArgumentation, LA [Krause et al 95a], which is based on a subset of
intuitionistic logic involving only 'conjunction' and 'implication', known as 'minimal
logic'. LA is an extension of this logic in which propositions are labelled with formal
representations of arguments for them. An argument for a proposition is a lambda-
calculus structure representing the form of a proof of the proposition, however,
arguments can be constructed in this logic which may not in fact be logically sound
(eg; they may be based on invalid assumptions). Thus these argument
representations look like proofs, but may not actually have the force of logical
proofs. Negation (^P) is interpreted as P—>1, where ± means 'contradiction'. In
most interesting cases it is possible to construct arguments for a proposition and also
for the negation of the proposition from two different consistent sub-theories in the
logic. Arguments are rejected if they are constructed from inconsistent sub-theories,
which ensures that it is not possible to carry out the classical pathological derivation of
anything from a contradiction (ex falso quod libet).
So, to put it simply, all formulae in LA have two parts and are written arg : formula,
where formula is an object-level proposition in minimal logic, and arg is a meta-level
expression which describes how formula is justified, by providing an abstract
representation of its proof in minimal logic.
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LA is, formally, a close relative of FORA. Chapter 6 in particular shows how FORA
argument structures can be viewed as abstractions of proof-steps in an object level
logic.
There are two principal differences. Firstly, in this thesis, the meta-level argument
representations are more abstract than those used in LA and are not tied to any
particular object-level language or proof system. The main claim of this thesis is that
this is a useful feature of the work described here and that the greater level of
abstraction enables a much higher degree of flexibility in manipulating and using
arguments in various ways. In other words, I argue that it is useful to totally decouple
the meta-level representation from its object-level counterpart, in order to achieve
independence from any particular object-level representation language or inference
mechanism.
The second difference between FORA and LA is that the purpose behind the
development of LA is to enable arguments to be used as a qualitative way of reasoning
about uncertainty. The reason for articulating arguments for and against a proposition
is to enable decisions to be made as to whether it can be confidently concluded or
should be rejected. The arguments are used to provide qualitative uncertainty
measures [Elvang-Gpransson etal 93], [Krause et al 94], which enable apparant
conflicts to be resolved. By contrast, the research involved in developing FORA has
not been particularly concerned with issues of uncertainty, rather the principal purpose
behind its development has been to provide an account of reasoning about conflict,
and disagreement, and allowing exploration of multiple points of view. A central
tenet is that no attempt is made to resolve conflicts nor 'weigh up' the arguments for
competing opinions.
Recently the ICRF have promoted arguments to a more significant level, describing
them in [Krause etal 95b] as first class objects which are themselves reasoned
about, at the meta-level. The StAR program produces reports of the level of risk of
chemical substances, by generating arguments for and against them being dangerous
carcinogens. It does this using a rule-based system based on an expert system for
toxicity prediction, called DEREK, which reasons about the presence in the chemical
substance of molecular structures known to indicate risks. These predictions are
qualified by also including information about how the substance will be administered
and other factors about the patient, which may reduce or increase the level of risk.
For example, a substance administered orally could be metabolised into a more
dangerous substance, or alternatively it may move swiftly through the body and be
excreted before causing dangerous side-effects. Thus StAR can combine arguments
for carcinogenity based on chemical analysis, with other arguments or counter¬
arguments based on an understanding of human physiology. In order to produce
useful risk reports, they address ways in which such collections of arguments can be
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evaluated and presented to a user. Their intention is 'that the risk characterisation
should be transparent to the recipient, and he or she acts as final arbiter'. For this to
be feasible the arguments presented to the user need to be both comprehensive and
clear. The linguistic uncertainty descriptors mentioned earlier [Elvang-Gpransson el
at 93] are used to support this.
This line of research indicates a real need for a more abstract approach to reasoning
about arguments and independence from any one particular object-level representation
language.
2.2.2.3 AI implementations of Toulmin's practical reasoning
[Freeman & Farley 92] describes a formal theory of argumentation, closely based on
Toulmin's claim-warrant-backing structures, which they have used to implement an
argumentation model [Freeman & Farley 93]. They draw the usual distinction
between an argument as a structured entity, for explaining the grounds for a claim, and
an argument as a dialectical process between two agents who disagree. Like the
ICRF, they are largely concerned with representing and reasoning about the
uncertainty of claims disputed in the argument process.
They produce a taxonomy of possible qualifiers (in Toulmin's sense) which are
closely related to the qualitative uncertainty factors derived by the ICRF. Their
argument structures are based on Toulmin Argument Units (taus) which is their name
for the argument representations described in section 2.2.1.2. Their contribution is to
provide a recursive algorithm for the exhaustive generation of arguments for and
against a claim. Further algorithms characterise a dialectic argumentation process as a
series of moves, achieved in a game-theoretic turn-taking manner.
Unlike the ICRF, but like much other AI work on argumentation, however, they do
not address the issue of how to achieve the basic representation of argument steps
which is required for these algorithms to be used. Formalisation of the argument
steps is taken as the given from which they proceed. Their argument process is also
strictly two-sided. Hence as an implementation of Toulmin's basic theory this is
useful research and successfully brings Toulmin into the AI arena. However, it does
not yet address the question of how to use argumentation to support the construction
of knowledge based systems in controversial domains. They also do not address any
examples of significant complexity, limiting themselves to standard (toy) examples
such as Toulmin's 'British citizenship' example, Poole's 'Republican-quaker-hawk-
dove' example, the standard default reasoning ('Penguins-birds-flying') example and
Pearl's 'Rain-sprinkler-wet-grass' causal reasoning example.
Another implementation of Toulmin-style argumentation is [Bench-Capon et al 91],
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which produces explanations of the reasoning carried out by logic programs using
Toulmin's argument structures as the template for explanations. In this system the
object-level reasoning is carried out by a logic program interpreter, which requires that
the logic program's predicates are annotated with information describing which part of
a Toulmin-style argument it represents (datum, qualifier etc). This, naturally,
facilitates the explanation of the proof. The description in chapter 6 of how object-
level proofs can be parsed to provide meta-level arguments describing the reasoning
carried out in the proof, is a direct contribution to the problem tackled by Bench-
Capon, and provides a more elegant method for carrying out this abstraction step
without requiring modification of the object-level representation.
2.2.2.4 AI applied to legal argumentation
Given the importance of rigorous argumentation in courts of law, and the necessity of
dealing with two inconsistent points of view (the prosecutor and the defendant) in the
adversarial legal practice common to many countries, it comes as no surprise that the
legal domain is a rich source of interesting argumentation-based AI applications. One
of the most famous is the representation of the British Nationality Act as a logic
program [Kowalski and Sergot 90], the purpose of which is to automatically construct
an argument for or against a candidate's eligibility for citizenship.
[Sartor 93] provides techniques whereby a logic program can assess arguments for
and against a legal decision and, by providing orderings of the premises used by both
sides, resolve the conflict between them. This work is particularly interesting from
the point of view of this thesis as it provides rigorous formal definitions of the
concepts of argument and counter-argument which can be stated using FORA's
language (see section 5.3). The argument-ordering devised by Sartor is similar to the
qualitative uncertainty measures developed in [Elvang-Gpransson et al 93],
Another legal AI application which involves argumentation is [Yang et al 9?]. This
work applies case-based reasoning techniques to the problem of formalising Scottish
building regulations. Planning permission for buildings involves a combination of
building rules (which are deliberately open ended) and precedent, ie: reference to
previous buildings which have been granted planning permission which are deemed
similar to the case in question. These cases allow the rather vague rules to be
interpreted in particular cases, by the construction of IBIS-like argument structures
(see section 2.2.3.2) about the similarity or dissimilarity of the current case to previous
cases, and the relevance of various aspects of the regulations.
[Loui et al 93] is another example of work which seeks to allow legal reasoning to
integrate both arguments based on general policies or rationales, and arguments based
on particular precedents. These are combined in a version of defeasible logic in order
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to provide syntactic methods for determining which of several arguments is the
strongest. An interesting avenue this research has taken is to explore, in cases where
there is no obvious winning argument, ways of nonetheless drawing conclusions.
One such is the use of notional 'resources' which can be applied to arguments, to limit
the time spent on arguing for various options. [Loui 92] describes strategies for this,
such as allocating resources to generating counter-arguments when a strong argument
exists, so that after a finite amount of resource has been used up, it can be concluded
that a position is upheld despite a maximal attempt to undermine it. A similar
approach to providing heuristics for allocating resources to arguing is suggested in
[Sillince 94], This idea is reflected in the 'arguer' program described in chapter 4 of
this thesis, which given a strong argument for one position, suggests ways in which
a user of the program can generate counter-arguments to it. Again, though, this
thesis differs from Loui's work in approach by not aiming for computer-based conflict
resolution, merely exploration, and by not being tied to a particular object-level logic.
2.2.2.5 AI applied to environmental argumentation
The environmental domain is only recently gaining the interest it deserves from AI
researchers and relatively few exumples exist which attempt to use AI techniques to
represent environmental or ecological arguments. One is [Robertson et al 91] in
which ecological models are treated as arguments for particular patterns of relations
occurring in an ecosystem. These arguments are represented as logic programs,
which can be run as simulations. Some more recent research [Robertson and
Goldsborough 94] has taken a more direct approach to environmental argumentation,
representing as logic programs the arguments for and against the selection of 3ites for
wildlife reserves. Again this is restricted to a particular object-level representation.
A much more informal approach to capturing the structure of agricultural extension
documents has been developed in [Beck & Watson 92], but this has little to say about
argument structures, being concerned more with the 'molecular structure' of sentences
than their 'ecological' relationships with other statements.
[Haggith 95a] and [Haggith 95b] discuss the use of FORA for representing various
arguments for and against the granting of oil production leases in the environmentally
sensitive coastal zone off Alaska. More details of this example are given in chapter 4
of this document.
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2.2.3 Less Formal Approaches to Argumentation
2.2.3.1 Linguistic Perspectives on Argumentation
Linguists are interested in argumentation because a pattern of argument is often
reflected in the structure of a piece of text. There is thus a large body of research
which assesses how such structures affect the coherence of text. One particularly
influential example is the Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) of [Mann & Thompson
87a], [Mann et al 89], This theory provides a set of structures which can be used to
analyse (or 'mark-up') text. These structures are binary relations between pieces of
text, or sets of pieces of text, so for example, one piece of text might be linked to
another which provides background information. The first would be called the
'nucleus', the second would be called the 'satellite' and the link between them would
be called 'background'.
Although the idea of marking up textual structures to reveal the form of the underlying
argument is interesting, and RST has inspired considerable research (particularly in
the computational linguistics area, eg: [Knott & Dale 93], [Daradoumis 93]), it has
some significant problems. In particular, it is not suitable as a representation
framework for handling arguments from conflicting points of view, for the following
reasons.
Firstly, in the various papers on RST a large set of binary relations is proposed.
These relations are not given any formal interpretation, and it is assumed that people
will use them in a uniform fashion. There is a laissez-faire attitude toward the
generation of new relations, and as a result there is a proliferation of relations with no
clear statement of their intended meaning. This problem is linked to a lack of
indication of how Mann et al intend to use their theory, other than as a way of
organising linguistic analysis and spotting when texts do not 'hang together'. There
is no indication in particular that their theory could be used for automated analysis,
and as a result their definitions are semantically unclear. This makes it difficult to
compare their structures with alternative ways of representing arguments, for
example, the method described in [Fisher 88], A somewhat more formal approach to
the representation of argument structures in rhetorical texts (newspaper editorials) is
the OpEd system of [Alvarado 89] which is based on structures they call Argument
Units to represent patterns of support and attack relationships between beliefs.
However, the underlying belief relationships suffer from the same proliferation of
link-types as exemplified by RST.
The second problem is that this is a theory about 'rhetoric', which they claim is
comprehensive enough to be used in the complete analysis of over 400 sample texts,
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but the assumption here is that these texts are monologues. The focus of this thesis is
to support analysis of debate and thus the central need is for analysis tools which are
not restricted to a single writer or voice. Some of their requirements for text
coherence are thus inappropriately restrictive. Having said that, their relation
definitions frequently refer to the reader of the text (in addition to the writer), and they
are explicit in their theory of text being part of a theory of communication. The
problem is that their theory restricts this communication to being one-directional, so
there is total asymmetry between reader and writer. This is clearly a big problem,
particularly given the central role of disagreement in argumentation. There is no way
their theory can be expected to handle this notion effectively within the constrained
view of 'rhetoric'. Even their notion of 'antithesis' (normally considered an aspect of
dialectic) is treated in [Mann and Thompson 87b] as a style of monologue in which the
writer attempts to counter a possible objection to their main claim.
More recently there has been some research done into extending RST to handle
dialogues, for example, (Daradoumis 93a&b] and [Fawcett & Davies 92], but though
these tackle the limitation of a 'single voice' in RST, the problem of informality
remains.
2.2.3.2 Issue-based Information Systems
Another well-known approach to the representation of argument structures is the
Issue-based Information System (IBIS) of [Kunz & Rittel 70], This was developed
as a way of structuring political decision making processes, and in particular the
development of policies by disparate groups of people, potentially with strong vested-
interests, which involves a lot of coordinated debate. The aim was to bring closer
together the structure of actual discourse in political organisations, and the way in
which the resulting decisions are documented, and 'to stimulate a more scrutinized
style of reasoning which more explicitly reveals the arguments'. IBIS has been used
by many decision making bodies, from universities, to the World Health
Organisation and US government departments. It involves people stating their
'position' on policy suggestions already suggested by other people, and providing
arguments either to support their position or to attack others. Although designed as a
purely paper-based system, it has led to various implementations of argumentation
systems, including [Conklin & Begeman 88].
[Casson & Stone 92] describe an 'expertext' system (combining IBIS style hypertext
argument links with expert system facilities) which allows legal regulations to be
explored, and redrafted, using high-level relations between sections of text which
indicate, for example, that one regulation subsumes another.
An important limitation of the work on IBIS is its informality - the relations are not
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logically constrained, nor intended to have a particular formal interpretation, which
provides the systems with great flexibility, but limits the amount of reasoning which
can be automated using these relations.
2.3 Summary
This chapter has provided a brief survey of literature which addresses the question of
disagreement. This survey was divided into two main areas. Firstly, the issue of
disagreement itself was addressed in section 2.1 with a survey of the literature about
conflict, inconsistency and multiple viewpoints. This section characterised the
'problem' addressed by the research described in the remainder of this dissertation.
Secondly, the area of argumentation was surveyed and section 2.2 described
approaches to argument and debate in philosophy, linguistics and AI. This section





This chapter gives an overview of the components of FORA, (Framework for
Opposition and Reasoning about Arguments). It explains how these components link
together, and whore to find more detailed descriptions of them in other chapters.
Section 3.1 reviews the context and goals of the research which led to FORA's
development. Section 3.2 summarises the FORA system. The basis of FORA is a
language for representing the structure of arguments (described in chapter 4). FORA
is composed of modules for reasoning with arguments represented in the language.
Some of these modules illustrate ways of using the language and provide an informal
operational semantics for it. Other modules provide ways of mapping between formal
representations in FORA and an object-level logic. All the modules are illustrated
using a running example which is introduced in section 3.3.
3.1 Motivation
Chapter 2 presented a survey of research in the areas of disagreement and
argumentation. It revealed three important things.
Firstly, in AI, the most usual approach to disagreement is to try to resolve it, either
before constructing an AI system, or when a conflict is encountered by a reasoning
system. The community of AI researchers most tolerant of disagreement includes
people who build tools for qualitative reasoning with uncertainty - to them conflict
need not necessarily be resolved as it can provide useful information about how
confident we should be in certain conclusions. Argumentation is a useful way of
generating this information. However, there is very little research attempting to build
knowledge bases which represent many differing points of view without attempting to
reach an overall consensus, though there is a clear need to do this.
Secondly, most logic based approaches to inconsistency and disagreement attempt to
handle it within the logic (eg: paraconsistent logics, the Logic of Inconsistency,
Restricted Access logics). The alternative is to handle inconsistency by providing a
more abstract layer of representation, at the meta-level, in which to reason about the
existence of disagreements and arguments for differing points of view. I argued that
this is a more coherent approach to argumentation. It is a meta level activity, and
methods are needed for representing arguments independently of any particular object-
level logic.
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Thirdly, amongst the various approaches to representation of arguments, two broad
themes can be seen:
(i) Informal argumentation: In most cases, arguments are represented informally,
usually as some kind of network structure in which the nodes and links are given
informal meanings (eg: IBIS, RST, Expertext, Toulmin Argument Units).
(ii) Formal argumentation: In the remaining cases, arguments are represented in terms
of a particular formal logic (eg: the defeasible logic used by Loui; the ICRF's labelled
logic of argumentation, LA; the logic programming language used by Bench-Capon,
etc).
Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. The main strength of the informal
approaches is that they are flexible (for example people can express relationships
between statements in a relatively unconstrained way), and there is evidence that
people find it relatively straight-forward to sketch out connections between argument
parts in order to use them. The main problem with informal argumentation is that its
lack of clear definitions makes it hard to provide much in the way of computer-based
analysis or support, as the formal meaning of the links and nodes are unclear. At best,
rules can be written to help a user to navigate the network of sentences, but it is not
possible to reason automatically across the links to draw conclusions, because the
network creators are not restricted to any particular semantics of the links.
The main strength of the formal approach is that algorithms can be easily written to
manipulate formal arguments. The main problem with most logic-based argumentation
systems is that they provide a representation of arguments which is tied to a particular
logic. The very close relationship between object-level logical representations and
argument definitions makes it difficult to compare arguments represented using
different object-level languages or to separate out the overall structure of arguments
and reason with them independently of the low level details of the argument parts.
My thesis, that there is a need for an argumentation system handling multiple points of
view, has therefore been refined so I can now say what characteristics this system
should have.
I The system should not focus on conflict resolution, but must provide facilities for
exploration of the content and structure of a debate.
2. It should enable the many useful argumentation structures from the literature (such
as counter-arguments, corroborations, rebuttals and undercutting) to be expressed.
3. It should be based on a formal language which does not encourage proliferation of
primitive relations without clear meaning.
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4. Most importantly, the arguments should be represented at the meta-level in a way
which is independent of any particular object-level language, but which can be
formally interpreted in terms of object-level logics.
The main evidence I present to show that such a system is possible is the description
of the implemented FORA system, which has all of the above characteristics, at least
to some extent. FORA is summarised in the next section. The argument that such a
system is useful is that it can handle an important health policy debate as demonstrated
by the running example introduced in section 3.3 and used to illustrate all the modules
of FORA in the remaining chapters.
3.2 FORA system overview
The remainder of this chapter describes an argumentation framework, FORA,
(Framework for Opposition and Reasoning about Arguments) which is intended to
combine some of the advantages of the two positions of flexible informality and rigid
formalism. It is based on a simple argument representation language, which is
independent of any particular object-level knowledge representation language, and
therefore more abstract than most other formal argumentation approaches. The
argument representation is based on a small set of relations which are formally defined
to enable automated reasoning over them to be possible.
Figure 3.1 gives a diagrammatic overview of how the tools in FORA interrelate.
They form four distinct groups which each tackle a different use of arguments. Each
group of tools is described in a separate chapter. These are summarised in the next
four subsections.
3.2.1 The FORA knowledge representation language
In chapter 4, FORA's argument representation language is introduced. The basic
syntax and primitives are stated and then used to define a variety of argumentation
structures.
The second half of chapter 4 discusses knowledge acquisition from the point of view
of FORA. Acquiring many inconsistent points of view, and arguments for them,
requires a slightly different approach from standard knowledge acquisition for expert
systems. A series of experiments in acquiring inconsistent viewpoints allowed some
valuable lessons to be learned and these are discussed in section 4.3. The final
section of chapter 4 describes a hypertext mark-up tool for helping to build knowledge
bases in FORA starting from text describing various viewpoints. This tool produces














Figure 3.1 : The FORA system.
Rectangles represent static structures such as knowledge bases, libraries of
definitions or proofs. Circles represent tools for manipulating or transforming
these structures. Arrows indicate flow of information from one or more tools or
set of structures to another.
(*) The devil's advocate tool was implemented by an MSc student supervised by
the author. All other tools were implemented by the author.
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3.2.2 Using knowledge bases in FORA
Having defined urgumcnts in chapter 1, and shown how to construct knowledge
bases containing them, chapter 5 describes three tools which allow a user to explore
them.
1. The first of these is a tool for exploring conflicts in the knowledge base by
following the threads of the urgumcnts used to support and oppose conflicting points
of view.
2. The second tool is an 'arguer' program which suggests ways in which the user
may like to add additional arguments to the knowledge base - it does this by pointing
out weak statements which arc not argued for, statements which require
corroboration, statements which are undisputed and so forth. This is useful for both
evaluating the arguments in a knowledge base and as a tool for knowledge base
extension.
3. The third tool is a simple tutor called the 'devil's advocate' which encourages a
student user to follow an argument for a particular point of view, whilst the system
produces counter arguments to point out weak points in the student's argument and to
challenge her to keep strengthening it. This tool manipulates arguments represented in
the FORA representation language. It was designed to illustrate how FORA could
form the basis of debating strategies, and, under my supervision, implementation
was carried out by an MSc student [Retalis 95], It was evaluated by first year
Artificial Intelligence students using knowledge bases expressing philosophical
arguments in the debate about the 'mind body problem' with promising results [Retalis
el al 96].
3.2.3 Automating Mark-up
It is awkward if all FORA's knowledge bases have to be constructed from scratch, by
marking up text. There are many knowledge bases in existence which can be
interpreted as expressing arguments for points of view, and it would be useful if these
arguments could be integrated into FORA. There is a significant overhead in marking
up such knowledge bases by hand. To support the thesis that meta-level argument
representation is useful it is important to provide evidence that the mark-up process can
be automated.
Chapter 6 discusses this issue and describes two techniques for automating mark-up of
formally represented knowledge bases. These techniques are illustrated by providing
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tools which mark-up (or abstract from) object-level knowledge bases represented in
first order predicate logic (FOPL).
The first technique involves modifying the inference engine so that it records argument
structures as it constructs proofs. The second technique is more elegant and involves
parsing completed proofs to infer various levels of argument from them.
3.2.4 Supporting Mark-down
The final issue and group of tools concerns the inverse issue to mark-up, ie: generating
an object-level knowledge base from arguments represented in FORA. To provide
further support to my thesis that meta level argument representation is useful, chapter
7 shows how it can support knowledge engineers in building knowledge based
systems. This is done by using argumontc as 'sketches' of proofs or inference chuins
which we would like an inference engine or theorem prover to be able to carry out.
Arguments in this sense are requirements for knowledge bases - they are a way of
describing the reasoning we need a knowledge based system to carry out, as a first
step in building the system.
Argument structures are more abstract than knowledge bases represented at the object-
level. Translating from an object-level representation to the meta-level description of
it is called 'mark-up', so the reverse process, giving a particular object-level
representation which fits a meta-level description, is called 'mark-down'. This is a
rather ugly epithet, but it neatly captures how knowledge base specification (mark-
down) is to be viewed as the inverse of abstraction (mark-up). Figure 3.2 illustrates
this idea.
It is important to notice that mark down cannot normally be automated like mark-up,
because it generally requires a user (in this case a knowledge engineer) to add
information to the arguments. To understand this it is useful to compare mark-down
with mark-up.
Mark-up takes a proof and uses abstraction to strip out the structure of the proof (the
argument), ignoring the detail of how the content of the proof is formally represented
at the object-level (which is what gives it the 'force' of a proof). So mark-up removes
information from a proof. Mark-down, as the inverse operation, starts with an
argument representing the structure of a proof, and adds information about how the
steps in the proof will actually be represented at the object-level, in order to give the
argument the force of a proof. This information needs to be supplied by a knowledge
engineer who knows which object-level language they wish the proof, or inference
chain, to be carried out in, and who can provide object-level representations of the
propositions used in the argument. The structural information contained in the FORA
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argument representation can be used to guide the knowledge engineer and to constrain
choices they need to make. Chapter 7 of this document explains how this is done.
Figure 3.2 : Mark-up and mark-down as inverse translations
between object-level and meta-level representations.
A schema-based approach to supporting mark-down is described in chapter 7, along
with some useful tools for maintaining knowledge bases implemented in this way.
The first of these is an inference checker which verifies that inferences expressed in
arguments in FORA can indeed be carried out by the new object-level knowledge base,
and if not, points out where they fail. The second is a knowledge base critic which
uses counter-arguments to the argument from which the knowledge base is derived to
suggest possible weaknesses in it. These tools demonstrate how sketching out
arguments in FORA can guide knowledge base construction and maintenance. Like
the demonstration of automated mark-up in chapter 6, the object-level language
chosen for the examples in chapter 7 is FOPL.
3.2.5 Summary of FORA
In section 3.2 I have introduced the FORA system and given an overview of the next
four chapters which provide detailed discussion of the following aspects of the system:
1. FORA's representation language (chapter 4);
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2. Construction of knowledge bases in FORA, knowledge acquisition and a hypertext
tool for constructing FORA arguments from text (chapter 4);
3. Tools for exploring, using and reasoning about arguments in FORA (chapter 5);
4. Automating mark up of existing formal knowledge bases or logical proofs us
arguments in FORA (chapter 6);
5. Supporting mark-down of arguments to help knowledge engineers interpret
arguments as requirements for object level reasoning which can support the
construction and maintenance of object-level knowledge bases (chapter 7);
6. The operational semantics of FORA (chapters 4 and 5) and definitions of FORA
structures in relation to first order predicate logic proofs (chapters 6 and 7).
3.3 Introduction to the running example
To illustrate the technical discussions in the remainder of this document an cxumple
will be used of an important real world debate about the health risks posed by a group
of chemicals called aflatoxins. Some other examples will occasionally appear as they
were used to test some of the tools and techniques, but for clarity each chapter includes
an illustration of the ideas presented there in terms of this running example which will
be referred to from now on as 'the aflatoxin debate' [Rodricks 92],
3.3.1 The aflatoxin debate
Sometimes stored peanuts (ground nuts) go mouldy. If the mould is Aspergillus
flavus, sometimes it produces chemical substances called aflatoxins [UK Government
92], There is concern that aflatoxins might cause cancer in humans [Eaton &
Groupman 94). They have been shown in laboratory experiments to cause liver
disease including liver cancer in rats, mice, ferrets, guinea-pigs, monkeys, sheep,
ducks, hens and rainbow trout [Rodricks 92], Aflatoxins are also produced by
moulds on cotton, corn and other nuts. The aflatoxins are not retained in the oils of
these foods, but they are found in the raw food, and in meal made from them [MAFF
82], If livestock and poultry are fed this meal then the aflatoxins can show up in their
milk, eggs and meat [Mohi Eldin 88], Animals have died due to liver disease after
eating contaminated meal, (notably, a large number of turkeys whose death in the
1960s led to the discovery of aflatoxins), but to date there are no human deaths which
can be directly attributed to aflatoxins though there are suspiciously high levels of liver
cancers in some parts of the world where it is very likely that there could have been
aflatoxin contamination of food as a cause [McDonald 76], [ICRISAT 87].
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Aflatoxins have been the focus of controversy in the USA [Rodricks 92], particularly
within the Food and Drink Administration (FDA), who produced a policy that
anatoxin levels should be restricted to their minimal detectable level. In the 1960s this
level was 30 parts per billion (ppb). Due to improvements in analysis methods,
several years later this was set at 20ppb (parts per billion). Not everyone agrees with
the FDA's policy, which is based on the 'no threshold' hypothesis that certain
carcinogenic chemicals may have no level below which they are inactive. As is typical
of issues which are socially important, and scientifically uncertain, the anatoxin issue
has generated debate, and connict. The examples in chapter 4 and 5 of this document
will illustrate how these arguments and conOicts can be represented and reasoned
about using FORA.
Subsequent further improvements in laboratory techniques mean that we can now
detect anatoxins (by their fluorescence) at levels as low as 1 part per billion (lppb)
[Rodricks 92], When the detection level dropped from 30ppb to 20ppb, the FDA
revised their 'acceptable level' accordingly. However, although the detectable level
has dropped radically, the FDA's policy level has not. Rodricks explains this as
follows :
".. a large fraction of the peanut butter produced by even the most
technically advanced manufacturers wouldfail to meet a Ippb limit, and it
was also apparent that other foods - corn meal and certain other corn
products, and certain varieties ofnuts (especially brazils and pistachios) -
would also fail the Ippb test pretty frequently. The economic impact of a
20ppb limit was not great. The impact of a lppb limit could be very large
for these industries " [Rodricks 92].
To apply the principle of 'minimum detectable level' (the 'analytical detection limit' as
Rodricks calls it) would mean the destruction of huge amounts of contaminated food.
In order to justify action like this, policy makers need a high level of scientific
certainty of the human cancer risks of such food. At the present time, the industrial
inconvenience and economic impact win out over the risk to human health and the
aflatoxin limit rests at 20ppb, at least 20 times the minimum detectable level.
Changes in available evidence like this can result in knowledge bases representing the
current 'received wisdom' needing to be modified. This example of improvements in
detection sensitivity will be used in chapter 7 to illustrate a knowledge base critic
which suggests modifications to a knowledge base in the light of this new counter¬
argument to the acceptability of a 20ppb limit.
In the prologue of his book, Rodricks asks whether the FDA's position is
scientifically defensible. He presents two arguments, each representing a different
point of view in the debate.
"(I) Yes. The FDA clearly did the right thing, and perhaps did not go far
enough. Aflatoxins are surely potent cancer-causing agents in animals. We
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don 't have significant human data, hut this is very hard to get and wc
shouldn 't wait for it before we institute controls. We know from much
study that animal testing gives a reliable indication ofhuman risk. H'e also
know that cancer-causing chemicals arc a special breed of toxicants they
can threaten health at any level of intake. H'e should therefore eliminate
human exposure to such agents whenever we can, and, at the least reduce
exposure to the lowest possible level whenever we 're not sure how to
eliminate it.
(2) No. The FDA went too far. Aflatoxins can indeed cause liver toxicity
in animals and are also carcinogenic. But they produce these adverse
effects only at levels far above the limit FDA set. We should ensure some
safety margin to protect humans, but 20ppb is unnecessarily low and the
policy that there is no safe level is not supported by scientific studies.
Indeed, it's not even certain that aflatoxins represent a cancer risk to
humans because animal testing is not known to be a reliable predictor of
human risk. Moreover, the carcinogenic potency of aflatoxins varies
greatly among the several animal species in which they have been tested.
Human evidence that aflatoxins cause cancer is unsubstantiated. There's
no sound scientific basis for FDA's position. " [Rodricks 92]
3.3.2 Why choose this example?
The afIatoxin debate was chosen as the running example for the following reasons.
1. Much of the development work on FORA was carried out using examples from the
environmental domain, including controversies surrounding the greenhouse effect,
disagreements in agroforestry, arguments about sheep management in Scotland, and
disputes over the environmental impacts of oil production in Alaska. The aflatoxin
example is from the medical and public policy domain and therefore enabled an
evaluation of the domain independence of FORA.
2. The aflatoxin example is used by the Imperial Cancer Research Fund whose logic of
argumentation has been identified as a close relative of FORA. Use of the same
example clarifies comparisons with their work. The aflatoxin debate is presented as a
'canonical example' for investigations of argument-based risk assessment in an
unpublished technical report |Fox 94] specifically to facilitate comparisons between
their work and other approaches to argumentation.
3. The aflatoxin example concerns a real public policy debate and has important
medical and social implications as it is about carcinogenicity.
3.3.3 The Imperial Cancer Research Fund's approach to formalising the
aflatoxin debate
As already mentioned, the aflatoxin debate has been analysed by researchers at the
Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF), and comparisons with their work is one of
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the ways in which the contribution of this thesis will be evaluated. So, their approach
to formalising the debate is described and some preliminary critical remarks are made
here as background to the comparisons which appear later.
In [Fox 94], John Fox discusses how to generate a knowledge base representing two
of the conflicting views about the cancer risk of aflatoxins. The approach which Fox
takes to constructing a knowledge base about aflatoxins has two stages. First, the
arguments both for and against the FDA's policy are articulated at a high level of
abstraction, using English language sentences and diagrams representing the
relationships between these sentences. Secondly, this high level representation is
used to drive the formalisation of the content of the arguments into a formal language
(the Logic of Argumentation, LA) which can be reasoned with using the
Argumentation Theorem Prover (ATP) [Krause et al 95a).
Fox's approach to formalising the aflatoxin debate in [Fox 94] is as follows. First,
the arguments are subdivided into the following 11 propositions :
1. Aflatoxins are potent cancer causing agents in animals.
2. Not known whether aflatoxins are potent cancer causing agents in humans.
3. Animal testing is a reliable indicator ofhuman risk.
4. Assume that carcinogens can act at any level ofexposure.
5. Must minimise exposure to the lowest possible level.
6. Minimum detectable level is 20ppb.
7. Aflatoxins have proven adverse effects only at levels » 20ppb.
8. No scientific evidence that there is no safe level of exposure.
9. Animal testing not known to predict human cancer risk.
10. Carcinogenic potency ofaflatoxins varies greatly across species.
11. Human evidence that aflatoxins cause cancer is unsubstantiated.
The first six statements are used in the 'case for' the FDA policy, the other five in the
'case against'. The overall argument structure of the debate is represented in Figure
3.3.
Fox then goes on to produce a formalisation in LA which captures some of the
relationships shown in the diagram. This is done by stating first general rules, then
instantiations of these rules, and also of facts, which together enable inference to be
carried out automatically at the object-level. The representation shown in Fig 3.3 is a
guide in this process, but it is not used in any formal sense to provide constraints on
the selection and instantiation of appropriate rules.
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Dark lines represent support and hatched lines represent disagreement.
E is an extrapolation claim. The numbers refer to the propositions.
Figure 3.3 : The aflatoxin debate as structured by Fox.
The ICRF's approach to the anatoxin debate is interesting for several reasons :
1. It takes into account both sides of the argument, not attempting to resolve the
conflict.
2. It starts with a rough 'sketch' of the argument, describing the structure of
relationships between the statements in it, before worrying about how the detail of the
formal representation will work out. In other words, the meta-level problem is
tackled first.
3. This rough sketch is declared to be useful in deciding how to formalise the
argument, ie: the meta-level representation supports the object-level decisions.
However, there are also problems with the ICRF's approach. These include :
I. The two sides of the argument are not given equal weight - the argument for the
55
FDA policy is 'central' (see figure 3.3) and the structure of the con argument is given
only relative to the pro argument. It would be more elegant, and would give an
unbiased view of the debate, if both sides of the debate were represented in the same
way.
2. The object-level formalisalion which Fox produces includes some argumentation
knowledge, for example, the existence or lack of corroboration is represented as an
object-level predicate whereas this is actually an argumentation concept which can be
more cleanly and generally reasoned about at the meta-level (see section 5.3.1).
3. The argument structure is purely diagrammatic, and only indicates rather than
defines the structure. LA produces formal definitions of the arguments only after the
object-level formalisation has occurred, effectively by abstraction from (in my
terminology, 'mark-up' of) the inference chains. The formal representation of the
arguments is thus dependent on the use of a particular object level logic.
4. It is not clear how the structure of the argument is used to guide the formalisation,
and in particular there is no suggestion that a computer-based tool could help to guide
the formalisation.
Deciding how knowledge will be formalised is crucially important when building a
knowledge base as it is this which controls what inferences will be possible. Fox
makes crucial choices in deciding on particular predicate names, the number of
arguments these predicates take, the selection of premises and conclusions in the
implications, and so forth, as he formalises the statements in the minimal logic
underlying LA. It is these choices which then determine exactly which arguments will
be abstracted by LA and represented at the meta-level as labels of propositions. The
piece of the jig-saw which is missing from Fox's account, is how the diagrammatic
structure of his argument representation relates to the final formal argument structure
generated by LA.
The remainder of this document advocates taking a formal approach to the meta-level
argument structures from the start, and argues that these structures are then useful
tools in guiding knowledge base construction and formalisation. The formal
articulation of both sides of the debate at a high level of abstraction enables a
knowledge engineer to see the logical weaknesses in an argument before committing
herself to a particular logical representation. These formal structures can be used to
guide and verify object level formalisation and tools which use these formal
representations can show how knowledge bases may be vulnerable to attack, or
extendible, by taking into account related argument structures.
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3.4 Summary
This chapter has given an overview of the FORA system. The FORA system is
discussed in four parts, in the next four chapters :
(i) its representation language and tools for knowledge acquisition,
(ii) tools for manipulating arguments,
(iii) tools for marking-up or abstracting from object-level knowledge bases, and
(iv) tools for marking-down or constructing knowledge bases.
The final section of this chapter introduced 'the aflatoxin debate', a controversy about
the safe level of a set of carcinogens called aflatoxins which occur commonly in food.
This debate is used as a running example to illustrate the FORA argumentation system
throughout the remainder of this document.
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Chapter 4
Knowledge Representation in FORA
This chapter describes FORA's language for articulating disagreements and
arguments, and discusses how to construct knowledge bases in it - addressing both
knowledge acquisition and representation. A hypertext tool to support construction of
knowledge bases in FORA is described, and illustrated with the running example of
the aflatoxin debate.
First, in section 4.1, the language is defined by stating the syntactic definitions of
constructs allowable within it, and an example of their use is given in section 4.2.
Section 4.3 discusses knowledge acquisition from multiple, conflicting sources, and
section 4.4 describes a hypertext tool for marking-up text (such as transcripts of
interviews) into the FORA language. Section 4.5 returns to the debate about
aflatoxins and shows how the hypertext tool can be used to mark up texts from
[Rodricks 94] into a representation in FORA. Section 4.6 is a summary.
4.1 The FORA language
In this section, the language for representing arguments in FORA is presented, by
defining objects, terms, formulae and rules.
4.1.1 Mela-level objects
The language consists of three syntactic categories of meta-level objects :
1. Proposition Names (Ai ...Aj, Bi....Bj, or quoted text strings, denote proposition
names, which are atomic objects)
2. Arguments (<= is the argument constructor - see section 4.1.2)
3. Sets ( u (union), e (member) are the set constructors)
The language also uses the relation names given in section 4.1.3, together with the
usual logical connectives.
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4.1.2 Term constructor definitions
The terms of the meta-language are constructed by three methods.
1. All proposition names are terms
2. Sets of proposition names are terms which are constructed by the usual set
construction :
// is a set (the null, or empty set)
If T is a term, then (T( is a set.
IfSi is the set /T1...T1 /and S2 is the set (Tj...T„)
then Si u S2 is the set (Ti...Ti, Tj...Tn)
3. Arguments are terms which are are constructed recursively. There are two parts of
the definition, the base case and the recursive case:
Base case : IfP is a proposition name and S is a set ofproposition names
then P <= S is an argument.
P is called the conclusion of the argument, and the elements of S are the premises.
The <= operator indicates that the conclusion can be drawn from the premises.
Recursive case : IfP.Q are proposition names, S, R are sets such that
P <= S, Q <= R are arguments, and S = SI u(Q(,
then P <= (SI u(Q <= Rj) is an argument.
The recursive case extends an argument for P, by taking one of the premises in the
argument, Q, and replacing it by the argument for Q. The argument for P thus has
an argument for Q nested inside it. Other premises in the argument for P, and/or
premises in the argument for Q could be replaced by arguments in the same way,
forming a tree structure directly analogous to a proof tree.
Example : Given two arguments as follows :
A! <= (Bl, B2), and B2 <= (CI, C2, C3(
we can form the argument which has the second nested inside the first:
AI <= (Bl, B2 <= (CI, C2, C3/(
4.1.3 Formula constructor definitions
The well formed formulae (wffs) of the language are defined as follows:
I. Relations between objects are wffs. There are four primitive binary relations,
interpreted as follows (also see section 4.1.6 for some relationships between them):
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a. equivalent(P, Q) : P and Q are names of propositions which mean the same, in
terms of some function for transforming propositions in one object-level language into
propositions in another language, or in terms of an object-level equivalence relation,
or according to the opinion of some person marking up text.
b. disagree(P.Q) : P and Q are the names of propositions which disagree or express a
conflict, according to some object-level notion such as negation, or temporal
inconsistency, or according to the opinion of some person marking up text.
c. elaborution(P, S) : P is a proposition name and S is a set of names of propositions
which elaborate upon or or give more details about P, according to multiple
instantiations at the object-level, or according to the opinion of some person marking
up text.
d. justificationP, S): P is a proposition name and 5 is a set of names of propositions
which are a justification of P according to some object-level justification procedure
such as modus ponens, abduction, or some other justification such as source or
evidence, in the opinion of some person marking up text.
2. Wffs can also be constructed in the usual way using the logical connectives.
These four basic relations were selected for two reasons. Firstly, they were adequate
for capturing the kinds of argument structures acquired during preliminary knowledge
acquisition exercises, for more details of which see section 4.3. Secondly, they were
a 'core' of the many relations used to represent texts in Rhetorical Structure Theory
(see section 2.2.3.1) and used elsewhere in the argumentation literature. Given the
problem of proliferation of such relations in RST, I drew up a list of about 30
commonly used relations and eliminated all those which are very closely related (eg:
questioning, doubting, and opposition were all deemed to be very similar in intention
to 'disagreement'). I then eliminated all those which could be interpreted as a
complex of simpler relations (so, for example, counter-argument was eliminated as
being definable in terms of argument and disagreement). The definitions of these
more complex argumentation structures in terms of this basic set of relations (plus the
argument definition just given) are presented in section 5.3.
It should be noted that the distinction between elaboration and justification is not
absolutely clear cut. It is intended to enable a distinction to be made between a step in
an argument which has the force of a deductive step (justification) and a weaker step
such as giving an example, or explaining a term (elaboration). Particular formal
interpretations of these relations can of course be given in terms of an object-level
representation language which make the meaning of the two relations unambiguous
with respect to that language (see chapters 6 and 7).
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4.1.4 Term destructor definitions
It is necessary to be able to know the contents of FORA terms once constructed, so we
also need destructor definitions. There are two basic destructor relations for looking
inside argument and set terms.
1. Set membership, e , which is a two-place, infix relation.
Definition : P e S iff
3S1. S = SI u(P)
2. Argument, which is a three-place relation.
Definition : argument(A, P, S) iff
A is the argument P < = S.
P is called the conclusion and S is called the top level set.
Note that if the argument is nested then the top level set is a set of proposition names
and arguments.
3. Premise_set, which is a three-place relation.
Definition : premise_set(A, P, S) iff
A is the argument P < = Set, and
S is the set ofproposition names occurring within Set.
S is called the premise set.
Note that the premise set is the result of 'flattening' the argument.
Three other useful predicates can be defined using the three destructors.
1. Support is a binary relation which holds between two propositions, the second of
which occurs in an argument for the first.
Definition : support(P.Q) holds for the proposition names P and Q iff
3A. premise_set(A, P, S) & Qe S.
2. Support is a three-place relation extending support/2 with an extra place holder for
the argument in which the support relation holds.
Definition : support!P, Q, A) holds for an argument A,
and proposition names P & Q iff
premise_set(A, P,S) & Q e S.
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3. Support _set is a binary relation which holds between a proposition name and the
complete set of proposition names which support it. Using the analogy between an
argument and a proof tree, a support for P is a node of the proof tree for P and the
support_set is the complete set of nodes on all proof trees for P.
Definition : For a proposition name P and a set ofnames S,
support_set(P, S) iff
VQ support(P, Q) —* Q e S.
4.1.5 Types of argument
Now some further definitions of types of arguments can be given. This is necessary
as the argument definition given earlier gives the form of an argument, but does not
restrict which proposition numcs can be used as premises for which conclusions. The
meta level relations can be used to capture that the <= operator indicates the conclusion
following from the premises.
The strongest way of doing this is to restrict the argument operator to those sets of
premises and conclusions which are linked by the justification relation. These
arguments are thus called strong arguments. Note that this still docs not mean that they
are as logically forceful as proofs, because the justification relation need not
necessarily be used only to represent logically valid deduction.
Definition : IfP is a proposition name, and S is a set ofproposition names,
and justification(P.S)
then P <= S is a strong argument
If P, Q are proposition names and R,S are sets such that
P <= S, Q <= R are strong arguments, and S = 5/ u[Q),
then P <= (SI u/Q <= R)) is a strong argument.
Strong arguments can be indicated by:
P <=s S
Arguments using justifications, elaborations and equivalences are weaker and are
called hybrid arguments.
Definition : IfP is a proposition name, S is a set ofproposition names and
justification(P.S), or elaboration(P, S) or S =IE) and equivalent(P.E),
then P <= S is a hybrid argument.
If P, Q are proposition names and R,S are sets such that
P <= S, Q <= R are hybrid arguments, and S = Slu/Q),
then P <= (SI ufQ <= Rj) is a hybrid argument.
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Hybrid arguments can be indicated by:
P <=H S
Finally, arguments are complete if there are no premises which can be replaced by
arguments - this only happens when all the leaves on the tree are arguments of the
form P <= {}. This indicates that there is no argument for P, in other words, that P is
an assumption.
Definition : An argument is complete iff
either its set ofpremises is empty,
or all members of the set ofpremises are complete arguments.
4.1.6 Meta-level rules
It is now necessary to state some rules which constrain the interpretation and use of the
four primitive relations introduced in section 4.1.3. The FORA system includes the
following set of general rules.
1. Disagreement is symmetrical.
disagree(P, Q) —> disagree!Q, P)
2. Equivalence is symmetrical.
equivalent!P, Q) —> equivalent!Q. P)
3. Disagreement and equivalence are mutually exclusive.
disagree!P, Q) —>' --(equivalent!P.Q))
equivalentlP.Q) —• -fdisagreefP, Q))
4. Disagreement is 'contagious' within equivalence sets.
(disagree!P.Q) & equivalenl(Q, R)) -> disagree!P.R)
5. Elaborations apply to all members of equivalence sets.
(equivalent(P.Q) & elaboration(P, S)) —> elaboration(Q, S)
6. Elaborations must not disagree with the statement they elaborate upon.
elaboration!P, S) —» ( VQ.Qe S —» -^(disagree!P. Q)))
7. Justifications must not disagree with the statement they justify.
justification!P, S) —> ( VQ.Qe S —* -^(disagree!P, Q)))
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Figure 4.1 : The Alaskan Oil Production Lease controversy
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4.2 Example
For the purposes of illustration, here is an example taken from [Dryzek 83] concerning
the views of various parties in Alaska about the granting of state leases to drill for oil
off the Alaskan coastline. Three parties are represented :
P: government bodies and industries interested in encouraging self-sufficiency in US
oil production (Dryzek dubs these interests the 'Petroleum Club');
I: the indigenous Inuit population which is internally divided about oil production,
particularly on the issue of employment; and
G: the 'Green Alliance' of environmental pressure groups and government bodies
concerned with conservation of natural resources and concerned by the harm caused
by oil production.
The Petroleum Club argues in favour of the granting of new oil production leases, on
the basis that satisfactory environmental impact assessments have been carried out and
new leases will increase the rate of oil production. This, they argue, is a good thing
as increased oil production generates state revenue by increasing employment,
increasing the government's share of oil company profits and providing taxable
revenue. The Green Alliance disagree that new leases should be granted, because
they don't agree that the environmental impact statement is satisfactory. They argue
that increased oil production will reduce fish and marine mammal populations by
causing pollution, which kills them, and disturbance, which causes them to migrate
to other regions of ocean. The Inuit are in agreement with some of the Green Alliance
views, and on the whole agree that new leases should not be granted. Their
argument is that they will impact negatively on their indigenous culture by shifting
work patterns away from the traditional fishing and hunting into working for the oil
and service industries. The shift away from fishing and hunting is justified by use of
the Green Alliance's argument that fish and marine mammal populations will be
damaged by more oil production. Their prediction of increased employment in the oil
industry corroborates the Petroleum Club's claim that this will be an outcome of new
leases, but interestingly the Inuit draw a different conclusion from this piece of
evidence.
This short summary of the conflict is inevitably a gross simplification of the situation
which has involved years of legal disputes and political activity, involving many
people who do not necessarily all fall neatly into the three camps as characterised by
Dryzek. For example, he is at particular pains to point out that there are a significant
number of Inuit people who believe that new jobs in the oil industry would be a
positive thing and that more oil leases should be granted. However, for the purposes
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of demonstrating how a real debate can be articulated in FORA, this example will
suffice.
Figure 4.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the three way conflict. The
propositions representing the opinions are given below, together with FORA relations
and arguments representing the views of each group, followed by some relations and
arguments showing how multiple viewpoints can be combined.
THE PETROLEUM CLUB
PI : A lease for oil production should be granted.
P2 : An adequate environmental impact statement has been produced.
P3 : Maximum rate of production of oil should be attained.
P4 : The lease for oil production will increase rate of production.
P5 : Oil production provides state revenue.
P6 : Oil production increases employment.
P7 : Oil companies share profits with the state.
P8 : Profits from oil production and employment are taxable.
The following three relations capture the main steps in the argument:
'The Petroleum Club argues in favour of the granting ofnew oil production leases, on
the basis that satisfactory environmental impact assessments have been carried out and
new leases will increase the rate ofoil production.'
justificationfPI, (P2, P3, P4)).
'This, they argue, is a good thing as increased oil production generates state revenue
justification(P3, IPS)).
'...by increasing employment, increasing the government's share of oil company
profits and providing taxable revenue.'
elaboration(P5, (P6, P7, P8J).
The overall argument is as follows :
AI : PI <= (P2, P3 <=/P5 <=/P6, P7, P8)), P4)
THE INUIT PEOPLE
11 : A lease for oil production should not be granted.
12 : Oil production is damaging to indigenous culture.
13 : Oil production reduces work in fishing and hunting.
14 : Oil production damages fish and whale stocks.
15 : Oil production produces work in the oil and service industries.
'The Inuit are in agreement with some of the Green Alliance views, and on the whole
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agree thai new leases should not be granted. Their argument is that they will impact
negatively on their indigenous culture.. '
justification(II, 112)).
'...by shifting work patterns away from the traditional fishing and hunting into
working for the oil and service industries.'
justification(l2, (13, 15)).
'The shift away from fishing and hunting is justified by .. the .. argument that fish and
marine mammal populations will be damaged by more oil production.'
justiftcation(/3, (14)).
The overall argument is as follows:
A2: II <= (12 <= (13 <= / 14), 15))
(Note that this is a strong argument)
THE GREEN ALLIANCE
G1 : A lease for oil production should not be granted.
G2 : The environmental impact statement is not satisfactory.
G3 : Oil production causes pollution and disturbance.
G4 : Oil production reduces populations of fish and marine mammals.
G5 : Pollution kills fish and mammals.
G6 : Disturbance causes migration of animal populations.
'The Green Alliance disagree that new leases should be granted, because they don't
agree that the environmental impact statement is satisfactory.'
justification(Gl, (G2)).
'They argue that increased oil production will reduce fish and marine mammal
populations ...'
justification)G2, (G4)).
'...by causing pollution, which kills them, and disturbance, which causes them to
migrate to other regions ofocean.'
elaboration(G4, (G3, G5, G6)).
The overall argument is as follows :
A3 : G1 <= (G2 <= (G4 <= (G3, G5, G6)))
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INTER-AGENT RELATIONS






(Note support by the Inuit for the Petroleum club's argument)
disagree(I3, P6).
(Note the disagreement too)
MULTI-AGENT HYBRID ARGUMENTS
Having identified an equivalence between G4 and 14 the Inuit argument, A2, can now
be extended to include this equivalence and also the elaboration of G4, resulting in the
following hybrid argument.
A4 : II <= (12 <= (13 <= ( 14 <= (G4<= (G3, G5, G6)U, 15/f
Similarly, the new justification of statement P6 by the Inuit claim 15, results in a
hybrid extension to the Petroleum Club's argument, Al, as follows :
A5 : PI <= (P2, P3 <=(P5 <=(P6 <= (15), P7, P8)), P4)
This example has demonstrated how the FORA language can be used to capture the
structure and interrelationships of arguments in a debate between several points of
view. It provides a summary of the key points of contention and shows how the
positions of the three parties relate to each other. It has done this by building up
structures out of the four basic relations. In chapter 5 some richer structures will be
defined which can further demonstrate the range of concepts from debates which can
be characterised in FORA, and which can provide insight into the overall structure of
a complex set of arguments.
The benefit of representing debates in this way is that they can then be reasoned with
automatically, providing support for extending the debate, integrating it with existing
formal representations of knowledge and using it as the basis of more fine grained
logical representations. Such support is provided by the reasoning tools described in
the remaining chapters of this document. First, though, we need to address some of
the practicalities of how knowledge can be acquired from multiple conflicting points of
view, and represented in FORA's language. This is the subject of the remainder of
this chapter.
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4.3 Knowledge acquisition from multiple conflicting viewpoints
This section discusses the acquisition of many people's knowledge. It describes a
pilot study in which various knowledge acquisition techniques were used with varying
success. The problems encountered are discussed as they enable a set of guidelines to
be developed for acquiring conflicting knowledge. The main issues covered in this
section are : the level of interaction of the researcher with the informant, the breadth
of topics in interviews, recording details about the informants, the acquisition of
controversial opinion and analysis of interview transcripts.
Conventional knowledge acquisition techniques tend to assume that the knowledge
being acquired is a consistent body of expertise in some domain (this is a dominant
assumption in the standard texts such as [Hart 86], [Kidd 87], [Gaines & Boose 88],
[Wielinga 90]). Such techniques sometimes even assume that only one expert will be
involved and where multiple experts are consulted, the techniques usually include
methods for resolving any conflicts of opinion under the assumption that one expert
will know best [Moore & Miles 91], or that conflicts simply suggest that a further
level of detail is required to distinguish between two different situations in which
different conclusions should be drawn (see for example [Boose 86], [Politakis &
Weiss 80], [Trice & Davis 89], [Easterbrook 91])
In acquiring knowledge to represent in FORA, I was deliberately setting out to acquire
multiple conflicting points of view and so the standard conflict-avoiding or conflict-
eliminating knowledge acquisition techniques were quite inappropriate. It became
clear that acquisition of arguments from a range of different viewpoints was an
interesting research issue in itself. To draw some conclusions about appropriate
knowledge acquisition techniques, it was necessary to acquire some samples of
conflicting points of view and then evaluate how this was achieved. This section
describes three pilot experiments using different acquisition methods. By comparison
of the results, some conclusions are reached about how knowledge acquisition can be
approached to optimise the level of controversy and to produce transcripts containing
clear arguments.
The underlying goal of the experiments was to acquire and represent people's opinions
in a formal manner in such a way as to make explicit the structure of their arguments.
A parallel, methodological aim was to minimise the intervention of the researcher, to
ensure that the representations were as true to the statements of the informants as
possible and to minimise the distortion of these statements by the researcher. There
are tensions between these two objectives (formalisation is bound to involve the
researcher's intervention at some stage) so another purpose of this set of experiments
was to bring out, and more clearly understand, the interplay between them.
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Note that it was not my aim to capture the 'cognitive' structure of people's arguments.
These were not psychological experiments. My aim was to observe the arguments
people make, to provide some empirical evidence about patterns of disagreement,
argument and debate, and to evaluate the suitability of three knowledge acquisition
techniques for capturing conflicting viewpoints. The results of each experiment in
turn fed into the choice of method for the subsequent experiment.
In these experiments the choice of domain was important as it must be clear to the
informant that they need not worry about being 'wrong'. If lay informants were
asked to offer opinions on medical diagnoses or toxicological risk assessment, they
may justifiably feel ill-informed and lacking in the specialist knowledge required for
this task. However, speculation about the causes and influences of the greenhouse
effect is not threatening in the same way because it is commonly accepted that even
experts in the environmental sciences are undecided or in dispute about many
projections. The greenhouse effect has also been widely reported in the media so
most people could be expected to know something about it.
4.3.1 The 'Fly on the Wall' Experiment
A im
To ascertain that lay people would disagree about the greenhouse effect and to acquire
their arguments for these different points of view.
Method
The first experiment took a very simple approach to knowledge acquisition. Six
informants were interviewed, each interview lasting between ten and twenty minutes.
Informants were asked the open-ended question "What do you speculate will be the
impact of the greenhouse effect on the climate of Great Britain within your lifetime?"
The informants were asked to talk as freely as possible about anything they thought
relevant to this issue, and were also prompted to speculate about how food production
may be affected by the greenhouse effect. My only other inputs during interviews
were occasional prompts of "Why? " to encourage the informants to offer justifications
of their opinions. I noted down on paper what was said by the informants, and then
attempted to represent these informal language notes in first order predicate logic1.
Results
As the records of the interviews are notes, some of what was said was inevitably not
recorded. This caused problems in verifying the accuracy of the representation. An
important result is that some of the innocuous-seeming details of how an informant
Note that at this stage of the research, the FORA language was not finalised and so FOPL was
chosen as a formal 'lingua franca'. In fact the FORA language components were decided partly on the
basis of the results of these knowledge acquisition experiments.
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states their opinion are important indicators of the form of their argument. For
example, a set of notes may include the factual statements an informant makes but
without the'little words', like'therefore', 'for example', and'however'it can still
be unclear how they are using these statements to support their argument (see [Knott &
Dale 93] for more on the importance of these 'little words' in articulating argument
structures). Likewise it is important to know if the informant was responding to a
prompt such as 'why?'. In addition, the vagaries of speech are such that not all
necessary details for a formal representation at the level of first order predicate logic
are made clear, for example when an informant says that 'the effect of global warming
will not be great' this does not make clear their intention as to 'the effect on what?'.
With some informants it was possible to check these intentions by getting them to
verify the logical representation which resulted. With others, this was not possible
either because of a lack of knowledge of logic or just unavailability.
Conclusion
Despite these problems the informants were forthcoming and a useful body of
information was obtained which indicated both the existence of disagreements (for
example, on the effects of the greenhouse effect on winter weather, some predicting
colder winters, some warmer winters), and the ability of informants to argue their
position. This was a formative experiment, intended to give some indication of the
styles of arguments people use. These arguments include claims {eg: that weather will
become more extreme) which are then justified in various ways, such as referring to
sources of information (eg: the media) or by explanation. Often people make use of
particular examples in their justifications, such as referring to a particular place where
something is happening and then generalising from that to a more global conclusion
(eg: reference to a particular pacific island which is shrinking, to infer a general
conclusion about sea-level rise). This pattern of mixing general justifications and
elaborations of particular points in the argument by reference to examples was a
significant motivation for including both justification and elaboration relations in
FORA.
4.3.2 The 'Blue Peter' experiment
A ini
The second experiment attempted to reduce the level of interpretation by the researcher
by providing the informants with a framework for producing their statements in a
formal representation directly.
Method
Asking lay people to write down their opinions on the greenhouse effect in some form
of logic was clearly not feasible, so an intermediate method was sought. Analysis of
the results of the first experiment indicated that many of the statements could be
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represented using a limited set of predicates and keywords, principally :
1. names of things;
2. causal relationships;
3. statements about the increase and decrease (or change) of attributes such as rainfall,
temperature, sea-level and food production;
4. indications of time and spatial location.
A collection of predicate names and keywords was drawn up with the aim that an
informant could use them as their vocabulary for expressing their views on the
greenhouse effect.
Some means was needed of indicating to the informant the syntax of this language -
for example to indicate that cause is a two place predicate, or to show how statements
can be qualified by time or place ('The average temperature will increase in Britain
over the next 10 years'). The experiment was therefore set up using a collection of
cardboard templates with names on, representing predicate names or keywords2.
The intention was that by borrowing an intuition of fitting together jigsaw pieces to
make a picture, the informant would fit these templates together to form statements
and chains of reasoning.
Predicates with different arities were given distinctively shaped cards :
1. Constants (arity 0) were represented as rectangles
2. One-place predicates were represented as rectangles with a slot cut into one of the
short sides, to suggest that a constant can be slotted into it. For example the template
for 'increase' might have the constant 'rainfall' slotted into it.
3. Two-place predicates such as 'controls' and the logical connectives 'and', 'or'
and 'if ... then', were represented as larger rectangles with a slot cut into both short
sides, indicating that constants (or one-place predicates) could be slotted into both
indentations. Informants were given connective cards with 'causes' written on them
which were interpreted formally as the same as implications. Hence for example, the
constant 'global warming' might be slotted into one side of the connective 'causes'
^The fact that the templates were cut out of cereal packets and my use of an example ('Here's one I
made earlier') led to the affectionate name The Blue Peter Experiment after the UK children's TV
programme.
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while the other side could take the one place predicate 'melt' applied to the constant
'ice-caps'. In this case 'global warming' is in fact being interpreted as a proposition
such as 'There is global warming'. This is shown in the following diagram.
4. Time and location qualifiers were represented as a small rectangle with a stalk
(sign-post shape), the intention being that they could be attached as labels to as many
predicates as necessary and act as extra arguments, or informal indicators of modal
operators. For example, the one place predicate 'change' might be applied to the
constant 'rainfall' and have the place label 'britain'. This would be interpreted as
adding an extra argument to 'change', ic: indicating change)rainfall, britain), as in the
following diagram.
It became clear when setting up this experiment that this visual representation of the
logical features of the intended language was limited and contained ambiguities. In
particular, nesting of predicates and connectives was problematic; there were no
means of representing uncertainty or vagueness of any sort; and the temporal and
spatial labelling was under-defined. (This was in fact deliberate as it was hoped to
avoid building in too many assumptions about any temporal and/or modal components
of the object-level logical language at this stage).
A further problem was that the named templates (for example, 'ice-caps' and 'sea-
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level') would act as prompts and therefore influence the statements which the
informant would make, thereby breaching the first knowledge acquisition guideline.
The intention was thus to require the informant to ask the researcher for templates as
they wanted them, rather than browsing through a collection of cues. This, although
intended as a safeguard against building expectations about subject-matter into the
experiment, in fact caused considerable problems as it forced the researcher to be too
closely involved with the use of templates.
Results
This experiment was only carried out with two informants, one of whom was
familiar with predicate logic, one of whom was not. Although construction of a few
statements was achieved by both of these people, severe problems were encountered.
1. Considerable introductory explanation was required by the researcher which had
not been necessary for the first experiment and this resulted in the informants starting
with preconceived ideas. In particular, illustrative examples, such as those given
above to describe the syntax rules, provide topic cues such as the relevance of ice¬
caps, rainfall and so on. This problem could have been eliminated by using a second
set of templates, about a different domain, for introductory purposes. However,
this would not have alleviated the remaining problems.
2. Most of the interesting reasoning, justification of statements and explanations by
the informants was not recorded in template form.
3. Both informants frequently asked "Is this right?" or "Is this finished?", indicating
that they felt that the cardboard templates suggested to them a puzzle or game with an
objective or solution for which they should be aiming (like a jigsaw puzzle). This
was in direct contrast to the free expression of opinion sought.
4. The restriction of syntax rules was difficult for the informants to grasp. In the
case of the informant familiar with predicate logic this was because the experiment
used such a restrictive syntax and contained ambiguities. In the case of the other
informant it was because of the unfamiliarity of logic. In particular, the informants'
syntax errors caused a problem because asking the informant to correct their statement
only served to emphasise further the erroneous impression of 'right and wrong
answers'.
5. The logistics of fitting together cardboard shapes, even on a large table, meant
that informants were reluctant to join statements together. As a result most of what
was recorded were rather fragmented comments. Much of the informants' reasoning
was expressed as asides while they attempted the exercise. For example, one
informant constructed the sentence "Global warming will cause insect plagues in
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Britain", and verbally reeled off a string of justifications which he refused to represent
in template form, because of their speculative nature, which did not merit the effort of
using templates to express. The implication of this was that few controversial or less-
than-certain statements would be represented and disagreements would thereby be less
likely to occur.
Conclusions
Tape-recordings of the informants' comments while using the templates would provide
more useful information than the statements created during the exercise. Notes taken
during one of the experiments substantiate this. An informant produced a
sophisticated chain of reasoning to justify his claim that global warming will not cause
sea-levels to rise. This reasoning involved considering the relative densities of water
and ice at different temperatures, the distribution of ice between the Arctic and
Antarctic, the proportion of this ice currently displacing sea water, and so forth.
Although the informant could express this information eloquently in English, he said
he didn't know how to start expressing it 'in cardboard'.
It was thus concluded that this technique built in too many of the researcher's
assumptions about the intelligibility of logical syntax. A formalism which appears
quite natural to those trained in logic and logic programming can in fact be quite
threatening to people with no logical training. The informants' comments of being
'unsure' and 'confused' led to the conclusion that the involvement of formal logic in
knowledge acquisition activities with such informants would severely impede their
progress.
Discussion of the first two experiments
The first experiment was a better model for knowledge acquisition for this project than
the second, but the problems of verification observed in it need to be addressed.
These problems were minimised by the following knowledge acquisition plan.
1. Interviews should be tape- or video- recorded (to provide a record for transcription
and verification of the statements formally represented).
2. The relevant material from interviews should be transcribed.
3. Attempts should be made to focus on the chains of reasoning and arguments the
informants use.
4. Formal representation of the arguments should be left until later.
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4.3.3 The 'Transcript' Experiment
Method
Based on the conclusions drawn from the two pilot knowledge acquisition exercises,
a further set of interviews were carried out, asking lay people about their views on the
greenhouse effect. These were unstructured interviews lasting between 15 minutes
and half an hour. Eight interviews were carried out, the results of which form the
basis of a knowledge bune together with some extra scripts taken from the media.
None of the informants for these interviews were experts on the greenhouse effect, or
environmental scientists of any sort. Three were male, five female. Five were
British, one was from the US, one from Greece and one from Malaysia. All lived in
Edinburgh at the time of the interviews. Four were students, four were not.
Each interview proceeded as follows. First the informant was given a sheet entitled
"Your views on the greenhouse effect" which gave them some background
information and gave them some idea of what they were required to do. They were
asked to read this. Once they had done so, i asked them if I might start the tape
recorder. They sometimes had questions at this stage. I started recording. I began
the interview by asking them "to predict the impact of the Greenhouse effect in Great
Britain within their lifetime". From then on, I kept quiet as much as possible. With
some informants this was easy, with others less so. In one extreme case I spoke as
much as the informant, getting monosyllabic replies or silence in response to most
questions.
Results
The responses to the initial question about the impact of the greenhouse effect in
Britain during the informant's lifetime resulted in a variety of kinds of responses,
some concerned with climatic changes, and some with broader issues such as the level
of concern about the greenhouse effect within society at large. A considerable body
of the predictions arc about possible changes to human behaviour which may result
from changes to social attitudes. I have been surprised and interested by this, as it
suggests that the representational techniques needed to fully express the contents of
these views should handle not only factual statements about the physical world, but
also propositions expressing levels of belief in statements by various parties. So,
there are first-order statements of the form 'If sea-levels rise then East Anglia will
flood', but also higher level statements of the form 'If the government believes that
sea-levels will rise, then power will be devolved from London, and Scotland will
attain independence'.
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The discussions about climate ranged from local weather forecasts and previous
experiences, predictions about global climate patters, winds and sea-currents,
references to the ice-caps, glaciers, atmospheric behaviour and particular gases
(notably CO2, CO, CFCs, nitrous and sulphurous gases, ozone and methane) and
radiation (ultra-violet and long-wave). Other environmental topics included flooding,
infestations, pollution, desertification and deforestation. Social issues included
health (eg: skin cancer), transport, education and the media. Political issues included
the government, Europe, the West's relationship to the developing world and
economics.
In some interviews I encouraged the informants to go off on some tangent (for
example, I encouraged one informant to talk about bees, and another to talk about the
government). This ensured that the breadth of content from the interviews was quite
wide. Two of the informants from non-British countries spontaneously spoke about
their own countries, and the impact of the Greenhouse effect there.
In every interview I asked the informant to predict what would be the impact of the
greenhouse effect on food production, which proved an interesting question in that the
range of answers was very broad. In many cases, as hoped, the informants used the
predictions they had already made about climate, the environment or society to justify
their claims about changes to fanning or food consumption.
I also took cuttings from the press to include in the analysis, as they express views in
clear conflict with some of what was said in interviews. These were about the
beneficial effects of C02 on food production and the impact of the greenhouse effect
on volcanoes and subterranean faults.
Analysis
[Ericsson & Simon 84] suggest a structure for protocol analysis. The steps involved
are
1. transcription,
2. establishing syntax and vocabulary for the representation (ie: the language
described in section 4.1),
3. segmentation of the transcript into self-contained chunks (propositions),
4. coding of segments, (ie: formal representation).
In place of coding, in order to achieve a FORA knowledge base, linking is required,
which is the process of adding relationships or links between segments.
The first stage of analysis is transcription. As already noted, some information (for
example, pauses) is lost. I retained as much of the actual content of people's speech
as possible (so the transcripts are littered with I mean' and 'you know'). Some
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information was also added, in particular I added punctuation. The transcripts were
proof-read and edited once and then the text file ported to the hypertext tool described
in the next section (4.4) in order to enable segmentation and linking of propositions.
For details of the results see [Haggith 94).
Interviewer Intervention
One of the interesting parts of transcription is to look closely at the intervention by the
interviewer. On the whole I have intervened much more than I thought 1 had. The
majority of my interjections significantly influence what the informant says afterwards.
Most of what 1 asked was of the form "Why is that?" or "What is the connection
there?" to try to encourage people to elaborate on a prediction they have made, or to
provide a justification or a statement of cause. Most people seemed to respond well
to this sort of prompt. Another common prompt I used when the informant had
totally dried up, was to pick up on something they said earlier and ask them to be
more specific, or give another similar case, so for example in one interview 1 said
'Earlier you said that rainfall is going to increase, will that be all year round?', and in
another 1 said 'So you have predicted hurricanes and smog, do you have any other
predictions about the weather?'
I have not transcribed pauses (except where they are exceptionally long) however, a
significant proportion of interjections were the result of pauses when 1 felt the
informant needed prompting. As a result of such intervention it is possible to set in
place a 'question-and-answer' routine, in which the informant behaves as if
responding to a questionnaire and does not talk freely. It is, however, sometimes
awkward to leave the informant sitting silently, apparently not knowing what to say,
and using gestures and body language to indicate that they want you to speak. To
remain quiet in this situation can lead to very pronounced and awkward silences and an
air of psychoanalytic seriousness which can seem rather threatening to the informant.
1 tried as much as possible to give the impression of 'having a chat', in which 1 said
rather less than I normally would!
Ericsson and Simon's book on Protocol Analysis [Ericsson & Simon 84] includes an
appendix containing 'some practical advice and information on how to elicit various
types of verbal reports under standard conditions', which includes the advice that the
researcher should be out of the field of view of the informant, preferably sitting behind
them ('like behind the couch'), and restricting their comments to 'keep talking'.
According to these criteria the interviews I have carried out are at fault. However, 1
believe that imposing these conditions (reminiscent of the techniques of psycho¬
analysis), would put more pressure on the informant, and lead to a less speculative
and free series of exchanges.
Ericsson and Simon have views on the interpretive role of the researcher which are
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almost directly at odds with my own. To them, the cardinal sin of an experimenter is
to 'intrude' into the interview, and they offer a metric for such intrusion, as follows.
'The number of verbalizations that are social and directed to the experimenter may be
used to evaluate how much the experimenter has intruded.' ibid, P 376. They do not
provide any guidelines as to how many such social verbalisations constitutes an
unacceptable level of intrusion.
It seems unrealistic that a non-intrusive, 'God's Eye View' of an informant's beliefs
is attainable, even in principle, so I start from the premise that the researcher will be
involved in a process of interaction and interpretation. The position of the
researcher's chair and level of engagement with the informant thus take on a different
importance. I believe that, contrary to Ericsson and Simon's claim, 'social
verbalisation' may in fact be seen as signs of the informant feeling relaxed, which may
be conducive to talking freely. Their assumption is that intrusion is always
detrimental. This opinion is extremely limiting, as it restricts their comments to the
tiny subset of verbalisations which are effectively monologues.
"Our discussion here is limited to situations where a single person
is performing a tusk, and does not include those where tuw or more
persons are working together, as in reaching a decision.. We also
ignore the influence of the experimenter on the subject. Two person
interaction, each person providing stimuli for the other, presents
additional problems we do not wish to deal with here", (ibid P278)
Clearly, for those of us whose research involves interactive concepts such as debate,
dialogue and argument, this is no help at all, other than as an admission of the lack of
generality of their approach. For analysis of the information collected here,
therefore, alternative techniques needed to be adopted.
I have commented on Ericsson and Simon's view of correct interview methodology
for two reasons. Firstly, to try to demonstrate why the 'classic' work on verbal
protocols is too narrow a method for knowledge acquisition of multiple viewpoints,
and thus to justify why I do not adhere to it. Secondly, because despite its faults,
their structure for transcript analysis (transcription, segmentation, encoding) is useful.
It seems important to point out that using this structure does not necessarily imply
adoption of any other parts of their methodology or of their theoretical position.
4.3.4 Conclusions
The main conclusion drawn from the experiments was that people do disagree with
each other and can provide complex arguments for their points of view and that it is
possible to record some of these by means of simple interview and transcription
processes. It is less useful to ask an informant to represent their knowledge directly in
predicate logic (and this causes real problems with informants without logical
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training). Even with logically trained informants, the detail of how to represent the
content of statements as predicate logic formulae can obscure the overall structure of
their argument. The level at which argument structure can be usefully represented
thus seems to be more abstract than FOPL.
Here are some guidelines for acquiring knowledge about controversial issues.
1. Provoke controversy by carefully choosing questions which encourage
speculation.
2. Do not influence the informants to say things which they might not otherwise
have said it is particularly important to avoid asking leading questions which appear
to have a 'correct' answer.
3. Encourage the informants not merely to state their opinion, but also to justify and
explain it, and record those justifications as completely as possible. 'Why?' is a
useful question to ask.
4. Record what informants have said as accurately and completely as possible,
preferably using full transcription as this provides a resource that can be returned to
later to trace the pattern of the informant's argument.
5. Do not introduce unnecessary formal tools which may also give an erroneous
impression of there being a 'right' way for the informant to contribute their views.
4.4 Mark-up using hypertext
A tool for helping in construction of FORA knowledge bases has been implemented in
HyperCard, a hypertext tool for Macintosh computers. This tool supports the
segmentation and encoding phases of transcript analysis, as described in the previous
section. In other words it lets a user lake a piece of text, select propositions from
within it (segmentation) and state how they relate to other propositions in terms of the
structure of the argument (encoding).
HyperCard works on the basis of small units of information called 'cards' (by analogy
with the catalogue card systems in libraries) which are grouped into 'stacks' with
similar structure or information content. Each card can include fields for text, buttons
and graphics. Clicking the mouse-button over any of these items can cause something
to happen, if the object clicked on has a program (called a 'script') associated with it.
The FORA mark-up tool consists of three stacks :
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1. Mark-up, which contains the text to be segmented.
2. Propositions, which contains the segments of text, records the links between
propositions or sets, and outputs the knowledge base in Prolog syntax.
3. Sets, which contains sets of propositions.
These are now described in turn, and followed by illustrative figures.
Stack I. Mark-up :
This is the entry point and it consists of a stack of cards which contain the text to be
segmented (See Figure 4.2). Any text file can be selected and loaded into the mark-up
stack, by clicking the 'read from file' button. Several files of text can be included in
the stack, and each card can have unique source information recorded in the top right
hand text field. Long pieces of text will be spread out over several cards - arrows
indicate how to 'turn the page' backwards and forwards through the text.
The text has two modes - read or segment. In read mode, clicking the mouse on text
produces normal hypertext behaviour (ie: if you click on part of a marked-up
argument, you move to where it is represented). In segment mode, clicking the
proposition button, the user can select a piece of text with the mouse and make it into a
piece of hypertext. The selected text appears in an editable box so that the user can
alter it (if the text appearing in the flow of a passage does not make complete sense
standing alone, for example because of anaphora such as 'it' which need to be
replaced by noun phrases). This edited text becomes a proposition in FORA and is
recorded along with its source information in the propositions stack, ready for linking
with other propositions.
Stack 2. Propositions :
The propositions stack is where most of the important information and functionality of
the tool is based. It contains the propositions (segments of text) selected by the user,
and enables linking between them. Each card in the stack (see Figure 4.3) contains a
single proposition and a record of all the links from it. These links are to either other
propositions or sets. The link types are the four binary relations in the FORA
language - disagree and equivalent (linking proposition to proposition), and
justification and elaboration (linking proposition to set).
The user can look at the current relations by clicking on a relation button and the
relations of that type from the current proposition appear in the big text field.
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The user can also create a new relation linking from the current proposition by clicking
the new relation button and the appropriate relation-type button. A message is then
presented asking the user to move (by hypertext links, arrows etc) to the proposition
or set they wish to link to, and then hit the 'enter' key which selects that point as the
target of the link. They are then returned to the starting proposition and the new
relation is recorded on its card. In the case of justifications and elaborations, the
target is a set, so the user moves to the set stack and selects an existing set. They may
need to create a new set, which they must do before being able to make the link. The
details of how this is done are given in the section on the sets stack.
Finally, from the propositions stack the complete FORA knowledge base, consisting
of propositions with sources and relations, can be generated in Prolog syntax and
saved to a file readable by Prolog to be used by all the other tools which make up
FORA. This is done by clicking the 'Dump Code' button and giving a file name for
the knowledge base.
Stack 3. Sets :
The sets stack cards each contain a set of propositions, and enable the user to carry out
the usual set operations, namely union, intersection, addition of an element, deletion of
an elomont, copying the set and deleting the whole set. This is done by clicking the
appropriate button on the card (see Figure 4.4). Addition, unions and intersections are
carried out in the same way as linking of propositions. The user clicks a button on the
starting point, say they click 'add proposition' on a set containing one proposition.
They are given a message to move to the chosen proposition (by hypertext links,
arrows etc) and then hit the 'enter' key which selects that point us the target of the link.
They are then returned to the set which has the new proposition added to it. A new set
can be created by taking the union or intersection of other sets or by selecting a
proposition in the propositions stack and making it into a new set by clicking the 'new
set' button.
Constraints urc imposed on changes and deletions. A set which is the target of a
relation cannot be changed or deleted. A proposition which appears in a set or is
related to or from another cannot be deleted. So to delete a proposition, first all
relations to and from it must be deleted, then any sets in which it occurs must be
deleted and only then can it be deleted itself.
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Figure 4.2: Mark-up stack
The text here is part of an interview transcript in which an informant (who chose


























































































































4.5 Example : Representing the aflatoxin debate in FORA.
To illustrate the construction of a knowledge base in FORA containing the conflicting
views about aflatoxins, the text in section 3.3.1 can serve in place of a transcript and
be loaded into the HyperCard mark-up tool. This enables segmentation of text, and
mark up or linking of segments, to be illustrated and also allows a return to the thread
of the running example. The text appears on cards, as illustrated in figure 4.5, and
propositions and the arguments for them were marked up using the hypertext tool. The
result, after using the tool and finally choosing the 'dump code' button to produce the
FORA knowledge base in Prolog-readable syntax, is as follows.
FORA knowledge base
After segmentation the propositions are as follows :
proposition('The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb\ pro).
propositionf'The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb\ pro).
proposition('Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans', pro).
proposition('There is no safe level of aflatoxins', pro).
proposition('The minimum detectable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb', journal),
propositionfAflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals', pro),
propositionf 'Aflatoxins are a kind ofchemical', pro).
proposition('Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk of chemicals to humans', pro),
propositionf'Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals', pro).
propositionf'Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable',
pro).
propositionf'The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb', con),
propositionf '2()ppb is not the maximum acceptable level of aflatoxins', con).
propositionf'The level ofadverse effects ofaflatoxins is 200ppb', con),
propositionf '2()0ppb is much greater than 20ppb\ con).
propositionf'Extrapolation ofcancer risk from one species to another is unreliable', con).
propositionf'The effect ofaflatoxins varies greatly between species', con),
propositionf'There is a lack of scientific evidence showing no safe level ofaflatoxins', con),
propositionf'Extrapolation ofcancer risk of aflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable',
con).
propositionf'There is a lack of scientific evidence showing aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
con).
propositionf'Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals', journal),
propositionf'Aflatoxins cause liver toxicity in animals', journal).
The propositions are then linked to show they relate to each other in terms of the
arguments. There are lots of justifications, on both sides of the debate.
justificationf'The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb',
l'20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins'j).
justiflcation('20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins',
I'The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb',
'The level ofadverse effects ofaflatoxins is 200ppb', '
200ppb is much greater than 20ppb'J).
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justification!'Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable',
]'Extrapolation ofcancer risk from one species to another is unreliable'!),
justification!'Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable',
/The effect ofaflatoxins varies greatly between species'!),
justification!'The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb',
I'The maximum acceptable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb',
'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans']),
justification!'The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb\
I'There is no safe level ofaflatoxins',
'The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb'J).
justification! There is no safe level ofaflatoxins',
I'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans']),
justification!'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
I 'Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
'Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable']),
justification!'Extrapolation °f the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable',
I'Aflatoxins are a kind ofchemical',
'Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk ofchemicals to humans']).
The elaboration relation is used here to elaborate on the type of adverse effects caused
by aflatoxins.
elaboration!'The level ofadverse effects ofaflatoxins is 20()ppb',
]'Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals', 'Aflatoxins cause liver toxicity in animals']).
The following disagreements can be given.
disagreef'The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb',
'The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb').
disagree!'The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb',
'20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins').
disagree!'Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable',
'Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable'),
disagree! There is no safe level ofaflatoxins',
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing no safe level ofaflatoxins').
disagree!'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing aflatoxins cause cancer in humans').
Finally, here is an example of two equivalent statements.
equivalent!'Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
'Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals').
Argument for the FDA policy
The definitions of arguments allow the construction of the following argument for the
FDA policy.
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The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb < =
The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb < =
There is no safe level ofaflatoxins < =
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans < =
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<= Assumption
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins fturn animals to humans is i tliuble^ —
Aflatoxins are a kind of chernical<= Assumption
Animals are good indicators ofthe cancer risk ofchemicals to humans
<= Assumption
The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb<- Assumption
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans<-
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<= Assumption
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable< =
Aflatoxins are a kind of chernical<= Assumption
Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk of chemicals to humans<~ Assumption
The argument is laid out in this manner (with indentation to show the nesting more
clearly than brackets can) by one of the programs described in the next chapter - the
'arguer'. The internal representation is just as defined in section 4.1. This is a
complete, strong argument (see the definitions in section 4.1). It is complete in the
FORA sense, because none of its leaf nodes arc extendible (from the knowledge base
just given) - all the leaf nodes' justifications are empty sets. These are indicated here
as 'Assumptions'. The argument is strong in the FORA sense because none of the
steps in the argument are elaborations or equivalences.
Argument against the FDA policy
There is a complete, hybrid argument against the FDA policy as it contains the
elaboration, and the equivalence. Note that the use of an equivalence as a support in
an argument causes a loop (because if P and Q are equivalent this produces the
argument P <= (Q <= /P <=....))). The hybrid argument against the FDA policy is
as follows :
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb< =
20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins<=
The minimum detectable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb<= Assumption
The level of adverse effects ofaflatoxins is 200ppb<-
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<=
AJlatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<=
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<= Loop
AJlatoxins cause liver toxicity in animals<= Assumption
200ppb is much greater than 20ppb<= Assumption
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4.6 Summary
This chapter has introduced the meta-level framework which is used as the
representation language within FORA. It is abstract and simple, focussing on
argument structures defined in language-independent terms. It is intended to capture
the form of arguments as represented in ordinary knowledge representation languages,
such as rules, or logics of various types, and it is abstract enough not to presuppose
any particular object-level representation language.
The second half of the chapter discussed how to construct knowledge bases using this
language. It addressed the general issue of acquiring knowledge from multiple
conflicting sources and summarised some experiments in knowledge acquisition.
Then a hypertext tool for helping to mark-up texts into FORA's argument
representation language was described. Finally, the FORA language and mark-up
tool were illustrated with the aflatoxins example.
A formal semantics (model theory) for this framework has not been included here.
Chapter 5 provides an operational semantics for the language: it describe its meaning
by defining how it is used. Chapters 6 and 7 describe how to map between FORA
and first order predicate logic and so the reader who is interested in semantics will find
there definitions of what kind of logical interpretations are possible for statements in
the FORA language. These two chapters define correspondences between the meta-
level relations, and object-level structures in particular languages (propositional logic
and first order predicate logic respectively). FOPL was chosen as the object-level
language for these examples in order that these mappings can be thought of as a
possible semantics of FORA. The meaning of the relations in FORA is given by
showing their relationship to proof structures in FOPL. However it is important to
note that because arguments do not have the logical force of proofs, sometimes an
argument may correspond to a set of propositions and inference steps which is not
logically valid or sound, for example because assumptions do not hold, or because it
uses invalid inference, such as abduction.
It would be possible to provide a formal model theory for the framework, and the
logic of [Reseller and Brandom 79] would be a good starting point for this enterprise,
providing semantics of the primitive relations in terms of superpositions of possible
worlds. For the present, however, the main aim is to investigate the computational
and practical properties of the framework, articulating its meaning in terms of its use.





This chapter describes some tools for using FORA knowledge bases. The chapter
begins in section 5.1 with a discussion of who FORA is intended to be used by, and
what kind of functionality FORA needs to provide for them. Section 5.2 describes
the basic implementation of FORA, including the simplest FORA tool for exploring
knowledge bases, called explorer. Section 5.3 is the core of this chapter, and
contains formal definitions of a set of argumentation structures built from the
primitives of the FORA language presented in the previous chapter. These structures
are used by a tool called arguer, described in section 5.4.2, for exploring, modifying
and extending arguments in a knowledge base. This section includes an illustration of
how the argumentation structures are used to explore and extend the aflatoxin debate.
Section 5.4.3 gives a brief description of a 'Devil's Advocate' implemented by an MSc
student as an argumentation tutor based on the FORA argumentation structures. This
chapter is summarised in section 5.5.
5.1 FORA users and their requirements
My thesis is that formal and abstract representations of arguments are useful. The
FORA language presented in the previous chapter enables formal, abstract
representation of arguments, and so my task is now to argue that such representations
are useful. The first question to answer is 'useful for whom?' In this section I will
describe the intended users of FORA and by doing so provide some motivation for the
suite of tools which have been implemented in the FORA system.
5.1.1 Users
The primary intended users of FORA are knowledge engineers whose task is to
construct, revise and maintain knowledge based systems representing some area of
expertise. In particular, my aim has been to support knowledge engineering in
difficult domains, where by difficult I mean controversial, rapidly changing, partially
understood, or fragmented.
The domain of toxicological risk assessment is difficult in all these senses. It is
controversial, because there are many different vested interests with conflicting goals
who have a stake in risk assessment decisions (for example, food producers who want
to minimise the amounts of their produce which must be destroyed due to
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contamination by high-risk chemicals, versus medical experts who want to minimise
any extra risks of cancer). It is rapidly changing as research is continuously providing
new evidence about the risks of chemicals, analytical chemistry is continually
improving detection techniques, and the role and distributions of risky chemicals
change from day to day. It is only partially understood : there are many areas of
toxicology (for example, the precise mechanisms by which chemical substances cause
cancer) in which understanding is patchy. It is also fragmented, as assessment of risks
involves consideration of many different issues, from chemical transport mechanisms,
human exposure patterns, epidemiological evidence, mechanisms of pathology,
consumption, metabolism and excretion, evidence from animal experiments, testing of
food products, agricultural methods of using chemicals, and so on. No one person can
be expert in all the areas which need to be taken into account, and so risk assessment
involves integrating knowledge from different specialisms. This is a profoundly
difficult task - and it involves, for example, combining very low levels of
understanding of levels of actual exposure to aflatoxins through food consumption,
with a good understanding of how we metabolise some of the aflatoxin compounds,
with a poor understanding of the mechanisms by which some aflatoxins cause disease.
In difficult domains such as these, knowledge engineers need to build knowledge
bases with an eye on the future. The knowledge bases are likely to need to be updated
and revised in the light of new evidence. Some of this evidence may lower uncertainly
levels, but we cannot assume that this is the case. New evidence (like the combination
of existing evidence) may well conflict with the contents of current knowledge bases,
and so require significant re-engineering of knowledge bases. In addition, knowledge
based systems have generally been constructed to support reasoning in a highly
specific corner of expertise, but in difficult domains, conclusions from such corners
need to be combined with evidence from other corners, or with currently useful rules
of thumb from areas which are 'wide open' and where research is only just beginning.
5.1.2 Functionality requirements
FORA is intended to be used by knowledge engineers constructing knowledge based
systems which involve:
a) knowledge from multiple sources;
b) conflicts of opinion between sources;
c) a high likelihood of new evidence conflicting with current evidence;
d) a need for regular updating and revision of knowledge bases;
e) a lack of algorithmic decision procedures for reaching conclusions.
I claim that in such cases knowledge engineers need to support argumentation between
knowledge sources, and that carrying out this argumentation in a formal, computer-
based system such as FORA will help them to build and maintain knowledge bases
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representing some of the current viewpoints. In addition, they need to be able to carry
out this argumentation in the abstract, independently of any particular knowledge
representation language, in order to integrate and debate between viewpoints
represented in different languages.
This leads to a requirement for the following functionality :
1. to express arguments;
2. to explore existing arguments;
3. to relate the arguments from one source to those of another;
4. to add new arguments and to challenge existing arguments;
5. to represent the arguments of an existing knowledge source;
6. to criticise views of a knowledge source which are particularly controversial;
7. to construct or modify a knowledge source;
8. to check that a knowledge source actually reasons according to an argument;
9. to identify how new evidence might require changes to a knowledge source.
FORA provides, in prototype form, all of this functionality. The remainder of this
chapter describe;; points I 4, which arc all meta level functionalities. Points 5 and 6
involve handling existing object-level knowledge sources and these arc the subject of
Chapter 6. Points 7-9 involve constructing and modifying object-level knowledge
sources and they are discussed in Chapter 7.
Having identified the intended users of FORA and some of their functionality
requirements, I now turn to describing how this functionality has been provided.
5.2 Implementation of FORA
Except for the hypertext mark-up tool described in the previous chapter, FORA is
implemented in Prolog. The implementation is modular, consisting of core language
components and a toolkit of programs for manipulating knowledge bases expressed in
this language.
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5.2.1 Implementation of the language
The implementation of the FORA language involves some set handling procedures (in
order to treat Prolog lists as sets), and some predicates for construction and
destruction of arguments. Meta-level knowledge bases containing propositions and
FORA relations are stored as sets of facts. Propositions are represented using the
predicate proposition/2, in which the First argument is the name of the proposition,
and the second represents its source. Relations are represented using the predicates
disagree/2, equivalent/2, elaboration/2 and justification/2.
Argumentation structures such as counter-arguments (see section 5.3) are defined
declaratively in terms of their constituent relations, using an object constructor.
These definitions are stored in an argumentation structure library which can be altered
without needing to change the underlying procedures for object construction.
5.2.2 User interface
The user interface for FORA is basic, consisting mainly of windows displaying text
and simple dialogue boxes. Access to knowledge bases and tools for using them is
achieved by selecting options from pull-down menus. Knowledge bases constructed
by mark-up can be loaded into FORA from files. They can also be constructed from
scratch and modified within FORA, by selecting options (such as 'add relation') from
a pull-down menu which triggers appropriate user interaction.
5.2.3 Exploration of FORA knowledge bases
FORA allows knowledge from multiple sources to be represented, and is intended to
be particularly useful when those views conflict. The intended users of FORA (as
identified in section 5.1) will be interested in these conflicts and therefore need to be
supported in exploring the controversial issues. A proposition is particularly
interesting if it is controversial and in FORA this means that it is in direct disagreement
with another proposition.
Definition : A proposition, P, is controversial, iff
3Q such that disagree)P,Q) or disagree)Q, P).
In order to help a user to interact with the objects in FORA, the concept of a conflict
set is useful. This set is a subset of all the proposition names currently loaded, and
it is used to represent those propositions which a user is currently interested in.
Typically it contains at least two propositions which are in disagreement, plus other
statements equivalent to or elaborating on those statements. It can also contain
justifications for the propositions which may then generate further points of
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disagreement.
The basic knowledge base exploration tool, explorer, starts with an initial conflict set
which is a pair of propositions which disagree. The conflict set is initialised either as
the result of the user selecting a controversial proposition, or a controversial
proposition being selected at random. The explorer tool then offers the user various
ways of exploring the controversy. This results in the conflict set being added to, or
having propositions deleted from it.
The conflict set can be thought of as a window on the controversies within the
knowledge base which can move around according to the relations between
propositions. Exploration results from altering the conflict set, by either expanding
it to include new propositions related to those already in the conflict set, or focussing
it to eliminate those propositions which are not interesting or which have been
sufficiently explored. There arc various different ways in which expansion and
focussing can occur. The following methods have been implemented in the explorer
tool to demonstrate the use of all four basic FORA relations.
Expansion of the conflict set
Here are four simple methods for expanding the conflict set.
1. Adding support : take a proposition in tho conflict sot, find a justification relation
for it, and add the justifications to the conflict set.
2. Adding disagreement . lake a proposition in the conflict set, find a disagieeilienl
relation involving it, and add the conflicting proposition to the conflict set.
3. Substituting equivalents: take a proposition in the conflict set, find another
proposition equivalent to it and replace the first by the second in the conflict set.
4. Substituting elaborations : take a proposition in the conflict set, find an elaboration
of it and replace the proposition with the set of elaborations.
Focussing of the conflict set
Here are two simple methods for focussing the conflict set.
1, Removal of equivalents : if the conflict set contains two or more propositions
which are equivalent to each other, remove all but one of them.
2. Removal of uncontrovcrsial propositions : if any proposition in tho conflict set is
not in disagreement with any other proposition in the knowledge bases, remove it
from the conflict set.
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All of these methods of exploration have been implemented in FORA. The current
interface shows the user the conflict set expanding and contracting. It can be
tentatively concluded that this is a useful technique for revealing the connectivity
implicit in a knowledge base, and allowing the user to simulate the 'flow' of an
argument or debate.
However, although the conflict set exploration tool is a useful first step in allowing a
user to explore FORA knowledge bases, it is limited, primarily because it does not
use the arguments which were defined in the previous chapter. The definition of
arguments provides a much more comprehensive way of showing not merely the
individual relations between propositions, but also the way these relations combine
into chains of reasoning. Users also need to be provided with some kind of overview
of these chains of reasoning held implicitly in the individual relations.
In the next section I return to arguments and show how the basic argument definition
can provide a wealth of more complex argumentation patterns which show the overall
structure of a knowledge base and which can help a user to assess the weight and
coherence of the evidence surrounding a controversial issue.
5.3 Argumentation structures
An important use of FORA involves construction of more complex meta-level
structures defined in terms of the primitives. The four relations and the argument
definition enable formal definitions to be given for concepts such as counter-argument,
rebuttal and corroboration. In this section a set of argumentation structures is defined.
They have all been implemented in FORA and they are illustrated being used by one of
FORA's tools in section 5.4.
Three of these structures (rebuttal, undercutting and counter-argument) were chosen
because they are each used in other work on argumentation. The first, rebuttal, is
used in current work on dialectical reasoning by Morten Elvang-Gpransson [Elvang-
Gpransson et al 93], The second, undercutting, is from Toulmin's theory of
argumentation [Toulmin 58], The definition of counter-argument is taken from
Sartor's work on representation of legal arguments [Sartor 93], The fact that they can
each be characterised in terms of the FORA language helps to demonstrate that FORA
is a general purpose system capable of handling standard formal argumentation
concepts.
In section 5.3.1, three structures are defined which do not involve disagreement and
characterise the support for a proposition and the supporting role played by a
proposition in a knowledge base (corroboration, enlargement and consequence). In
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section 5.3.2, six structures are defined which capture opposition or conflict within a
knowledge base (rebuttal, undermining, undercutting, counter-argument, target and
counter-consequence). Finally, in section 5.3.3, two structures (context and
counter-context) are defined which give a broad brush indication of the supporting and
oppositional parts of a knowledge base with respect to a proposition.
The 11 structures defined in sections 5.1.1 - 5.1.3 are representative of how to build
more complex patterns of debate from the basic relation and argument definitions.
They are not a definitive or complete set as no such a set can be given. There is an
arbitrary number of ways in which the relations could be strung together to generate
larger structures. The ones that appear here include the most simple - those structures
which relate a proposition to an argument by a single relation - plus some other
significant structures from the literature. A lesson to be learned from Rhetorical
Structure Theory (RST) [Mann et al 89] is that depending on the context, people may
find various different combinations of relations to be meaningful or important. FORA
enables other structures to be defined if a user should wish to use structures other than
those provided in the structure library.
The definitions all have a similar form. They are all given as structures relating to a
single proposition named P. All but the final two are defined as a single argument.
(The final two are sets of propositions.) So, for example, a rebuttal of a proposition
is an argument. It is sometimes useful to describe the relationship between two
arguments, and a discussion of my terminological conventions for such descriptions
is in section 5.3.4.
The definitions make much use of the argument and set destructors as defined in
section 4.1.4, so it is useful to recap the following :
1. In the destructor expression argument(A, P, S), A is an argument, P is its
conclusion and S is the set of propositions at the first level of A.
2. In the destructor expression premise_set(A, P, S), S is the set of propositions
occurring anywhere in the argument A whose conclusion is P.
3. The meta-level rules in section 4.1.6 allow equivalent)P,Q) to be deduced from
equivalent(Q.P) and likewise for disagree/2 (ie: these relations can be treated as
symmetrical).
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5.3.1 Arguments for and from a proposition
This section gives definitions of argumentation structures. Each definition is first
described in words, and then given a formal definition. I have also sketched a
diagram for each to give an informal sense of how the proposition is related to the
argument in each case. The argument A is represented in each diagram as a simple
tree structure in a box with dotted-line edges. FORA relation-names are indicated as
italic labels on double-headed arrows.
A. Corroboration
A corroboration for a proposition is defined as an argument for a proposition
equivalent to it. In the example in section 4.2, the Inuit's claim that oil production
damages fish and whale stocks is corroborated by the Green Alliance's argument about
reduction in wildlife populations.
Definition: corroboration(P, A) ijf
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that
3Q. equivalentfP, Q) & argument(A, Q, _).
corroboration(P, A)
Figure 5.1 : Corroboration
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B. Enlargement
An enlargement of P is an argument for an elaboration of P. Again, in the example
from 4.2, the Inuit argument that the oil industry produces jobs in oil and services, is
an enlargement of the claim that oil production brings in state revenue.
Definition : enlargement)P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that





A consequence of a proposition name P is defined as an argument in which P is a
premise, in other words it is an argument from P. The argument that the Inuit's
indigenous culture is damaged by oil production is a consequence of the claim that oil
production damages fish and whale stocks.
Definition : consequence(P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that




5.3.2 Opposition about a proposition
D. Rebutted.
In [Elvang-Gpransson et al 93], rebuttal is defined as a relation between arguments
whose conclusions disagree. Strictly speaking, they say that the truth of the
conclusion of one must imply the falsity of the conclusion of the other. However,
this is just one of many possible object level interpretations of 'disagreement' as
expressed at the meta-level in FORA. The definition of rebuttal in terms of meta-level
disagreement, has, I claim, greater generality than a definition in terms of object-
level implication and negation, as it leaves open the possibility that a user could define
disagreement in terms of some other object level language; for example, in terms of
temporal inconsistency. The FORA definition of rebuttal is as follows ;
Definition: rebuttal(P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that
3Q.S. disagree(P.Q) <4 argument(A, Q, S) .
In other words, a rebuttal of a proposition P is an argument for any proposition which
disagrees with P. Two arguments rebut each other if one is a rebuttal of the
conclusion of the other. Thus the Petroleum Club's argument that the oil production
lease should be granted rebuts, and is rebutted by, the Green Alliance's argument that





An undermining of a proposition is defined as an argument for a proposition which
disagrees with an elaboration of P or an equivalence with P, in other words, a
rebuttal of the elaborations and equivalences of P. The Inuit argument that work is
lost in fishing and hunting as a result of oil production undermines the claim of
increased state revenue.
Definition : undermining(P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that
3E,S. {equivalentfP, E) v elaboralion(P, S))







In [Toulmin 58], another primitive is undercut, which means the following : an
argument A, with conclusion Q, undercuts B if for some premise P of B, P
disagrees with Q. In other words, an argument undercuts another if the first rebuts a
premise of the second. In the example, the Green Alliance's argument that the
environmental impact statement is unsatisfactory undercuts the Petroleum Club's claim
for a lease.
Definition: undercutting!P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that
3AI, S, PI, Q,S2.argument(Al, P, S) & PI eS &
disagree(PI, Q) & argument!A, Q. S2)
Alternatively, using the definition of rebuttal above,
Definition : undercutting!P, A) iff
Note that when the arguments are strong (using only justification steps - see section
d.1.5) then undercutting is a notion quite distinct from undermining, as the premise
relation in a strong argument represents justification. When hybrid arguments arc
used, the premise relation can be either equivalence, elaboration or justification and in
this case, the set of underminings is a subset of the undercuttings.






This structure is closely related to the definition given by [Sartor 93], in which a
counter-argument to a proposition P is defined as an argument for the 'complement'
(negation) of any proposition used anywhere in an argument for P. Again we can
interpret this in two ways, either strictly, if we restrict the arguments to strong
arguments or more flexibly, using hybrid arguments. This is a recursive extension of
the rebuttal and undercutting definitions (the recursion happens in the premise_set
destructor). Rebuttal involves a disagreement with the conclusion of an argument.
Undercutting involves a disagreement with a premise of an argument. Counter¬
argument involves a disagreement with any proposition appearing in an argument and
it thus subsumes rebuttal, undercutting (and in the hybrid case, undermining).
Definition : counter-argument(P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that
rebuttal)P, A)
v 3B. premise_set(P, B, Set) & QeSet & rebuttal(Q, A).
The Inuit and Green Alliance argument that oil production reduces work in fishing and
hunting is a counter-argument to the Petroleum Club's claim that a lease should be
granted for oil production. The argument that employment will be increased is a







The target of a proposition in debating terms is an argument challenged by the
proposition This involves an argument which contains a premise with which the
proposition disagrees. The target of a proposition is thus the consequence of a
disagreement with P. For example, the target of the Petroleum Club's claim that the
environmental impact statement is satisfactory, is the Green Alliance's argument
against the oil production lease.
Definition : target(P, A) iff
P is a proposition name and A is an argument, such that





The counter-consequence of a proposition P is an argument whose conclusion is
counter-argued by the consequence of P. In other words, arguing from P produces a
counter-argument to another proposition Q. The argument for Q which is challenged
by this argument from P is called P's counter-consequence. In FORA this means it is
possible to draw a conclusion from P which disagrees with one of Q's supports.
Whereas the target is an argument which is directly challenged by P, the counter-
consequences are only indirectly challenged by P (in the target, P is the 'head'
(conclusion) of the counter-argument and disagrees directly with a premise, while in
the counter-consequence, P is in the 'body' of the counter-argument).
Definition : counter-consequence(P, A) iff
P is a proposition name atul A is an argument, such that
3B,P1,P2. consequence(P, B) & argument(B, PI, _)
& disagree!PI, P2) & consequence(P2, A).
In the example, the argument in support of an oil lease is a counter-consequence of the




5.3.3 Summaries of support and opposition
Given a knowledge base containing many arguments and counter-arguments, with
potentially very complex structure, it is useful to be able to give a user an unstructured
view of the content of a knowledge base which is relevant to a proposition. This can
be of two sorts : either the propositions used in arguments for and from the
proposition, which is called the context, or all the propositions used in opposition to
the proposition, which is called the counter-context. Both are just sets of propositions
with no argumentation structure. Propositions which occur in both sets (ie: evidence
used by both sides of a debate) are either common knowledge or highly controversial.
J. Context
The context of a proposition is the set of propositions in arguments for it and in its
consequences. In other words it is the set of propositions used by one side of a debate.
Definition: context!P, S) iff
P is a proposition name and S is the set such that
VQ.( (BA,SI. premise_set(A, P, SI) & Q e SI) v
(3A,C,SI. consequence(P, A)
& premise_set(A, C, SI) & (Q = C v Q e SI))
-> Q e S)
K. Counter-context
The counter-context of a proposition is the set of propositions in counter-arguments to
it, in its targets and in its counter-consequences.
Definition : counter_context(P, S) iff
P is a proposition name and S is the set such that
VQ((3A,C,S1. counter-argument!P, A)
& premise_set(A, C, SI) & (Q = C v Qe SI)) v
OA, C,SI. target!P, A)
& premise_set(A, C, SI) & (Q - C v Q e SI)) v
(3A,C,SI. counter-consequence!P, A)
& premise_set(A, C, SI) &(Q = C v Q e SI)) )
->QeS)
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5.3.4 Some comments about terminology
Because these argumentation structures are an important part of the thesis, and
because they will reappear throughout the rest of this document, it is necessary here to
clarify a few points of terminology. In informal language some of these terms have
rather looser meanings than the definitions just given allow for. In particular, in
normal speech they do not exclusively refer to a relationship between a proposition and
a single argument, as sometimes they are used to relate two arguments, or two
propositions In the remainder of this document, there are three ways in which the
usage of terms may vary from the strict relationship of a proposition to an argument,
so these usages need to be explained.
1. Sometimes the set of all arguments of a particular type is referred to, in which
case the plural is used For example, instead of saying 'the set of arguments each of
which is a rebuttal of P', I use the expression 'the rebuttals of P'.
2. Sometimes it is also useful to use the same terminology to describe the relationship
between two arguments. So, for example, the expression 'a counter-argument to A'
(where A is an argument), should always be interpreted as meaning, strictly, 'a
counter-argument to the conclusion of A'. Likewise, the expression, 'A rebuts B'
(where A and B are both arguments) means 'A is a rebuttal of the conclusion of B'.
3. Sometimes what is intended is a relationship between a proposition name P and the
conclusion of a related argumentation structure. For example in the expression 'one
of the consequences of P' (where P is a proposition name) this means 'a conclusion of
a consequence of P'.
Where the intended interpretation is not clear from the way the expression is used, the
verbose version will be given. The simpler expressions are used in an attempt to
make the text easier to read, but it should be borne in mind that the formal definitions
are always intended when this is the case.
5.3.5 Summary
This section has defined a set of argumentation structures which provide a broad view
of the patterns of reasoning possible within a knowledge base, and provide a rich,
coherently organised source of information relevant to any particular proposition. The
FORA system can construct all of these structures for any proposition in its knowledge
base using the tools described in section 5.4.
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The argumentation structures provide a user with detailed comparisons between
knowledge bases, detailed in that they provide, for each individual proposition, an
analysis of how it relates to other propositions in the knowledge bases. The counter-
context sets and the sets of rebuttals, undercuttings, underminings, counter¬
arguments, counter-consequences and targets provide a detailed analysts of conflicts,
so that those propositions (such as the claim that leases for oil production should be
granted) with large sets are highly controversial. Propositions with large
corroboration sets are points of consensus. Large context sets and many enlargement
and consequence sets are indications of highly coherent knowledge bases. Likewise
small context sets or few enlargements or consequences indicate fragmentary
knowledge. These structures can provide evaluations of the overall 'shape' of FORA
knowledge bases, either during their construction or to guide a user in exploration of
completed knowledge bases. The next section describes some tools for this sort of
exploration and gives an example of their use in terms of the aflatoxin debate.
5.4 Tools for using argumentation structures
The first part of this section describes how the structures defined in section 5.3 are
built automatically in FORA. The second part describes a tool for suggesting FORA
knowledge base extensions using the structure definitions.
5.4.1. Synthesis of argumentation structures
In FORA, the structures defined in the previous section are defined declaratively.
They can be automatically synthesised, given any FORA knowledge base, providing
the user with a lot of useful information about the form of support or opposition for
any particular proposition they choose.
For example, suppose while using the aflatoxin knowledge base a user wishes to
know what support or opposition there is for the FDA policy. FORA can
automatically construct counter-arguments, rebuttals, corroborations and so on and
allow the user to browse them. A pull-down menu allows a user to select a particular
type of argumentation structure - or all possible structures - for the proposition they
are interested in. Here is the result of the user selecting the statement of the FDA
policy and requesting all argumentation structures relating to it within the knowledge
base as shown in chapter 4.
Argumentation structures relating to :
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Arguments :
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb<=
The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 2Oppb<=
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There is no safe level ofaflatoxins< =
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans< =
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<-
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<-
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<= Loop
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable<-
Aflatoxins are a kind of chemical<= Assumption
Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk of chemicals to humans< =
Assumption
The minimum detectable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb<= Assumption
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans<=
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals< =
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<=
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<= Loop
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable< =
Aflatoxins are a kind of chemical<= Assumption
Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk of chemicals to humans<= Assumption
There is a direct rebuttal of the FDA policy.
REBUTTAL of
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Disagrees with
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb
Argument :
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb<=
20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins< =
The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb<= Assumption
The level ofadverse effects ofaflatoxins is 200ppb<-
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<=
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals< =
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<- Loop
Aflatoxins cause liver toxicity in animals<= Assumption
200ppb is much greater than 20ppb<= Assumption
There are two undercuttings of the FDA policy, as both immediate premises (the
maximum acceptable level claim, and the claim that aflatoxins cause cancer in humans)
are disagreed with.
UNDERCUTTING of
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Premise :
The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb
which disagrees with
20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level of aflatoxins
Argument :
20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins< =
The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb<= Assumption
The level ofadverse effects ofaflatoxins is 200ppb< =
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Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<-
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals<=
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals<= Loop
Aflatoxins cause liver toxicity in aninuils<= Assumption
200ppb is much greater than 20ppb< = Assumption
UNDERCUTTING of
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Premise :
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans
which disagrees with
There is a lack of scientific evidence showing aflatoxins cause cancer in humans
Argument :
There is a lack of scientific evidence showing aflatoxins cause cancer in humans<=
Assumption
There are 4 counter-arguments to the FDA policy. The first two are the two
undercuttings, as just shown, so these are omitted here (though FORA generates
them). There are three further counter-arguments attacking two other premisses of the
argument for the FDA policy (there are two rebuttals of the extrapolation claim).
COUNTER-ARGUMENT for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Support :
There is no safe level ofaflatoxins
Disagrees with :
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing no safe level ofaflatoxins
Argument:
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing no safe level ofaflatoxins<= Assumption
COUNTER-ARGUMENT for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Support:
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable
Disagrees with :
Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable
Argument :
Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable< =
Extrapolation ofcancer risk from one species to another is unreliable<= Assumption
COUNTER-ARGUMENT for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Support :
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable
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Disagrees with :
Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable
Argument :
Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable<-
The effect of aflatoxins varies greatly between species<- Assumption
The context of the FDA policy claim is the set of statements used in the argument for
it.
CONTEXT of
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Set ofpropositions :
The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb
There is no safe level ofaflatoxins
The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans
Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable
Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals
Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals
Aflatoxins are a kind of chemical
Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk ofchemicals to humans
The counter-context of the FDA policy claim is the set of statements used in counter¬
arguments, rebuttals etc.
COUNTER-CONTEXT of
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
Set ofpropositions :
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing no safe level ofaflatoxins
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing aflatoxins cause cancer in humans
Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans is not reliable
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb
20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins
The minimum detectable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb
The level of adverse effects ofaflatoxins is 200ppb
200ppb is much greater than 20ppb
5.4.2 Extending the knowledge base by arguing
Once arguments exist, it is useful to be able to augment the knowledge base to support
or attack the arguments within it. A useful application of the formal argumentation
structures is to use them to suggest additions to the knowledge base. The arguer
program is an implementation of this facility. If the user wishes to attack a proposition,
they can be told of all the ways currently available to weaken the argument for that
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proposition, by producing counter-arguments or rebuttals, etc. Alternatively, they
may wish to support existing arguments by providing additional corroborations and so
appropriate information to enable this is also generated. Here is an example of the
output of the arguer program, when asked to suggest ways of arguing about the FDA
policy statement.
Some suggested ways ofarguing about:
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
You could produce a corroboration for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
equivalent(The FDA policy levelfor aflatoxins should be 20ppb, Equivalence)
You could produce a enlargement for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
eluboration(The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb, Elaboration_Set)
You could produce a consequencefor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
justification!Conclusion, /The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb,
Justification_Set})
You could produce a rebuttal for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree(The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 2()ppb, Disagreement)
You could produce a undercutting for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree/The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb, Disagreement )
You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for ajlatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree(The maximum acceptable level ofajlatoxins is 2()ppb, Disagreement)
You could produce a counterargument for
The FDA policy level Jor aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree! Disagreement, There is no safe level ofaflatoxins)
You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree!Disagreement, The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb)
You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree!Disagreement, Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans)
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You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagree(Disagreement, Extrapolation of the cancer risk of aflatoxins from animals to
humans is reliable)
You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagreefDisagreement, Aflatoxins cause cancer in animals)
You could produce a counterargument for
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagreefDisagreement, Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals)
You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagreefDisagreement, Aflatoxins are a kind ofchemical)
You could produce a counterargumentfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation of the form :
disagreefDisagreement, Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk of chemicals to
humans)
You could produce a targetfor
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb
by adding a relation ofthe form :
justification(Conclusion, {The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be
20ppb\Justification_Set))
5.4.3 The Devil's Advocate
This section sketches an tutor helping a student explore the various points of view
represented in a set of FORA knowledge bases.
OLIA is an argumentation tutoring system, specifically for use with opposing points of
view represented in FORA. One part of this system plays 'Devil's Advocate' to a
user (student) who is encouraged to follow a line of argument for one position. As
the user selects propositions which lend support to their view, the Devil's Advocate
argues against them by attacking their position, or arguing in favour of an opposing
viewpoint. It does this using argumentation structure definitions as given in section
5.3. A FORA knowledge base is used as the expert model in the tutoring system, and
it includes various tutoring strategies which are all defined in terms of FORA
argumentation structures. The most interesting of these is the Devil's Advocate
strategy which attempts to produce a rebuttal of every proposition the user selects, and
then challenges the student to further justify their position. The student does this by
selection of other propositions from the knowledge base. If they are indeed
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justifications for the student's current position, then the 'Devil' continues its process
of rebuttal, but if the student fails to justify the position the 'Devil' informs them of
this, and offers tutoring support using a different strategy, such as more
straightforward coaching in the use of the urgument structures. This program was
implemented as part of an MSc project and full details can be found in [Retalis 95].
The Devil's Advocate was evaluated using two cohorts of students. A preliminary
(formative) evaluation involved MSc students who were tutored using a simple
knowledge base about the greenhouse effect, which I constructed from the results of
the knowledge acquisition experiments described in Chapter 4. This provided useful
feedback about the implementation of the tutor. A further evaluation was lutcr carried
out by building another FORA knowledge base containing arguments for the idealist
and materialist positions on the 'mind body problem' which forms part of the first year
curriculum in Philosophical Issues in A1 at the University of Edinburgh. This example
was used by first year students in a practical session which complemented a tutorial
and allowed us to conclude that students both enjoy and find useful the process of
arguing with a computer as part of their studies. About half of the students found that
using the tutor helped to clarify the structure of the arguments more effectively than
their tutorial. Further details can be found in [Retalis et al 96].
This student project provides evidence that there are useful educational applications of
FORA and these are currently being pursued further. It also provides evidence that
FORA can act as a basis for definition not only of debating structures as shown in
section 5.3, but also of debating strategics which characterise how patterns of
arguments can be combined in a meaningful interaction with a user.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter I have identified the intended users of FORA (primarily knowledge
engineers in difficult domains) and described some tools implemented in FORA for
exploring and modifying the arguments in FORA knowledge bases. I have also
shown how the basic FORA language enables declarative definitions of more complex
argumentation structures to be written which give more insight into the structure of a
knowledge base.
The first tool, explorer, is a basic mechanism for exploring conflicts in a knowledge
base and discovering relationships between propositions.
The second tool is a program called arguer which shows the user ways in which the
arguments in the knowledge base can be challenged or expanded. It does this using
the library of argumentation structures.
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The third tool described briefly is a tutoring tool which adopts the position of Devil's
Advocato to encourage a student to construct stronger arguments and meet the
challenge of counter-arguments. Experience with the Devil's Advocate suggests
useful future applications of FORA in an educational role.
In the first section, I made some assumptions about functionality which would be
useful to a knowledge engineer using FORA to assist in the construction of knowledge
bases in difficult domains. The first four functionality requirements have now been
met. They were :
1. To express arguments - this is possible using the hypertext mark-up tool described
in the previous chapter, or directly within FORA.
2. To explore existing arguments - the explorer tool lets a user explore FORA
knowledge bases containing arguments.
3. To relate the arguments from one source to those of another - the argumentation
structures provide overviews of the way arguments relate to each other, and FORA
generates these automatically.
4. To add new arguments and to challenge existing arguments - FORA allows new
arguments to be added, and the arguer tool suggests ways in which existing
arguments could be either augmented or challenged.
The argumentation structures defined in this chapter play an important role in this
thesis because they demonstrate the benefit of taking both a formal and a meta level
approach to argumentation.
1. In FORA, concepts from the literature on argumentation, like counter-argument
and corroboration, can bo formally defined from the four basic relations and
arguments, and as a result they can be constructed and reasoned with automatically.
This is a new contribution to existing, more informal work on argumentation, in
which there is little attempt to define existing concepts in terms of other, more simple,
concepts.
2. Having taken an abstract, meta-leve! view of arguments, we have been able to go
a long way towards providing useful support for argumentation without having to
consider at all what kind of object level logic is appropriate for representing the content
of propositions, nor what sort of logical inference will provide the reasoning steps in
an argument. We can decide the structure of these steps without having to decide how
to give them logical 'force'. FORA is therefore a contribution towards existing
research on formal argumentation in which these object-level decisions have to be
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made in order to represent the structure of arguments.
The next two chapters examine how FORA relates to knowledge bases represented
using particular object-level logics.
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Chapter 6
Automating Mark-up to FORA
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses how FORA knowledge bases can be generated automatically by
abstraction from existing knowledge bases represented in a formal language.
It is useful to integrate existing knowledge bases into FORA because the arguments
they express can then be combined with arguments from other knowledge bases, or
text, or the opinions of a user. The FORA framework enables a user (as we saw in
the previous chapter) to challenge an argument and provide a counter-argument, or to
shore up a claim by providing corroborating evidence, and to weigh up the overall
weight and coherence of multiple arguments for controversial points of view.
Enabling existing representations of knowledge to be included in this process is
useful, particularly where the knowledge bases express expertise in rapidly expanding
or changing fields of knowledge (and which may therefore need revision as they
become out of date, or are challenged by new evidence), or where the knowledge base
expresses the views of only one of many important stakeholders in a decision-making
situation and there is a desire to broaden the range of views taken into account.
Knowledge bases built in the past, which are no longer adequate to meet the needs of
users and require updating, are known as 'legacy' knowledge bases. This chapter
contributes to our understanding of how to reuse such knowledge bases. Some of the
problems of using legacy knowledge bases are that they need to be integrated with
other information, they need to be updated and refined, and they sometimes need to
be re-represented in order to be used with new reasoning techniques. The re-
engineering of such 'legacy' knowledge bases is an important current issue.
In chapter 4 the process of building knowledge bases using hypertext techniques was
called 'marking-up' text, and I use the same word here to describe computational
techniques for discerning the structure of arguments expressed in knowledge bases.
It is clearly not yet feasible to automate mark-up of texts, as this would require both
understanding of natural language and interpretation of the intended line of reasoning.
However, it is feasible to automate mark-up where knowledge has already been
formally expressed and where chains of reasoning can be carried out by an inference
engine. This chapter shows that it is feasible, by explaining how it can be done.
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Figure 6.1 : Three approaches to automating mark-up. The left-hand
path from the knowledge base shows static mark-up, which fails to create
a full FORA representation, due to lack of reasoning. The middle path
shows dynamic mark-up, using a modified inference engine which can
record meta-level representations of its reasoning steps. Proofparsing is
the right-hand path, which more elegantly abstracts a FORA
representation from completed proofs generated by an unaltered
inference engine.
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This chapter describes three approaches to the mark-up task. They are illustrated in
Figure 6.1, as the three attempted paths from the knowledge base at the bottom of the
diagram, to its representation in FORA at the top of the diagram.
The left-most path of Figure 6.1 shows what happens when mark-up is attempted by
simply looking at the syntax of the knowledge base. This is called 'static mark-up'
and it fails as a method of extracting arguments from a knowledge base. Section
6.2.1 explains why it fails by showing that mark up must involve inference at the
object-level.
The remainder of section 6.2 describes a successful method for automating the mark¬
up process. This is the central path from the knowledge base to FORA, shown in
figure 6.1. It is called 'dynamic mark-up'. Dynamic mark-up is achieved by using
and adapting an object-level inference system so that it records meta-level
representations of the reasoning steps it uses when drawing a conclusion from the
knowledge base. The object-level system used to illustrate this chapter is a sequent
calculus theorem prover. It is described in section 6.2.3. The details of the dynamic
mark-up technique are given in section 6.2.4. Some problems with dynamic mark¬
up are spelled out in section 6.2.5.
In Figure 6.1, the right-hand path from the knowledge base to FORA uses an
unaltered object-level inference mechanism to generate a proof of some conjecture.
This proof is then parsed to generate a FORA representation of the reasoning it
involves. This is a more elegant approach to mark-up because it does not require
rewriting of the object-level inference engine. Once parsed, proofs can be described
at various levels of abstraction : from a stop by step description to a more abstract
proof outline. The proof-parsing and proof-outlining methods are described in
section 6.3.
Both successful approaches have been implemented to mark-up sequent calculus
proofs for the restricted group of knowledge bases using only classical propositional
calculus. This provides a demonstration of the plausibility of automating mark-up to
FORA, and is sufficient to suggest that a useful line of future research will be to
automate mark-up from an extended range of legacy knowledge bases represented in
more complex object-level languages. Section 6.4 describes one such extension by
returning to the running example, and describing automated mark-up of a full first
order predicate logic representation of the aflatoxin debate, using the proof parsing
method of section 6.3. Section 6.5 is a summary.
6.2 Abstracting arguments from knowledge bases
This section explores how to extract arguments from object-level knowledge bases, so
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that they can be represented in FOR A. First, in section 6.2.1, I argue that mark-up
is more than a syntactic process and must involve an object-level reasoning
mechanism. I do this by presenting a static mark-up process which does not involve
inference, and show why it must fail to produce a complete representation of the
arguments implicit in the knowledge base. Having established that inference is
essential to mark-up, in section 6.2.2, 1 discuss at what stage in the mark-up process
inference should happen. One option is to embed the inference mechanism inside the
mark-up process. In section 6.2.3, 1 describe the inference mechanism, a sequent
calculus theorem prover, used for these experiments in automating mark-up to FORA.
Finally, in section 6.2.4, I describe how mark-up can be achieved by modifying this
inference mechanism, and embedding it inside the mark-up process. I conclude, in
section 6.2.5, with some problems with this approach. This section leads into
section 6.3, in which a more elegant and satisfactory approach to automated mark-up
is described.
6.2.1 Why mark-up must involve inference
The simplest possible way of marking-up a knowledge base would seem to be to look
at it and notice where relationships are indicated between statements which could be
described at the meta-level. In chapter 4, the FORA relations (such as disagreement),
were described as representations of object-level notions (such as negation). So, if
the knowledge base is represented as a theory of propositional logic, it would seem
reasonable that implications could be described as justifications, negations could
indicate disagreements and so forth.
The purpose of this section is to show that mark-up is not as simple as this, and that
just describing a static knowledge base will not reveal all of the interesting argument
structure which it implicitly contains. To reveal the arguments which can be produced
from a knowledge base it is necessary to carry out inference and attempt to draw
conclusions. To demonstrate this, 1 will explain what happens when attempting to
mark-up a static knowledge base, without invoking an inference mechanism.
Assume that it is possible to look at the structure of the object-level theory (or
knowledge base) and match these structures with FORA representations. If so, it
must be possible to state syntactic patterns at the object level which correspond to
FORA relations. The following very simple algorithm carries out matching on a set of
such patterns, or templates.
The algorithm is intended to construct a FORA meta-theory consisting of the set of all
meta-level statements generated from the propositional theory. Each meta-level
statement is generated from a set of syntactic templates (the markup_links), which
relate syntactic structures in the object-level propositional logic to FORA relations.
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The syntactic structures are then instantiated with respect to the prepositional theory by
matching the structures against the theory (by searching for appropriate sub-theories).
Algorithm for static mark-up
Given an object-level theory, T, static mark-up generates the FORA meta-theory, M,
which is the set of all relations, R, which are meta-statements describing T.
VT, VM. static-mark-up(T, M)
(VR. meta-statement(T,R) —» R e M.)
Given a theory, T, the meta-statement, R describes a part of it, if and only if there is a
mark-up template for a set of object-level propositions, O, described at the meta-level
as R, such that O matches with a subset of T.
VT, VR. meta-statement(T,R) <->
( 30. markup_link(0, R) &
subset_match(0, T ))
A possible set of templates (markup_links ) for classical first order prepositional
calculus is as follows. Each link is a predicate taking two arguments - the first being
the set of propositions which will match (unify) with a subset of the object-level
theory, the second being the FORA relation which describes the set.
1. There is a disagreement between a proposition and its negation
markup_link( [P, -P], disagreement(P, -^P)).
2. Conjunction and disjunction are symmetric
markup_link( [P&Q, Q&P], equivalentP & Q, Q & P}).
markup_link( I P v Q, Q v P], equivalentP v Q, Q v P)).
3. De Morgan's Laws
markup_link( [fP & Q), -fv -Q], equivalent -(P & Q), ^P v -Q)).
markup_link( [~fP v Q), ~^P & ^Q], equivalent~fP v Q), ~^P & -f2)).
4. There are equivalences between conditionals
markup_link( [^P s Q, P —> Q], equivalent -P v Q, P —> Q)).
markupJink( [P ~ Q, (P-> Q), (Q - P)],
equivalentP —> Q, (P — Q) & (Q — P»).
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5. Proposition sets matching to inference rules, such as modus ponens, modus
tollens and abduction, can generate justifications
markup_link([P, P —> Q], justification(Q, [P —> Q, P])).
markup_link([P —> Q, -f2f justification!-J3. [P —> Q, -f21))-
markup_link([Q, P —> Q], justificationP, [P —> Q, Q])).
6. In order to match to an inference rule such as modus ponens being applied with
with more complex premises, such as conjunctions or disjunctions, the syntactic
matches need to be spelled out.
markup_link([A & B —> P, A, B], justificationP, [A & B -» P, A, B])).
markup_link([A v B -> P, A], justificationP, [A v B —> P, A])).
markup_link([A vB —> P, Bj, justificationfP, [A v B —> P, B])).
7. Finally, here is a syntactic match indicating an application of the and-elimination
inference rule.
markup_link([P & Q], justificationP, [P & QI))-
markup_link([P & Q], justificationQ, IP & QI))-
Just by looking at what is needed to write syntactic mark-up links we can start to see
the problem. Many of these links are attempts to state the syntactic conditions for the
application of inference rules. The root of the problem is the use of subset_match/2
which carries out first-order term unification to match subsets of the object-level
theory, whereas what is really required is full logical equivalence. However, to
establish logical equivalence is in general undecidable, and therefore requires a
theorem prover to be invoked as part of the unification process.
An example will illustrate the difficulty. The following propositional theory :
theory![p, q. ~P- -<?. P&i7. qvp, pvq, p->q, q—>r, -^qv r, q—>p,
p<-*q, p&a&b, p&(avb), p&q—>w, pvq—>b, (p->q) —>Z, -fp&q).
a&p&b, pv-q]).
generates a set of 33 meta-level statements (3 disagreements, 7 equivalences and 21
justifications). Examination of these shows up a number of problems.
Problems
1. Disagreements should show up between the negation of a proposition P and a
statement Q which is equivalent to it, eg: we get
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disagreement(p&q, -(p&q))
but we should also get
disagreement(q&p, -(p&q))
and disagreement( ~^p v -q, p & q,)
This can only be achieved by the addition of a template which has a condition attached
to it, as follows :
markup_link([P, -Q], disagreement)P, -Q)) <—
markupJink([P, Q], equivalentfP, Q)).
However, even this conditional template only solves the first of the problems, but not
the second. Part of the problem is the lack of symmetry of the disagreement template
(ie: the first or second of the arguments may be negated, not just the second), and of
the equivalence template. In addition, this added template is problematic as it is really
expressing a meta-level relation between disagreements and equivalences so it should
be left to the meta-level. The question of symmetry is also handled already at the
meta-level.
2. Equivalence checks should be more sophisticated and applied recursively, in order
to pick up the equivalence between p&a&b and a&p&b, etc.
(p& (a&b)) <—>((a&b) &p) «-» (a & (b&p)) <—> (a& (p&b))









There is thus a need for the justification rules to be applied repeatedly. In general,
given a set of propositions such as [r&s, r—>t] it should be possible to generate an
argument for 7' in FORA, by recognising that through a sequence of inference steps,
7' can be deduced. This can only be done by invoking the object-level inference
engine or theorem prover, because in FORA, the propositions are all atomic.
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These problems lead to the conclusion that it is not enough to have mark-up templates
which recognise that a set of propositions in a knowledge base 'look like' they can be
used to make a deduction. Inference actually needs to be carried out in order to pick
up derivable conclusions and logical equivalences which are not syntactically obvious.
Therefore mark-up must involve the object-level theorem prover or inference
mechanism. In general the inference needed will be arbitrarily complex. For
example, to establish all possible disagreements involves finding all pairs of
contradictory formulae derivable from the theory, which is not a decidable problem
for the first order case in general, so limits to the inference search space will need to be
put in place. The general point here is that completeness of the set of FORA relations
generated is limited by the inferential mechanism used at the object-level.
6.2.2 When should the inference happen?
Having established that inference is necessary for mark-up, the next question is
whether inference should be applied at the object level before mark-up, during mark¬
up, or after mark-up (at the meta-level). The latter is not appropriate, because at the
meta-level the proposition 'a&b' is simply a name or atom, and thus the application of
and-elimination to it is impossible at the meta-level and would require object-level
syntactical knowledge.
The two options left are :
(1) to use a mark-up process which performs inference at the object-level in order to
generate, incrementally, all possible candidates for mark-up; or
(2) to generate the closure of the theory with respect to the inference mechanism, or a
complete proof of a target proposition, then mark that up after the inference is
complete.
Note that both possibilities potentially do not terminate (repeated application of or-
introduction, for example, will not terminate in general).
Another example will make clear what the options are. Suppose we have a theory as
follows :
[a&b, a—<c].
Option I involves generating
justificationfc, [a—c, a&b])
by a mark-up process which itself carries out the necessary and-elimination step before
applying the modus-ponens template, and representing it as a justification in FORA.
With this option, inference is embedded in the mark-up process.
Alternatively, option 2 would first generate the closure of the theory with respect to the
inference mechanism...
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[a&b, a—>c, a, b, c, avb, avc, ] 1
...and then mark-up afterwards. A more conservative reading of the second option
(see section 6.3) is to target a particular conjecture and use the inference mechanism to
generate a proof of that conjecture, and then mark-up that proof.
The second option is discussed in detail in section 6.3. First we will look more closely
at what the first option involves. In either case the mark-up process requires an
inference engine or theorem prover, so I begin by describing the one I used.






Figure 6.2 : The theorem prover, which applies inference rules
to a theory in order to try to generate a proofof a conjecture. The
conjecture generator selects propositions named in the theory,
which the theorem prover will attempt to prove.
The inference mechanism which I implemented is a prepositional logic theorem prover
(See figure 6.2). This inference mechanism takes a theory, generates a set of
hypotheses (conjectures) to attempt to prove from that theory, and then attempts to
1 Note that in general this is non-terminating due to the use of or-introduclion, so some limit would
need to be put on the inference.
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prove each of them with the theorem prover, recording the proof if there is one. The
set of conjectures which are generated from the theory is the set of literals (atomic
propositions) occurring in the theory, plus the set of their negations. The theorem
prover can also be invoked to attempt a proof of a conjecture (which can be arbitrarily
complex) given by the user, in other words it is not restricted only to proving
conjectures generated automatically from the object-level theory.
The proofs are generated using sequent calculus inference rules, backward chaining
(depth-first, left-to-right) from the goal sequent:
Theory h Conjecture
where t means 'entails'. The proof terminates when there are no remaining
conditions of inference rules remaining to be satisfied.
Sequent calculus was chosen as the inference technique because it uses a large set of
inference rules from which to abstract when marking-up. By contrast, an inference
technique such as resolution, which uses only one inference rule, would be expected
to pose much less of a challenge when marking-up proofs, because each step in the
proof wouid be handled in the same way.
A second benefit of sequent calculus is that it is straightforward to add new inference
rules to the rule-base, including rules which are logically invalid, such as abduction.
These can be used to generate plausible (though logically invalid) arguments in FORA.
The third, and most important, benefit of sequent calculus is that its proofs contain a
complete record of the proof situation (the state of the theory and conjecture) at each
inference rule application. No additional context, history or working memory needs
to be recorded, in order to generate a full proof from the theorem prover. Unlike a
resolution theorem prover, or a natural deduction theorem prover, there is no need to
generate a 'trace' of the proof procedure in order to generate a full record of the proof
(including vital information such as the discharge of assumptions, for example). This
is explained by Dana Scott in [Scott 81] as follows :
"The idea of using sequents is to display on the left of the t
symbol all the required assumptions. In following the flow of
argument, the assumptions will be movedfrom left to right (or
will simply disappear). At every step everything is explicit :
the books are always open to public inspection. The cost of
this procedure is that your arms get very tired carrying large
books around .... The advantage of the sequent scheme is that
general arguments about provability are easier to give." (pi30)
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An example of an inference rule is:
r h p, A r h y/, A
arid-introduction :
r r p & n/, a
This rule says that if the theory r entails the proposition <t (plus the set of propositions
A), and it also entails the proposition ty (plus A ), then r must entail the proposition
$ &if (plus A).
The proofs which are recorded are simply lists of the inference rules applied during the
proof. A 'residue' inference rule allows the capture of partial proofs, and thus the
ability to record at the meta-level which propositions are not justified and thus are a
dead end in a proof tree.
The theorem prover includes a depth-check to prevent proofs of a depth of greater than
25 steps down any branch, and a loop-checker to prevent infinite loops. See section
6.2.1 for comments explaining why a limit to the size of the inference search tree is
needed.
6.2.4 Dynamic mark-up
The first of the two mark-up methods using the theorem prover is called 'dynamic
mark-up'. The proof procedure is embedded within the mark-up process and drives
the generation of FORA relations. The dynamic mark-up module monitors the
application of each inference rule by the theorem prover and records 0,1 or 2 meta-
level relations for each proof step, as it is taken. Most of these relations are
justifications, though negation-introduction and negation-elimination also allow
disagreements (between negations) to be recorded.
The FORA relations are added as an additional component in the rules, which ensures
instantiation of the proposition names as the propositions are used in the proof. For
example, the and-introduction rule shown above would record at the meta-level the fact
that A&B is justified by the set /A,B). The and-introduction rule thus becomes as
follows, in which an additional component is added by the FORA relation which can
be derived from it:
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As a proof proceeds all the FORA relations generated by it are recorded. All the
propositions mentioned in the relations are altered to make clear that the FORA relation
at the meta-level is between the proposition names. This is done by surrounding each
proposition by triangular brackets, so A&B becomes <A&B>. This is an important
syntactical detail, as it indicates that these are FORA objects which cannot be
decomposed, and that they are the basis building blocks for constructing arguments.
The point is that FORA does not make any logical distinction between A—>B and
'Clouds lead to rain' . In FORA they are both atomic. The final FORA relation
recorded by the dynamic mark-up would look like :
justification(<A&B>, [<A>,<B>]).
6.2.5 Problems with dynamic mark-up
The primary problem with this method of mark-up is that it requires alteration to the
inference mechanism. Every inference rule is altered by the addition of an extra
component representing the FORA relation or relations which relate to the rule
application. This therefore requires that the theorem prover is re-implemented in order
to reason with these different rules.
Secondly, in dynamic mark-up, knowledge about how rules can be interpreted as
argumentation steps is attached to individual inference rules. This is limiting. It
would be preferable to represent this knowledge in a more general manner, so that
argumentation steps could be deduced from chains of reasoning 'in general' rather
than being tied to particular inference rules.
Thirdly, when we produce real arguments, we regularly gloss over several reasoning
steps which we could give in more detail if necessary. It would be good if the mark¬
up process had this sort of flexibility, rather than being merely an echo of each
inference step made by the object-level theorem prover.
A fourth problem is that this method of mark-up is entirely dependent on the ability of
the modified inference engine to achieve proofs automatically, which is not generally
possible, and this limits the potential of mark-up to those cases where a proof is
achievable automatically.
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Finally, the most problematic thing about dynamic mark up is that the alterations to
the inference mechanism would have to be repeated for every different knowledge
representation language and new inference engine which needed to be used to produce
a FORA knowledge base. Each new legacy knowledge base thus requires, in
principal, that its inference engine is rewritten.
In the next section, the other alternative approach to mark-up is examined to show that
it is possible to overcome these problems.
6.3 Mark-up by Parsing Proofs
This section describes a second technique which automatically marks-up a proof of a
conjecture, constructed by an object-level theorem prover from a theory (or in KBS
terminology, an inference chain produced from an inference engine reasoning over a
knowledge base). This technique is proof parsing. It takes a proof as input and
outputs a set of FORA statements which describe the justifications and other
argumentation relations used in the proof. These relations are abstractions of the
reasoning steps used in the proof.
This technique is an improvement on the earlier attempt to automate mark-up because it
does not have the theorem prover embedded inside it. Instead it only uses the output
of a theorem prover - the proof - which it parses to deduce the reasoning steps
involved in it, resulting in a FORA knowledge base. The proof parser is implemented
to parse proofs from the sequent calculus theorem provcr as described in section
6.2.3. Proof-parsing is illustrated in figure 6.3.
6.3.1. Parsing Proofs
The individual proof steps are analysed and a record made of the justifications
involved in each one. This is done by parsing each of the proof rule applications
given in the proof, in turn. A small set of parsing rules analyse the differences
between the succedents and the antecedents in the sequents at each stage in the proof in
order to extract the nature of the deduction which must have occurred at that point.
The proof-parsing rules are general in form and work at a more abstract level than the
syntactical details of the inference rules. This abstraction is achieved by using a
separate module of inference rule destructors to determine if the conditions of each
parsing rule apply. These destructors are themselves more general-purpose than the
dynamic mark-up technique, as they refer only to the relative forms of the sequents
used in the inference rules, and do not depend at all on the syntax used to represent
conjunction, negation etc. For example, the destructor for checking if the
consequent has changed in a rule application applies to all possible sequent calculus
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inference rules. Hence if new inference rules are added to the rule base, the
destructors can apply equally to them. The rule destructors are the only aspect of this
technique which should noed to be adapted for a new inference mechunium (such as
resolution).
Figure 6.3 : Automated mark-up by parsing proofs.
The diamond-shaped boxes represent programs and the
rectangular boxes represent structures manipulated or used by the
programs. The uppermost section of the diagram represents the
meta-level, thus arrows pointing upwards indicate abstraction.
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The principal achievement here is the analysis of proof steps without any knowledge
of the object-level syntax (eg: & and -») or decomposition of compound
propositions. In other words, the parser does not know what the rule definitions are,
and simply treats each one as a transformation from one sequent to a set of one or
more (when the proof branches) sequents.
The proof parsing rules will apply to any proof in which the state of the theory and the
conjecture is explicit at each inference step, so they are not restricted to a particular
theorem prover. This has been demonstrated with the sequent calculus theorem
prover described earlier, augmented from the propositional case to full first order
predicate logic. Without any alteration at all to the proof-parsing rules, or sequent
destructors, full FOPL proofs can be parsed completely using the same parse rules as
required for propositional logic proofs.
The parsing rules are implemented in Prolog, and included as appendix A. Each of
these parse rules takes a single inference rule application and generates one or more
FORA relations to describe it. Parsing takes as input the complete proof and
generates a complete FORA representation of the reasoning steps.
Definition : Given a proof n, which is a set of inference rule applications,
3F, a set of FORA relations, such that
parsed_proof( n, F) iff
n = 0 and F = 0
or, VI e II, 3 S, parse(I, S) and F n S .
Definition : Given an inference rule application , 7,
and a set ofproof-parsing rules, R,
3 S, a set of FORA relations, such that parse(I, S) iff
3r e R, and r: I ==> S
The parse rules are as follows. Note that in a sequent, the succedent is the current
conjecture, and the antecedent is the current state of the theory. These descriptions
are given as if the proof is generated by backward chaining, so the changes to the
sequents at each inference step are described as changes moving from the conclusion
of the inference figure (below the line) up to the antecedent of the inference figure
(above the line). The conventional inference rule names (I use the conventional
natural deduction nomenclature) refer to introductions and eliminations of formulae
reading down the proof, or forward chaining. However, a proof can be generated or
read in either direction, and I have adopted the approach of describing each proof step
upwards because it leads more easily to the interpretation of the proof step as part of an
argument in which the conclusion is justified by some reasoning step.
132
For example, if the conjecture does not change during a proof step, but the theory
does, then any addition to the theory must have been deduced from (can be justified
by) whatever has been removed from the theory. Likewise, when a conjecture is
removed, it must be deducible from (is justified by) whatever conjecture(s) have
been added plus whatever propositions have been removed from the theory. The
proof parsing rules are presented in detail next.
The proof parsing rules
Rule I : If the succedent of the sequent has changed, but the antecedent has not, then
the succedents which have been removed must be justified by the succedents which
have been added.
Example : and-introduction has this form.
r t <p, a r h \p, a
and-introduction:
r h <p & i/r, A
Here, reading up the inference figure, the conjunction A&B has been removed from
the conjecture set (succedent) and A and B have been added to the two new
succedents. The theory (antecedent) has not changed during this inference step.
Hence this rule generates the FORA relation :
justification (A&B, [A,Bj).
Rule 2 : If the succedent of the sequent has changed, and no items have been added to
the antecedent, then the succedents which have been removed must have been
derivable from the new succedents plus any items in the antecedents which have been
removed.
Example : direct has this form.
direct:
r, <t> t <p, a
This rule reads the conjecture directly from the theory and therefore results in a leaf
node in the proof tree. The sequent set in the antecedent of the inference figure is
empty, therefore both the antecedent and succedent of the sequent have changed, but
nothing has been added to the antecedent. The conjecture is thus justified by the entire
antecedent set, resulting in :
justification <p. / ipl rj)
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Rule 3 : If no succedenls have been eliminated, but new succedents have been
generated, and the antecedent has changed, then any additions to the antecedent must
be justified by the eliminated elements in the antecedent plus the new succedents.
Example : implication-elimination has this form.
r h <j>, a r, y/ /- a
implication_elimination :
r, tp ->ti- a
The implication elimination rule branches the proof tree, removing an implication from
the theory in both branches. In the left hand branch, the premise of the implication is
added as a new conjecture to prove. The right hand branch continues with the same
conjecture set but the conclusion of the implication is added to the theory. Hence, no
succedents have been eliminated but ip (the premise of the implication) has been added
to the succedent in the left hand branch. The conclusion, y, is an addition to the
antecedent, and the implication, <p-r y, has been removed from the antecedent. The
third parse rule therefore justifies y with M y and^, giving
justification ( y, l<p -> y, <pj )
Rule 4 : If the succedents have changed and there's an addition to, but no removal
from, the antecedent of the sequent, then the old succedents must have been justified
by a further justification - of the new succedent by the additions to the antecedent, ie:
this is a meta-meta-level relation.
Example : implication-introduction has this form.
f <ti r yr, a
implication_introduction:
r r <p-> i//, a
This inference rule handles the situation when an implication is one of the conjectures
by generating a sub-proof in which the conclusion of the implication is added to the
conjecture set and the proof attempted with the premise of the implication as a new
assumption in the theory. The parse rule applies because the succedent of the sequent
has changed with the removal of the implication and the addition of the conclusion of
the implication. Nothing is removed from the antecedent of the sequent, and the
premise of the implication is added. The implication is thus justified by the fact that
its conclusion is justified by its premise, leading to the following meta-meta-level
statement:
justification( tp->\g, [justification( y, [ ip] )j)
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Rule 5 : If the succedents have not changed, but the antecedent has changed and the
proof has not branched, then any new items in the antecedent must be derivable from
the items which have been removed from it.
Example : and-elimination has this form.
r, <p, ip h A
and-elimination:
r.tp&yr A
Here the conjunction is removed from the theory, and replaced by the two conjuncls.
The succedent of the sequent is unchanged, the proof does not branch, and therefore
the conjunction which is removed must be justified by the two conjuncts which are
added, giving the following justification :
justification( <p & ip, IP■ <fl)
Rule 6 : If the succedents have not changed in the proof step, and the proof branches,
with the same items removed from the antecedent in both branches but different
additions in each branch, then the elements in the succedent each have a justification
consisting of the thing removed from the antecedent, together with two meta-level
justifications representing each branch of the proof, ie: this rule says that the
hypothesis is justified by generation of two sub proofs, or alternatively, that this is the
point in the proof where assumptions are discharged.
Example : or-elimination has this form in general.
r, <p t a r, v i- a
or-elimination:
r, <p v ip r a
This inference rule allows the conjecture set to be deduced from a theory, r, plus a
disjunction if the same conjecture set can be deduced from the theory plus either side
of the disjunction. In other words it generates two sub-proofs for the conjecture set.
The parse rule therefore must generate meta-meta-level relations justifying each
conjecture by the disjunction, plus statements that the conjecture is justified by each
side of the disjunction. So suppose that the conjecture 8 is an element of ts, then this
parse rule generates the following justification for it:
justification( 5. [<p v ip, justification!8. (ip I n), justification!8, IiplH)J)
Rule 7 : This rule is similar to rule 6, except that in the left-hand-branch of the proof
tree, no new derived propositions are generated and added to the theory, and
therefore the only interesting justification occurs in the right-hand-branch of the proof
tree. In other words, the hypothesis is justified by generation of a sub-proof in the
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right-hand branch of the proof.
Example : or-elimination sometimes has this form. Specifically it has this form
when the left-hand disjunction is already a member of the theory. Using the same
example as for rule 6, this rule applies when <p is already a member of r, and the
resulting justification is thus :
justifications, [ipvy, justifications, [if in)])
Rule 8 : This rule is the counter-part to rule 7, in which the hypothesis is justified by
generation ofa sub-proof in the left-hand-branch of the proof tree.
Example : or-elimination sometimes has this form. Specifically it has this form when
the left-hand disjunction is already a member of the theory. Using the same example
as for rule 6, this rule applies when y/ is already a member of r, and the resulting
justification is thus :
justifications, [<p v % justifications, [<t>in)]>
The final three rules are only invoked to parse or-elimination. The other rules have
more general applicability. For example, rule 1 parses and-introduction, or-
introduction, and equivalence-introduction. Rule 5 parses and-elimination,
equivalence-elimination and all-elimination. Rule 3 can also parse the rule for
abduction, as despite being logically invalid, it has the same sequent structure as
implication-elimination.
For an example of proof parsing explained in detail, see section 6.4.3, in which a full
first order logic proof from the aflatoxin example is parsed. Here is a very simple
example of the output of a simple prepositional logic proof parsed by the parse rules.
Conjecture: d
Theory : a&b, b—>c, c—>d
Proof:
rule(and_elim, [[a, b, b—>c, c—>d] t [d]], [a&b, b—*c, c—d) > [d])
rule(imp_elim, [[a, b, c—>d] h [b], [c, a, b, c—>d] t- [d]j, [a, b, b--c, c-xl] r [d])
rule(direct, [], [a, b, c—>d] h [b])
rule(imp_elim, [[c, a, b] h [c], [d, c, a, b] h [d]], [c, a, b, c- *tl] t [d])
rule(direct, [], [c, a, b] h [c])
rule(direct, [], [d, c, a, b] h [d])
Meta-level relations generated by the parser:
justification(d, [c, c—>d], imp_elim)




Look at the first rule in the proof:
rule(and_elim, [[a, b, b—>c, c—xl] h [dj], [a&b, b—>c, c—>d] h [d])
This inference rule is parsed by recognising that and-elimination involves no
branching, no change to the succedent, and a removal and two additions to the
antecedent. Parse rule 5 is therefore applicable. This results in two justifications, of
the two additions (a and b), by the item removed (a&b). Thus each side of the
conjunction is justified by the conjoined statement.
justiJication(b, [a&bJ, and_elim)
justification(a, [a&b], and_elim)
Now look at the second rule in the proof:
rule(imp_elim,[[a,b, c—>d] t [b], [c,a,b,c—>d] h [d]], [a,b, b—>c, c—kI] t [d])
Implication-elimination is a branching rule, in which there is a new succedent and
both removals and additions to the antecedent. Parse rule 3 is therefore applicable.
The original succedent (d) is retained in the right-hand-branch, and the left-hand-
branch has a new succedent (the premise of the implication, b). The implication
statement (h—< ) is removed from the antecedent in both branches. In the right-hand-
branch the conclusion of the implication (c) is added to the antecedent. The resulting
justification is that this conclusion (c) is justified by the new succedent (b) plus the
item removed from the antecedent ib-»c).
justification(c, [b, b—>c], imp_elim)
It should now be clear that proofs are marked-up in a significantly more abstract
manner than was possible using the dynamic mark-up process.
Section 6.2.5 slated five problems with dynamic mark-up. The first was that it
involved alterations to the object-level inference mechanism. This has been solved by
working entirely with the output of the inference process (the proof). I have still
assumed that the object-level inference mechanism is capable of producing a proof
tree.
The second problem was that the mark-up process was not looking at the pattern of
reasoning produced by the inference mechanism, but was actually using hard-coded
knowledge about how to interpret each particular inference rule at the meta-level. This
problem has also been addressed by parsing the structural changes to the sequents at
each step in the proof, without reference to which particular inference rule has
produced these changes.
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The third problem was that it is necessary to be able to gloss over details in the proof
when describing it as a general argument. This can be achieved entirely at the meta-
level in FORA and is the subject of the next section.
The fourth problem was the limitation of requiring that proofs are achievable
automatically during mark-up. The proof-parsing method has also addressed this
problem by starting from a completed proof, with no restriction as to how it has been
derived. Proof parsing will parse proofs which could have been created by hand, or
automatically or partially automatically with some user involvement.
The final problem was that mark-up would be different for each new representation
language and inference mechanism at the object-level. Proof parsing has also tackled
this problem by reasoning about the form of the inference steps rather than their
content, and section 6.4 demonstrates that the object-level inference system can be
altered (from propositional to full first order predicate logic) without requiring any
changes at all to the parse rules. Assessment of how widely applicable this approach
is would be an interesting area of further work.
6.3.2. Merging relations
It is possible to carry the abstraction process even further, by merging the FORA
relations which result from the parsing process to produce more sketchy outlines of the
proof. Figure 6.4 illustrates this process.
The idea here is that a proof, or chain of inference, involves steps which are not all
equally central to the argument. Some proof steps carry out syntactic manipulation
which may seem not really to progress the proof a great deal, whilst at other points the
proof seems really to have 'moved on'. For example, if the conjunction A&B&C is
in the theory, and so is B —> D, deduction of D will involve an implication-
elimination step and also two and-elimination steps. The proof makes significant
progress as a result of the three rule applications taken together, so they could usefully
be merged into a summary of this stage of the proof.
When summarising the central argument in a proof or inference chain, there are
therefore likely to be steps which can be glossed over, and details of the object-level
syntactical manipulation which can be ignored. I am not claiming here that FORA can
possibly make the sorts of judgements required to decide when a proof step is
significant and when it is not - apart from anything else, in FORA each statement is
just a proposition name and the syntax is not available for reasoning about.
However, FORA does provide some useful machinery for combining several proof
steps into one and thus giving a more succinct description of the reasoning involved.
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Figure 6.4 : Further meta-level analysis ofa proofby merging and outlining.
For example, take the two inference steps parsed in section 6.3.1 :
justification(c, [b, b—>c], imp_elim)
justification(b, [a&b], and_elim)
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Of these, the deduction of b from a&b seems fairly obvious, whilst the application of
modus ponens by the elimination of the implication seems rather more substantive.
Also from the point of view of producing an argument for c, the two steps can be
neatly combined to give the following justification which captures the gist of the
argument.
justification(c, [b->c, a&b])
In merging, the justification relations are analysed and more abstract relations are
deduced by merging two or more relations into one. The merging algorithm is very
simple. If Q is one of the supports for P in P's justifications, and there is a
justification for Q too, then merging results in a new justification for P, which is the
union of Q's supports with the rest of P's supports.
Definition : merge]justification]P, SI), justification]Q, S2)) gives
justification]P, S3) iff




would be merged to give
justification]a, jb,e,fg,dj).
In this way, the intermediate details in a proof are ignored.
Merging is carried out exhaustively on the set of justifications resulting from parsing a
proof, to give the complete FORA proof_representation.
Definition : Given a proof, n, and a set of FORA relations F,
such that parsed_proof( II, F),
3R. proofrepresentation] 17, R) iff
V J. (J e F) —» ]J e R) and
VJ . (3J1 e R and 3j2e R and merge]Jl, J2) = J) —> J e R
One of the merged justifications in the proof representation is particularly significant.
It is called the outline proof. It is the justification of the conclusion of the proof by
listing all of the assumptions used in it (ic: all the leaf nodes of the proof tree, which
are the statements in the initial theory, or axioms, involved in the proof). This outline
proof states which subset of the underlying theory the conclusion is dependent upon.
It is important because it is the justification which results from removing all of the
derived or intermediate conclusions in the proof. Merging is abstraction, blurring out
one node in the proof tree at a time, while the proof outline is the end result of
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merging. It is the relation which captures the entire proof in a single justification step -
the proved conjecture is justified by the initial assumptions.
Definition : Given a theory, T, a conjecture, C, and a proof, PI, of Cfrom T,
such that proof_representation(n, R), then
3P. outline _proof(n, P), iff
P € R & P = justification)C, S) & subset(S, T).
In the example from section 6.3.1, the following three relations are generated by
merging.
justificationfc, [b—>c, a&b])
justification(d, [c-hI, b, h—>c])
justificationfd, [c—>d, b—>c, a&b])
The third of these justifications is the outline proof, because all three of the supports
are elements of the original theory, and no additional derived or intermediate
conclusions are included, so the support set is a subset of the theory. FORA's output
is as follows :




This section has described how FORA can take a parsed proof and, working entirely at
the meta-level, continue to provide other useful abstractions of the proof structure,
using simple merging and outlining techniques.
6.4 Illustration of proof-parsing in terms of the aflatoxin debate
In this section I illustrate automated mark-up by showing how the argument for the
FDA's policy can be automatically abstracted from a first order predicate calculus
proof. This illustration has several stages.
Firstly, a first order predicate calculus theory is given which is the knowledge base to
be marked up. Secondly, the conjecture, which states that the FDA policy should set
the maximum allowed level of aflatoxins at 20 parts-per-billion, is proved from the
theory. Thirdly, the proof of the FDA policy conjecture is parsed by the proof-
parser, resulting in a marked-up proof-representation of the subset of the knowledge
base used in the proof, consisting of a set of FORA relations. Finally, the merger
and proof outliner extract the key steps in the argument.
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6.4.1 A first order predicate logic knowledge base about aflatoxins
This theory is the formalised version of the FDA policy argument, as given by Fox in
[Fox 94], in a slightly altered syntax (in particular with the addition of quantifiers).
Some comments are included in the theory - these begin with a percentage (%) sign.
In Fox's representation, each statement in the theory has a name, and these are given
before each statement, indicated by the double percentage sign (%%).











% Next there are several implications in which variables are used,
% which illustrate the inclusion ofquantifiers in the FOPL theory
%% extrapl
Vagent, Vspeciesl, Vspecies2, Vclass,





Vagent, Vpath, Vspeciesl, Vspecies2,
(current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &
causes(agent, path, speciesl) A
can_extrapolate(agent, speciesl, species2))
—> causes(agent, path, species2)
%% safe I
V agent, Vspecies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
—> no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species)
%% minimi
V compound, Vpath, V species, V min,
(no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min))
-> maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min)
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%% fdal
V agent, Vpath, V level,
(causes(agent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level))
—> policy_level(agent, level)
6.4.2 Proving the FDA policy conjecture
The following conjecture :
policy_level(aflatoxins, '20ppb')
is proved using the sequent calculus theorem prover described in section 6.2.3. For
the full proof, which runs to several pages, see appendix B.
In order to prove this conjecture, the theorem prover needed to be upgraded from a
propositional theorem prover to a full first order calculus theorem prover. This was
done by adding four inference rules for handling quantified expressions :
(i) introduction of the universal quantifier: all-intro
(ii) elimination of the universal quantifier : all-elimination
(iii) introduction of the existential quantifier : exists-introduction
(iv) elimination of the existential quantifier: exist-elim.
In fact only two of these (all-elimination and exists-introduction ) are needed in the
proof. The object-level proof consists of 40 inference steps. This includes 12
applications of the direct rule, 17 applications of all-elimination (one for each
universal quantifier in the theory), and the remainder are all applications of exists-
introduction, and-introduction and implication-elimination.
In addition, some variable handling was needed in order to guide the instantiation of
variables by these four rules. Two types of instantiation are possible - either by
matching terms on similar terms in the theory, and deducing plausible constant values,
or by asking the user to give an instantiation. This avoids the system generating
implausibly large search trees by generating partial proofs with inappropriate variable
instantiations.
A summary of the proof is as follows :
1. all-elimination is repeatedly applied to the extrapl implication in the theory until all
the universal quantifiers are replaced by constants.
2. implication-elimination removes the implication, and branches the proof tree, so
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that one branch now has the conjunction of exlrapl's antecedents as its goal to prove
(the succedent of the sequent).
3. On that branch, anti-introduction branches the proof tree again to separate the two
parts of the conjunction.
4. The left-hand branch's goal (succedent) is the existentially quantified
3path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)
so the exists-introduction rule is applied and instantiates the existentially quantified
variable 'path' with 'cancer'. (It does this by matching on the theory). The resulting
instantiated succedent is found by an application of the direct rule.
5. The proof returns to the right-hand-side of the conjunction branch from Step 3.




Both of these are found by application of the direct rule as they are facts in the theory.
6. The left-hand-branch resulting from the implication-elimination application (Step 2)
is now complete, so the right-hand-branch continues, with
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)
in the antecedent of the sequent, the extrapl implication removed from the antecedent,
and the FDA policy conjecture still as the goal proposition (succedent) of the sequent.
(Elsewhere I describe it as an 'intermediate conclusion' which is added to the theory
during the proof but is not part of it at the start).
7. The next phase of the proof is similar to steps 1-6, as the extrap2 implication is
handled. All-elimination is repeatedly applied to the extrap2 implication in the theory
until all the universal quantifiers are replaced by constants. Then implication-
elimination branches the proof tree and and-introduction branches it again. There is
no equivalent of step 4 this time as the existential quantifier is not used. A second and-
introduction and three applications of direct complete this branch of the proof. The
right-hand-branch continues, with the extrap2 implication removed from the
antecedent and
causes!aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
added to the antecedent.




9. The same process occurs with minimi to derive
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)
10. Finally, the fdal rule is used, adding
policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)
to the antecedent. As it is the succedent too it can be derived using direct, thus
completing the proof.
The proof is output in the form shown in appendix B. This output includes some
annotation and layout infomiation. Internally the proof is just the list of the inference
steps. This list is next passed to the proof-parser, as explained in the next section, in
order to generate the argument structure from the proof. No additional information is
required by the proof parser.
6.4.3 Parsing the proof
By applying the parse rules to each step in the proof in turn, the set of FORA relations
shown in appendix C are derived. Note that for clarity they have an additional
argument stating which type of inference rule they resulted from.
The parse rules used are those described in section 6.3.1, and the proof is parsed
recursively, one inference rule at a time. The proof involves five different inference
rules, so five different types of parsing occur. Each inference rule type is always
parsed by the same parse-rule. Here 1 shall describe the effect of parsing each type of
inference rule used in the proof of the FDA policy conjecture.
1. all-elimination : This rule is parsed by the fifth parse-rule (see appendix A for the
full Prolog version of the parse rules). The parse succeeds because :
- there is no hypothesis change (ie: the succedent of the sequent is the same
above and below the line, or in other words, before and after the inference step);
- the theory does change (ie: the antecedent of the sequent is altered by the
inference step);
- the proof tree does not branch at this step.
The justification which results is the new addition to the antecedent, justified by the
term(s) removed from the antecedent. In this case, the term resulting from
instantiating the universally quantified variable is added. The universally quantified
term is removed. Therefore the result is that the instantiated term is supported by the
universally quantified term. For example, in the inference rule application shown in
figure 6.5, the variable agent is instantiated to aflatoxins. The term which alters in the
inference step is emboldened. The parse rule picks out the two highlighted terms and
produces the following justification.
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V species, current_assessment{aflatoxins, cancer, species)
—* no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species),
V agent, Vpath, V level, causes(agent, path, humans) &
max_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
—* policy_level(agent, level),
V compound, V path, V species, V min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
min_detectable_level(compound, min)










V agent, V species, currentjassessmentfagent, cancer, species)
—► no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species),
V agent, Vpath, V level, causesfagent, path,humans) &
max_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
—* policy_level(agent, level),
V compound, V path, V species, V min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
min_detectable_level(compound, min)










Figure 6.5: Application of inference rule : all_elimination
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justification(all(species, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species)
—» no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species)),
[all(agent, allfspecies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
—» no_safe_level(agenl, cancer, species)))], all_elim)
It is important to note that the parse rule uses general structural changes brought about
by the inference step, rather than using knowledge about the particular inference rules.
2. implication-elimination : Implication-elimination rule instances are parsed by the
third parse rule (again see appendix A for the details of the parse rule). The parse
succeeds because :
- there is a new hypothesis (succedent of the sequent) added but the prior
hypothesis is also retained, ie: the succedent is not removed entirely (this is because
the proof branches, with the original succedent on one branch, and a new one on the
other branch);
- the theory (antecedent of the sequent) changes, with both additions and
removals.
Any addition to the theory is justified by the union of the removals and the new
hypothesis. In this case, the addition to the antecedent in the right-hand-branch is the
conclusion of the eliminated implication. The new hypothesis in the left-hand-branch
is the premise of the implication. The implication is removed from the antecedent in
the right-hand-branch. Therefore the conclusion is justified by the premise, and the
implication, resulting in a justification which looks just like an application of modus
ponens. Again it must be noted that this is achieved solely by looking at the structural
changes in the sequents before and after the inference step, and not with any
knowledge of implication elimination in particular.
An example, showing parsing of an application of implication-elimination, is given in
figure 6.6.
The highlighted changes result in the following justification :
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) &
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) &
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)









V agent, V species,
current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species),
V compound, V path, V species, V min,




V agent, V path, V level,






causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &













V compound, V path, V species, V min,










current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) &









V agent, V species, currentjassessmentfagent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
Vcompound, V path, V species, V min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))), allfagent,
Vpath, V level, causesfagent, path, humans) &.




By now it should be becoming clear that the argument structure which is extracted
from each inference step is a useful clarification of the significance of each step in the
proof. Parsing picks out the pertinent change at each step, and ignores the rest. The
achievement here is that this is done at the meta-level in a way which is entirely
independent of the object-level syntax.
3. direct : All instances of the direct inference rule are parsed by the second parsing
rule. Parsing succeeds because :
- There is a change to the hypothesis (succedent of the sequent); and
- There is a removal from, but no addition to, the theory (antecedent).
The justification which results is that the old succedent is justified by the union of the
new succedent and the removed antecedents. In the case of direct, both the new
succedent and new antecedent are empty. Hence the original succedent (which is read-
off directly from the antecedent) is justified by the antecedent.
Figure 6.7 shows as an example the final application of direct in the proof of the FDA
policy conjecture. Note that there is nothing 'above the line'.
The following justification results.
justification)policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
Ipolicy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),






















Figure 6.7: Application of inference rule : direct
4. Finally, both and-introduction and exist-introduction are parsed by the first
parsing rule. This serves to demonstrate that the parsing is not inference-rule specific,
as both these rules have the same structural characteristics recognised by this single
parsing rule. The parse succeeds in both cases because :
- The hypothesis (succedent) is altered by the step - both removing a
hypothesis and adding new one(s) (note that in and-introduction the inference step
branches the proof, and in exists-introduction it does not);
- The theory (antecedent) is not altered by the inference step - the changes are
entirely to the succedent of the sequent.
The resulting justification is that the succedent(s) which were removed, must have
been justified by the new succedent(s). So, for exist-elim, the existentially
quantified term is justified by the term with its variable instantiated to some constant.
For and-introduction, the conjunction is justified by the two conjuncts. Figures 6.8






































causesfaflatoxins, cancer, humans) &
max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)







V agent, Vpath, V species 1, V species2, currentjassessmentfagent, path, species2)
& causesfagent, path, speciesI) & can_extrapolate(agent, species1, species2)
—> causesfagent, path, species2),
V agent, Vspecies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
—> no_safe_levelfagent, cancer, species),
V compound, Vpath, V species, V min, no_safe_leveIfcompound, path, species)
& min_detectable_levelfcompound, min)
—» max_acceptable_levelfcompound, path, species, min),
V agent, Vpath, V level, causesfagent, path, humans)
& max_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
—* policy_level(agent, level))))
h current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),




V agent, Vpath, V species!, V species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)
& causesfagent, path, species!) & can_extrapolatefagent, species!, species2)
—* causesfagent, path, species2),
Vagent, Vspecies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
—> no_safe_levelfagent, cancer, species),
V compound, Vpath, V species, V min, no_safe_leveIfcompound, path, species)
& min_detectable_levelfcompound, min)
—* max_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min),
V agent, Vpath, V level, causesfagent, path, humans)
& max_acceptable_levelfagent, path, humans, level)
—* policy_levelfagent, level))))
V 3 path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)
Figure 6.9: Application of inference rule : exists^introduction
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In figure 6.8, the following justification is derived from the succedents of the sequent
prior to inference, and of both branches after the inference rule application (above the
line):
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(dflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
[causesfaflatoxins, cancer, humans),
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)])
The same parse rule parses the non-branching, exists-introduction inference rule
application in figure 6.9. The following simple justification is derived :
justification(3path. current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)),
[current_assessmenl(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)])
Having abstracted the main steps of the proof, FORA can be used to carry the
abstraction process even further, as illustrated in the next section.
6.4.4. Further abstraction in FORA, merging argument steps and proof-
outlining
The set of relations produced by the parse-rules give the argument structure of every
step in the proof. This section shows how FORA can merge the steps in the argument,
producing an outline proof.
First FORA merges the justification steps just derived by proof parsing. Two
justifications of the following forms :
justification(P, [....Q ])
justification(Q. [....])
can be merged, to give a new justification for P whose support is the union of its
original support (minus Q), and the support for Q. The result of merging the
justifications derived by parsing the proof of the FDA's policy is given in appendix D.
A summary of the merged rules and the outline proof is given here.
At the start of the merging process there is exactly one justification per inference rule
application in the proof. The merging process achieves proof abstraction by
eliminating the intermediate propositions derived by application of inference rules.
Two justifications which represent two inference rule applications are merged,
resulting in the intermediate conclusion being abstracted away. This increases clarity.
Five examples are given to illustrate this.
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(i) Merging combines the repeated applications of all-elimination which instantiate
the universally quantified variables in the rules, to give a single justification of the fully
instantiated rule instance from the universally quantified version, abstracting from all
the intermediate stages when the rule instance is partially instantiated. For example,
here is the merged justification for the rule called extrap2.
justification(current_assessment)afiatoxins, cancer, humans) &
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)
—> causes)afiatoxins, cancer, humans),
[Vagent, Vpath, Vspeciesl, Vspecies2,
current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &
causes)agent, path, species 1) &
can_exlrapolate)agent, species 1, species2)
—> causes)agent, path, species2]))
(ii) Merging also combines the results of merging the all-elimination steps with an
application of implication elimination which allows the conclusion of an implication to
be deduced from its premise(s). For example, here is the result of merging the
instantiation of the rule safel and the elimination of the implication.
justification(no_safe_level(afiatoxins, cancer, humans),
[current_assessment(afiatoxins, cancer, humans),
V agent, Vspecies, current_assessment)agent, cancer, species)
—> no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species)!)
(iii) Merging also combines the steps involved in introducing conjunctions, and
existential quantifiers. For example, here is the result of merging the justifications
from the two instances of and-introduction, and the exists-introduction, to achieve
the combined conjunction, which is then used as the premise of the extrapl rule.






(iv) A more complex example similar to the previous one involves merging an
instance of and-introduction with an instance of implication-elimination to give the
premise of the minimi rule by application of the safel rule.
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Vagent, Vspecies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
—> no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species)])
(v) As a final example, merging also combines the results of all the all-elimination,
and-introduction, exist-introduction and implication-elimination inference steps which
are needed to apply both the extrapl and extrap2 rules and all the relevant facts, from
the theory, in order to deduce that aflatoxins cause cancer in humans.
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
[Vagent, Vpath, Vspeciesl, Vspecies2,
current_assessmenl(agent, path, species2) &
causes)agent, path, species I) &
can_extrapolate(agent, speciesl, species2)
—> causesfagent, path, species2),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
Vagent, Vspeciesl, Vspecies2, Vclass, 3palh,
current_assessment(agent, path, species2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) &
indicates_risk(class, speciesl, species2)




The outline proof which is generated from the proof is the single justification which
sums up the deduction of the conjecture from the theory, omitting all of the
intermediate inference steps. In this case the entire theory is used in the proof, so the
justification is of the policy level conclusion, from the set of all statements in the
theory. The outline proof is extracted from the complete set of merged rules, by
seeking a justification of the conjecture, and then checking that its support set is a
subset of the theory (ie: does not include any intermediate derived propositions). This
outline proof can also be described as justifying the root node of the proof tree (the
proved conjecture) by the complete set of leaf nodes (assumptions) in the proof tree.
Here is the outline proof of the policy level conjecture.
justification)policyJevel(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
[Vagent, Vpath, Vlevel, causesfagent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
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—>policy_level(agent, level),
Vagent, Vpath, Vspeciesl, Vspecies2,
current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &




Vagent, Vspeciesl, V species2,V class, 3path,
current_assessment(agent, path, species2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) &
indicates_risk(class, species!, species2)




V compound, Vpath, V species, Vmin,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
—> maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
V agent, Vspecies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
—» no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species)))])
It is important to note that the merging and proof outlining processes are carried out
entirely at the meta-level in FORA. This means that these processes treat each of the
propositions in the justifications as proposition names and do not involve any
decomposition of them at all. So, for example, if the justified proposition is an
implication, the merging and proof outlining processes do not need to know anything
about the syntax of the implication. The explanations of the merging steps just given
have talked in terms of how different inference rule applications are combined, but
from the point of view of FORA all that is happening is that two justifications of
arbitrary propositions are combined. The fact that this combination process is actually
a meaningful integration of inference steps adds weight to the thesis that abstract
representation of proofs as argument structures is both possible and useful.
The significant point here is that what appears as a meaningful integration of inference
steps is achieved by a simple merging algorithm applied at the meta-level. This
suggests that we have indeed abstracted out the significant structural aspect of
inference at the object-level and represented it more simply as an argument.
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6.5 Summary
This chapter has described how to automate mark up of existing formal knowledge
bases to FORA. In section 6.1, I explained why this is significant by arguing that it
is useful to reason about the arguments contained implicitly in legacy knowledge
bases. In order for this to be practicable it is necessary to be able to mark-up existing
knowledge bases automatically.
In section 6.2, I explained why automated mark-up of formal knowledge bases (or
theories of logic) requires inference and described dynamic mark-up, in which
abstraction is carried out during inference by modification of the inference mechanism.
There are inherent problems with having to carry out this kind of modification and so
in section 6.3 an alternative approach to automated mark up was described which
involves parsing completed proofs or inference chains independently of the inference
mechanism itself. Additional abstraction at the meta-level leading to the extraction of a
proof outline was also described.
Section 6.4 illustrated the ideas in this chapter with respect to the aflatoxin debate, and
showed how proof parsing is an adaptable and effective method for automating mark¬
up to FORA and abstracting arguments from chains of formal inference.
Having established that it is possible to automate the mapping from object-level formal
knowledge bases to FORA's meta-level representation, I turn now to the inverse
mapping from FORA to the object-level. The next chapter investigates how to help a




Supporting Mark-down from FORA
This chapter argues that FORA is useful because it supports the construction and
maintenance of object-level knowledge bases. Some tools for this are presented and
they are illustrated in terms of the aflatoxin debate.
7.1 Introduction
As introduced in chapter 3, [Fox 94] shows how to construct a knowledge base
representing two of the conflicting views about the cancer risk of aflatoxins. The
approach which Fox takes to constructing the knowledge base has two stages.
1. First, the arguments both for and against the FDA's policy are articulated at a high
level of abstraction, using English language sentences and diagrams representing the
relationships between these sentences.
2. Secondly, this high level representation is used to drive the formalisation of the
content of the argumonts into a formal language (the Logic of Argumentation, LA)
which can be reasoned with using the Argumentation Theorem Prover (ATP) [Krause
et al 95],
This chapter describes an alternative approach to this task. There is a tool within the
FORA framework called mark-down, which takes FORA meta-level argument
descriptions and uses them to guide the generation of formal object-level knowledge
bases which can be used to actually carry out the patterns of reasoning. This chapter
shows how articulating the structure of arguments at the meta-level allows FORA to
support object-level formalisation decisions, and enables some of the formalisation
process to be automated.
The object-level formal language chosen here is first order predicate logic (FOPL),
rather than the logic of argumentation (LA) as used by Fox. First order predicate
logic is chosen as it is a highly expressive language which subsumes many useful
knowledge representation and logic programming languages. A proof of concept
showing mark-down from FORA to FOPL to be possible therefore supports the
suggestion that mark-down is feasible for a broad family of formal representation
languages, including LA (which is an extension of part of FOPL involving labelling
propositions with representations of their proofs, or arguments, in a similar manner
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to the mark-up process described in Chapter 6).
Section 7.2 deals with mark-down to the object-level and describes the tool
supporting this task, section 7.2.1 gives one possible formalisation of the argument
for the FDA policy in the object-level logic, and sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 describe
how mark-down supports multiple alternative formalisations. Once a knowledge
base such as this has been constructed, it is useful to evaluate it, and in particular to
check that certain required chains of inferences (proofs) are possible. Section 7.3
describes an inference checker tool for doing just this. Finally section 7.4 draws
together the ideas of arguing (from chapter 5) and mark-down (from section 7.2) to
produce a tool which criticises the object level knowledge base by pointing out
vulnerable parts of the argument from which it derives. This demonstrates that
putting effort into a more formal abstract representation of the arguments at the
beginning pays off, not only by supporting knowledge base construction, but also by
enabling knowledge base evaluation and maintenance.
7.2 Mark-down
Having articulated the arguments at the meta-level, the FORA structures provide
support for further formalisation, or mark-down, to an object-level representation.
Each justification relation, for example, can be viewed as an indication of an
inference step which should be made possible at the object-level. The object-level is
assumed to require a language which supports a greater level of granularity of
formalisation. In particular, most interesting object-level languages involve internal
structure of propositions, in the form of rules, or predicate logic statements. The
FORA relations indicate patterns of deduction or syntactically recognisable
contradiction which should be possible in the object-level knowledge base, but they
do not provide any indication of the internal structure of the propositions.
The mark-down program supports a user in constructing elements of their object-level
knowledge base, by incrementally formalising the knowledge expressed in the
arguments, one relation at a time. The user needs to supply information to the
program, because mark-down results in a net increase in the level of detail of the
knowledge base. Unlike mark-up, therefore, it cannot in general be automated. The
abstract FORA relations between proposition names need to be filled out by adding
information about how the propositions will be represented, and the nature of the
inferences to be made possible. The mark-down program provides book-keeping
facilities and applies logical constraints to assist the user with the task of representing
the argument in predicate logic. It handles the placing and scope of connectives,
matching of predicates, and, to some extent, variable handling. The user is required
to select schemata from a list of inference descriptions. The user also provides the
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initial representation of each proposition as a predicate with arguments, but once this is
provided it is reused whenever it occurs in the reasoning, greatly reducing the risk of
syntax errors.
Example
In the following simple example, the justifications forming the argument for the FDA
policy are formalised, all in the same way, as implications. This results in a
representation similar to Fox's, though the issue of certainty factors is ignored. The
benefit is that an explicit link is kept back to the FORA representation, which can be
useful as shown in sections 7.3 & 7.4. This example marks-down the following five
justifications.
justification('The FDA policy levelfor aflatoxins should he 20ppb',
['The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb\
'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans']).
justification('The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb\
['There is no safe level of aflatoxins',
'The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20pph']).
justifica tionf'There is no safe level ofaflatoxins',
['Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans']),
justification! 'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
['Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
'Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans
is reliable']).
justification('Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals
to humans is reliable',
['Aflatoxins are a kind ofchemical',
'Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk ofchemicals
to humans']).
Each proposition name is given an object level instantiation, represented using the
two-place predicate inst/2 . They are acquired from the user.
instfThe FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb',
fda_policy_level(aflatoxins, (20,pph))).
instfThe maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb',
max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, f20,ppb))).
inst('Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
causefaflatoxins, cancer, humans)).
inst('There is no safe level of aflatoxins',
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)),
instf 'The minimum detectable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb',
min_detectable_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb))).
instf Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
causefaflatoxins, cancer, animals)),
instf Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxins from animals to humans
is reliable',
can_extrapolate(cancer_risk, aflatoxins, animals, humans)),
instf'Aflatoxins are a kind of chemical',
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemical)).
instf'Animals are good indicators of the cancer risk ofchemicals to humans',
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indicator(cancer_risk, chemicals, animals, humans)).
inst('The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb\
notfda_policy_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb))).
This knowledge base of Horn clauses is the result of formalising all the justification
relations in the same way, as implications.
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemical)
& indicator(cuncer_risk, chemicals, animals, humans)
—> can_extrapolate(cancer_risk, aflatoxins, animals, humans),
causejaflatoxins, cancer, animals)
& can_extrapolate(cancer_risk, aflatoxins, animals, humans)
—> cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans).
cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)





& cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
—> fda_policy_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb)).
7.2.1 Mark-down of a relation
This section explains how the example object-level theory just shown is generated
using the mark-down program. The mark-down program is a schema-application
program, similar to the schema application programs used in the construction of
simulation programs in [Haggith 88], [Haggith 90a], [Robertson et al 91]. The
general idea is that knowledge about how to formalise the meta-level relations in
various ways is represented as objects or schemata. For each relation, given a
particular object-level language such as FOPL, the schemata provide a variety of
options which the user can choose between to formalise the relation. The user selects
a relation, which allows the program to narrow down the range of schemata available.
The user is then asked to choose a schema. This is made possible as one of the
contents of each schema is a textual description of what it represents. Another part of
the schema consists of Prolog code for generating one or a set of object-level
propositions. This code is run once the user has requested a schema, generating the
appropriate object-level form and adding it to the object-level knowledge base.
Schemata have the following form :
schema(Name, Relation, Object-level-form, Generation-code)
The Name is the natural language description of the schema which the user selects
from. The Relation is the FORA relation to which it applies. The Object-level-form
is the resulting structure which will be added to the object-level knowledge base if
schema matching is successful. The Generation-code is Prolog code used to carry
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out the necessary instantiation of the object-level structure.
Schema matching has three steps.
1. Match the meta-level relation to the second schema item.
2. Call the Prolog goals in the fourth schema item.
3. Check that this has successfully instantiated the third schema item and if so, add the
resulting proposition(s) to the object-level knowledge base.
For example, suppose the user chooses to formalise the following meta-level relation :
justification('The FDA policy levelfor aflatoxins should he 20ppb',
['The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb\ '
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans']).
One of the schemata for justification is as follows :




findall(inst(X), on(X, RHS), S).
conjunctionfS, Q))).
This is the schema which will formalise justification(P, [Q,R]) as Q & R -> P. In
other words it treats the justification as being a simple implication.
This schema consists of four items :
1. The textual description of the formalisation it enables - in this case 'Justification as
implication
2 .The meta-level representation of the relation - in this case justification)LHS, RHS),
which matches with the relation chosen by the user.
3. The set of formalised propositions which will be added to the object-level
knowledge base - in this case [Q-> P].
4. A set of Prolog goals which when run will carry out the appropriate instantiations.
In this case these are :
(P = inst(LHS),
findall(inst(X), on(X, RHS), S),
conjunctionfS, Q)).
162
The first line of these instantiates the statement justified (either by looking it up in the
set of instantiations or asking the user how they wish to formalise it). The second line
does the same for each of the justifications, using the Prolog predicate findall/3, to
repeatedly call the goal inst(X) for each member of the set RHS which is the set of
meta-level justifications (the membership relation is called 'on')- The resulting set of
instantiated propositions is the set S. The final goal, conjunctions, Q), converts
the set of instantiated propositions, S, to the conjunction of these propositions, Q,
which in turn matches with the left hand side of the object-level implication.
In the case of the example, schema matching goes as follows :
1. First, the second item of the schema matches to the meta-level relation, so the
following variable matching occurs :
LHS = 'The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb'
RHS = 1'The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb',
'AJlatoxins cause cancer in humans']
2. Next, the Prolog goals in the fourth schema item are called, prompting the user to
give instantiations for the three propositions used in the relation. Assume that the user
gives the following three instantiations for the three propositions :
inst('The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb\
fda_policy_level(aJlatoxins, (20,ppb))).
instf'The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb\
max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb))).
inst('Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
cause{aJlatoxins, cancer, humans)).
This means that the schema variables are matched as follows :
P = fda_policy_level(ajlatoxins, (20,ppb))
S = [max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb)),
cause(ajlatoxins, cancer, humans) ]
Q = mux_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb)) &
cause)ajlatoxins, cancer, humans)
3. As a side effect of this variable matching, the object-level formalisation (the third









This is the simplest possible case for formalising a justification. The justification maps
directly to an implication, and each of the meta-level proposition names are instantiated
directly. There is no redundant information at the meta-level, and no variables are used
in the formalisation (all arguments to predicates are constants). The next section will
examine some more complex examples.
7.2.2 Supporting a range of alternative representations
The benefit of using schemata to represent knowledge about formalisation is that many
alternative formalisations can be provided to the user for any one meta-level relation.
To illustrate this, some alternative methods for providing object-level representations
of the meta-level relations are now given. This will allow some exploration of issues
such as the existence of redundant information at the meta-level, variable handling at
the object-level and introduction of quantification over variables at the object-level.
Removing redundancy and controlling inference at the object-level
In some cases, some of the meta-level proposition names may be interpreted as
unnecessary in the object-level knowledge base. An example is the following
justification, which in the initial formalisation shown above was formalised as an
implication precisely as explained in section 2.1.
justifwation('Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
['Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
'Extrapolation of the cancer risk of aflatoxins from animals to
humans is reliable']).
However, there is an alternative interpretation of this justification, which is that it
indicates a direct implication from Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals' to
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans'. Under this interpretation, the extra proposition
'Extrapolation of the cancer risk of aflatoxins from animals to humans is reliable' is
stated just to explain the implication, or to provide what Toulmin [Toulmin 58] calls a
'warrant' for the implication. Interpreted like this the final proposition is redundant at
the object-level. Note that in the meta-level knowledge base, the extrapolation
statement is itself justified and this justification was also formalised as an implication
in the mark-down at the start of section 2. In the following example we assume that
the user is being selective about what they include in the object-level knowledge base,
and choosing not to include this justification, leaving it there simply as a meta-level
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commentary on why the extrapolation is legitimate. The redundancy which is left out
of the object level knowledge base is thus both the extrapolation statemont, and the
justification of this statement.
When a knowledge engineer builds a knowledge base they need to decide not only
what knowledge to include in it, but also decide what sort of inferences will be
possible. Decisions about inference constrain how the knowledge should be
formalised. To illustrate this, an alternative to formalising the justification above as a
simple implication, or rule, is described here.
Consider what is required in the object-level knowledge base in order to enable
Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans' tube inferred from 'AJlatoxins cause cancer in
non-human animals', using an inference rule such as modus ponens. The
implication alone is not sufficient, as modus ponens requires both the implication, and
the left-hand-side of the implication to hold, in order for the right-hand-side to be
deduced. So, say the instantiations of the two propositions are as follows :
inst( Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
cause(aJlatoxins, cancer, humans)).
inst( Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
cause)aflatoxins, cancer, animals)).
The object-level knowledge base is required to contain both
cause)aflatoxins, cancer, animals) —> cause(aJlatoxins, cancer, humans)
and
cause)aflatoxins, cancer, animals)
so that modus ponens can be used to deduce
cause)ajlatoxins, cancer, humans).
The schema enabling this formalisation is the following :





findall(inst)X), on)X, Rest), S),
conjunction)S,Q))).
As before, the conclusion of the implication is the instantiation of the left hand side of
the justification. But in this case, the user is asked which, if any, of the statements on
the right-hand-side of the justification are redundant, and only the remaining
statements arc instantiated and used as the conditions of the implication. Note also
that the third item of the schema, which represents the object-level formalisation,
contains both the implication and also the list of instantiated condition statements, in
165
order to enable modus ponens to deduce the conclusion.
Continuing the example, if the user selected this schema to instantiate the justification
above, the schema matching would proceed as follows :
1. First the second item of the schema would match to the justification giving these
variable instantiations :
LHS = 'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans'
RHS = ['Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals',
'Extrapolation of the cancer risk ofaflatoxinsfrom animals to
humans is reliable']
2. Next, the Prolog goals in the fourth schema item are called. The left-hand-side is
instantiated giving :
P = cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
and then the user is asked to point out redundant statements in the right-hand-side.
Assume that they select the statement about extrapolation as redundant in the object-
level inference. Thus
Rest = [Aflatoxins cause cancer in non-human animals']
S = [cause)aflatoxins, cancer, animals)]
Q = causefaflatoxins, cancer, animals).
3. The third schema item )[Q -> PI S]) is now fully instantiated and so the statements
cause)aflatoxins, cancer, animals)
—> cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
causefaflatoxins, cancer, animals)
are added to the object-level knowledge base.
This example has illustrated two things. Firstly, it has shown how information at the
meta-level can be omitted during formalisation when it is considered redundant in
terms of the object-level inference system. Secondly, it has shown how schemata can
be used to enable users to decide during formalisation how inferences shall occur at the
object-level, and thus to ensure that the object-level knowledge base contains all that it
needs to enable the inference to go through. In section 7.3, a tool is described which
enables this decision to be postponed until later if necessary, and to verify that chains
of inferences are possible as a result of a set of inference steps which have been
formalised using individual schemata.
7.2.3 Handling variables and quantification at the object-level
In this section another alternative formalisation is demonstrated to illustrate the use of
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variables at the object-level. The examples so far have all produced object-level
formalisations which are ground, ie: all the arguments of the object-level predicates are
constants. However in full first order predicate logic, arguments can also be
variables, and these variables can be quantified over. There are inference rules which
handle reasoning with quantified variables appropriately. The following example
shows how a schema can introduce a quantifier and enable inference with the resulting
quantified statement. This example is illustrative of what is possible, and further
schemata will need to be devised to enable the complete range of uses of quantifiers
within full first order predicate logic to be handled at the object-level.
Suppose that we want to use a variable to represent the level of aflatoxins in the
following justification :
justification!'The maximum acceptable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb',
['There is no safe level of aflatoxins',
'The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb'j).
By using the same variable for the level of aflatoxins both times it occurs, (instead of
actually stating its level to be 20ppb as we did in the initial formalisation), the
maximum acceptable level will be deducible at the object-level, from the knowledge of
the minimum detectable level by unification of the variables during inference at the





This states that, for any level, X, if it is the minimum detectable level of aflatoxins,
and there is no safe level, then that level is the maximum acceptable level. The level,
X, is universally quantified.
Assume the following instantiations of propositions (and note that the variables here
have been given instantiations by the user which look like two different variable
names, L and LI):
inst( 'The maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb',
max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, 'Lj).
inst('There is no safe level of aflatoxins',
no_safe_level(aflatoxins)).
inst( "The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb',
min_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 'LI')).
As an aside, it is worth noting that whenever the user gives an instantiation of a
proposition, the mark-down system simply ignores the user's attempts to differentiate
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between constants and variables, and treats every argument as a constant initially
(which is why the variable L is recorded by the system as the constant 'L'). The
system relies entirely on the mark-down schemata to decide which arguments of the
object-level predicates need to be variables and to ensure that they will unify. Thus the
user could in fact have used constants such as '20', 'level' or anything else and the
system can still replace them with appropriate variables, and likewise the user's use of
different variable names is also immaterial.
The schema which enables the justification of the maximum acceptable level to be
formalised as an implication with a universally quantified variable, is as follows :
schemaf 'Justification as implication, with universally quantified variable',
justifcation(LHS, RHS),
[forall(X, GenPred —> GenConc)],
(inst_prop_set([LHS \RHS], [inst(LHS, P) \RHSinsts]),
fndall(Y, on(inst(^Y), RHSinsts), S),
user_selects_variables(X, [P\S], [GenConc\GenS]),
conjunctionfGenS, GenPred))).
This schema is slightly more complex than those seen previously. As before, the
user selects this schema by name. Then schema matching first matches the second
schema item, and then calls the four Prolog goals in the fourth item.
The first goal finds the instantiations of the propositions used in the justification by
calling inst_prop_set/2, which looks up, or asks the user for, instantiations of the
propositions in FOPL. Then user_selects_variables/3 is called, which is an interactive
dialogue. The user is asked which arguments are to contain the quantified variables,
in each of the propositions which will appear in the object-level implication. For each
proposition, all of the arguments are given on a menu and the user can select any or
none of them. So, for example, in the case of the conclusion of the implication :
P = max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, 'L')
the user is presented with a menu containing two items : aflatoxins and 'L'. They
select 'L' as the quantified variable (and note that the fact that this 'looks like' a Prolog
variable is entirely irrelevant, and it could just as easily be the constant 'level' or
'20ppb'). Both of the propositions in the condition of the implication are treated
likewise. In the case of the proposition :
no_safe_level(aflatoxins)
the user states that no argument is quantified over (ie: that aflatoxins is a constant). In
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the case of the minimum detectable level, the user selects L as the quantified variable.
The system replaces each of the chosen arguments with the same variable name (X),
which is the variable name used in the third schema item representing the object-level
form. This third item represents the universal quantifier using the predicate forall/2,
which takes two arguments: the variable quantified over and the object level
expression which is the quantifier's scope - in this case the implication.
The final goal of the schema matching code forms the conjunction of the conditions
(exactly as in section 2.1) and then matching succeeds as the third schema item (the
representation of the object-level statement) is now fully instantiated. The following




This section has demonstrated how the schemata can support a user in the consistent
use of variables and quantifiers in their object-level knowledge base. This is achieved
by embedding instantiation of propositions inside the schema matching process, and
reasoning about the internal structure of the propositions, interacting with the user, in
order to place variables appropriately so that they will unify. A simple example was
given which shows how universal quantification can be combined with implication.
The quantification schema is more complex than the previous schemata. When a
schema produces ground formulae at the object-levei (as in sections 2.1 & 2.2) the
instantiation of its internal propositions can be deferred until after schema-matching.
However when, as in this case, the schema produces non-ground propositions at the
object-level, it is necessary first to instantiate its constituent propositions because to
satisfy the other schema-matching goals the internal structure of the propositions has to
be manipulated. To be precise, the arguments of the predicates at the object-level
need to be known so that the variables can be made to unify.
To the user there is no apparent difference in behaviour - in both cases the user first
selects a schema, then gives the instantiations of the propositions at the object-level,
and then the formalised statement is added to the object-level knowledge base. The
difference is internal. In the ground case schema matching succeeds and then the
constituent propositions are instantiated. In the non-ground case, instantiation
becomes part of the schema-matching process. It could be claimed that instantiation
of propositions should be carried out within the schema-matching process in both
ground and non-ground cases, however it has been interesting to note that this is only
necessary in the non-ground case and that these two aspects of formalisation can be
uncoupled when the resulting object-level knowledge base is ground.
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The same technique can be used to include quantifiers and variables in other
formalisations like those shown in section 7.2.2 which omit redundant information,
or enable modus ponens by including rule conditions in the object-level knowledge
base. Similarly, in the case above, it is straightforward to enable the quantification
to be over a variable called 'Chemical' used in place of 'anatoxins', which would
result in a rule enabling deduction of the maximum acceptable level of any chemical
substance, if it has no safe level and its minimum detectable level is known. The
schema for including two or more universally quantified variables is more complex,
but follows the same lines as shown for one.
7.2.4 Discussion
As noted earlier, more work is required to produce a library of schemata which can
enable formalisation of relations as any arbitrary formula in full first order predicate
logic, for example there is no schema for quantifying over arbitrary numbers of
variables, nor for combining existential and universal quantifiers, and many common
inference rules are not yet implemented as schemata.
However, the schema-based mark-down tool does demonstrate, as a proof of
concept, that it is possible:
a) to represent knowledge of how to do formalisation as general schemata, which
provide mappings between meta-level relations and segments of a knowledge base
encoded in FOPL;
b) to use these schemata to support a user in generating an object-level knowledge
base, starting from abstract meta-level relations in the FORA framework;
c) to provide multiple, alternative, object-level formalisations from a single meta-level
knowledge base;
d) to address various important issues in the formalisation of knowledge, in particular
the omission of redundant information, control of object-level inference, and
handling of variables and quantification.
In the next section some tools are described which can support maintenance and
evaluation of knowledge bases once they have been formalised from arguments,
using the schema-based mark-down. This will illustrate further the benefit of
representing knowledge as abstract relations in the meta-level argumentation
framework, and in particular the flexibility it allows in changing our minds about
which arguments to formalise, and how we should formalise them.
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7.3 Object-level inference verification.
Having used schema-based mark-down to generate some object-level knowledge base
structures, it is next necessary to verify that the argument which has been used for
generation is indeed fully captured at the object-level. This involves checking that the
'line of reasoning' expressed in the argument corresponds to an inference chain at the
object-level. To verify this, there is a tool called an inference checker which first
establishes the conclusion of the argument as an inference goal, and then attempts to
infer it using the object-level inference mechanism, noting any points at which
inference fails.
Definition: Given an argument P <= S, a set of instantiations, I,
and an object-level knowledge base O,
inference_check(P) returns true iff
inst(P, P1)e1, and Oh PI,
otherwise inference_check(P) returns P2, where
P2 is generated as a failed subgoal in the attempted proofofPI
To illustrate the inference checker, recall the object-level knowledge base given at the
start of section 7.2, consisting of the following set of rules.
kmd ofiaflatoxins, chemical)
& indicatoifcancer_risk, chemicals, animals, humans)
—» can_extrapolate(cancer_risk, aflatoxins, animals, humans).
cause(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)
& can_extrapolate(cancer_risk, aflatoxins, animals, humans)
—> cause(ajlatoxins, cancer, humans).
cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)





& cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
—> Jda_policy_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb)).
These were formalised with the intention of enabling the deduction of
fda_j>olicy_level(aJlatoxins, (20,ppb)).
The inference checker program enables the user to test out this hypothesis, and
records where, if anywhere, the inference fails. In this case it fails at four proof tree
leaves, the assumptions for which are not stated explicitly in the knowledge base.
These are the following. They need to be asserted into the knowledge base to enable




indicator(cancer_risk, chemicals, animals, humans).
min_detectahle_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb)).
The syntax of these propositions is already known to the inference checker program
(via the records kept during mark-down, which record the object-level formalisations
of each FORA proposition as it is formalised) so they can be added automatically if
the user desires. Alternatively, the user can return to the mark-down program to
enable further justifications to be formalised, or they can return to the meta-level to
mark-up additional argument structure.
In the alternative formalisation illustrated in section 7.2.2, the justification of the
extrapolation statement was omitted and the schema was used to guarantee that modus
ponens will enable the inference of
cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans).
This means that the first of the four object-level propositions is already in the
knowledge base and the third is not used in the inference. The inference checker in
this case only suggests the second and fourth propositions be added to the knowledge
base.
In the case of section 7.2.3, assuming that the only different schema used was the one
illustrated (introducing a universal quantifier), all four of these statements would be
suggested by the inference checker. However, the final statement giving the minimum
detectable level, would be suggested with a variable instead of the 20ppb value, and if
the user gives a particular value this will enable the universally quantified variable to be
instantiated during object-level inference.
The inference checker thus uses information acquired, and retained, during mark-
down to enable the user to evaluate and add to their formalised knowledge base. The
inference checker requires access to the object-level inference mechanism, and this
mechanism needs to be able to record explicitly where inference fails. The further
work of generating a larger library of mark-down schemata will require a parallel in
extending the inference checker to handle a wider variety of inference mechanisms.
The inference checker demonstrates that the effort required in representing arguments
at the meta-level in FORA, is repaid when these arguments are viewed as
requirements for reasoning at the object-level. Using schema-based mark-down from
FORA, verification that these requirements have been met can be automated.
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7.4 Criticising the object-level knowledge base
The purpose of representing more than one side of the argument at the meta-level is to
enable more than one point of view to be taken into account when constructing the
object-level formalisation. Hence, a further tool, the critic program, has been
implemented to highlight points in the object level knowledge base which arc
vulnerable to counter-argument or disagreement. It does this by reasoning at the
meta-level about the statements in the formalised argument which are disputed, and
then maps down to the object level to determine the object level items which could be
questioned. It can use the schemata for mark down of relations, to suggest possible
formalisations of statements which would alter the deductions possible at the object
level.
The critic first asks the user to select a proposition at the meta-level which they want
the critic to use as the basis of its attack. All of the argumentation structures which
represent opposition (ie: all of the structures described in section 5.3.2 of this
document, including counter-arguments, rebuttals etc) are then constructed, and the
disagreement relation at their core is extracted. If one side of this disagreement occurs
instantiated in the object-level knowledge base, then the critic uses a schema for
disagreement to suggest a new object-level statement. All such statements are
generated and presented to the user.
Definition : For a proposition P in a FORA knowledge base F,
and a set ofobject-level instantiations ,0,
3 C. criticises!P, C) iff
3 S such that S is an oppositional argumentation structure for P
and disagree!Q, R) e S and disagree!Q, R) e F,
and inst(Q, Ql) e O
and schema!disagree!Q, R). C, _).
In this next example, the object-level knowledge base containing the five implications
is criticised. From the FORA knowledge base it is possible to generate various
counter-arguments to the argument in favour of the FDA policy, and these
possibilities are suggested to the user, along with negated statements of the offending
weak points in the argument. (This is because negation is currently FORA's only
schema for formalising disagreement.) The user could at this point either adopt some
of the suggestions, thus altering the inferences possible at the object-level (which
could be evaluated with the inference checker program), or alternatively, the user may
wish to take account of the weaknesses of the argument, and supply additional
arguments supporting them at the meta-level.
Note that some new evidence has been added to the meta-level in FORA, namely the
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proposition: 'Ippb is the minimum detectable level for aflatoxins'. In addition, the
new relation:
disagree( The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb,
Ippb is the minimum detectable level of aflatoxins)
has also been added, to suggest where this new evidence should be taken into account.
This new evidence was introduced in chapter 3, as support for the suggestion that the
FDA policy level is not, as the agricultural lobby claim, too low, but may in fact not
be low enough. The critic uses this new relation as the basis of its suggestion that the
minimum detectable level statement could be altered. The critic's suggestion of
simply adding the negation of the current level statement is not as sophisticated as one
might wish but it will at least alert the knowledge engineer to the possibility that this
information undermines the conclusion currently drawable from the knowledge base.
This suggestion is the third one generated in the critic's output shown below.
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ATTACKING :
The FDA policy levelfor aflatoxins should be 20ppb
IN THE OBJECT-LEVEL KNOWLEDGE BASE.
You could mark-down this relation :
disagreement(The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should be 20ppb,
The FDA policy level for aflatoxins should not be 20ppb)
For example, by adding this to the object-level knowledge base :
notfda_policy_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb))
You could mark-down this relation :
disagreement(The maximum acceptable level of aflatoxins is 20ppb,
20ppb is not the maximum acceptable level ofaflatoxins)
For example, by adding this to the object-level knowledge base :
not max_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb))
You could mark-down this relation :
disagreement(The minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins is 20ppb,
Ippb is the minimum detectable level ofaflatoxins)
For example, by adding this to the object-level knowledge base :
not min_detectable_level(aflatoxins, (20,ppb))
You could mark-down this relation :
disagreement(There is no safe level of aflatoxins,
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing no safe level ofaflatoxins)
For example, by adding this to the object-level knowledge base :
not no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
You could mark-down this relation :
disagreemenl(Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans,
There is a lack ofscientific evidence showing aflatoxins cause
cancer in humans)
For example, by adding this to the object-level knowledge base :
not cause(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)
You could mark-down this relation :
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disagreementExtrapolation ofthe cancer risk ofaflatoxinsfrom animals
to humans is reliable,
Extrapolation ofcancer risk ofaflatoxinsfrom animals to
luimans is not reliable)
For example, by adding this to the object-level knowledge base :
not can_extrapo!ate(cancer_risk, aflatoxins, animals, humans)
The second last of these suggestions is interesting as it demonstrates an important
aspect of Fox's initial analysis of the arguments in [Fox 94]. The counter-argument
to the argument in favour of the FDA policy challenges the assumption that aflatoxins
cause cancer in humans, due to a lack of corroborating scientific evidence for this
claim. In the representation shown here, this challenge has been articulated as a
proposition ('There is a lack of scientific evidence showing uflutoxins cause cancer in
humans') which disagrees with the claim 'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans', and
so the attack program has suggested the negation of this claim as a possible
formalisation.
In FORA, the lack of corroboration can also be interpreted entirely at the meta-level,
by noting a lack of supporting argument for 'Aflatoxins cause cancer in humans',
other than the argument which involves extrapolation from animal cancer-risk. This
lack of corroboration was also detected by the arguer program (see section 5.4.2)
which suggested ways that the user could add extra support to the claim that aflatoxins
cause cancer, at the meta-level, before carrying out further formalisation.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter some benefits of using FORA have been demonstrated. In particular,
some examples have been presented of software tools which make use of FORA
argument representations to support a user in the formalisation task, particularly when
faced with formalising conflicting points of view. These tools demonstrate that
arguing at the meta-level can facilitate formalisation (or mark-down) to an object-level
language, verification of inference using the resulting knowledge base and finally
criticism of this knowledge base. This final example, in particular, demonstrates the
gain from integrating abstract argumentation into the formalisation process, by
highlighting particular object-level statements which may be vulnerable to dispute or
which may need revising in the light of new evidence.
This chapter has concluded the presentation of evidence in support of my thesis that
FORA is a useful framework for supporting knowledge engineering in controversial




Conclusions and Further Work
8.1 Summary
This document has described a computational framework called FORA for articulating
arguments at a high level of abstraction and exploring the resulting structures.
Arguments and debate involve reasoning about the relationships between the
statements and chains of inference we use, and so they involve meta-level knowledge.
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on argumentation and disagreement, and in chapter 3,
I concluded that there is a need for an argumentation system handling multiple points
of view, which has the following characteristics :
1. The system should not focus on conflict resolution, but must provide facilities for
exploration of the content and structure of a debate.
2. It should enable the many useful argumentation structures from the literature (such
as counter-arguments, corroborations, rebuttals and undercutting) to be expressed.
3. It should be based on a formal language which discourages proliferation of
primitive relations without clear meaning.
4. Most importantly, the arguments should be represented at the meta-level in a way
which is independent of any particular object level language, but which can be
formally interpreted in terms of object-level logics.
FORA meets all four of these criteria and thus demonstrates that such a system is
possible. No attempt is made in FORA to resolve inconsistencies, instead FORA
includes a language for articulating disagreements and arguments at the meta-level,
and allowing users to explore them. The primitives in the language can be combined
to express standard argumentation structures, and they are limited in number and
restricted in meaning. They are also independent of any particular object-level
interpretation, and they can be interpreted as representing links between pieces of
natural language text, or between elements of a formal logic.
FORA's language was described in chapter 4, together with some tools and
techniques for acquiring knowledge from many points of view and abstracting
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arguments and controversial statements from the resulting texts.
The usefulness of FORA was argued in the remaining chapters of this document. In
chapter 5, its abilities to express many standard argumentation structures was
demonstrated, and some tools were described for helping a user to explore these
structures. In chapter 6, methods were described for constructing FORA knowledge
bases by automatic abstraction (mark-up) from formal object-level theories or legacy
knowledge bases. The usefulness of the FORA approach was also illustrated in
chapter 7, by describing how instantiation (mark-down) of the meta-level argument
structures can support construction, evaluation and criticism of object-level knowledge
bases.
In chapter 5, the following functionality was identified as important for an
argumentation system to provide :
1. to express arguments;
2. to explore existing arguments;
3. to relate the arguments from one source to those of another;
4. to add new arguments and to challenge existing arguments;
5. to represent the arguments of an existing knowledge source;
6. to criticise views of a knowledge source which are particularly controversial;
7. to construct or modify a knowledge source;
8. to check that a knowledge source actually reasons according to an argument;
9. to identify how new evidence might require changes to a knowledge source.
FORA provides, in prototype form, all of this functionality. Points 1-4, which are all
meta-level functionalities, were described in Chapter 5. Points 5 and 6 involve
handling existing object-level knowledge sources and these were the subject of
Chapter 6. Points 7-9 involve constructing and modifying object-level knowledge
sources and they were discussed in Chapter 7.
Throughout the document all tools and techniques have been illustrated in terms of a
running example which I refer to as 'the aflatoxin debate', based on a real world
controversy about an important health risk assessment. This has provided a
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preliminary evaluation of FORA's effectiveness in handling real-world argumentation,
and has enabled me to demonstrate some of the advantages of a meta-level approach to
argument representation.
8.2 Further Work
The future directions of this research include the following possibilities :
1. Application of FORA to other argumentation examples. This would demonstrate
further the ability of the FORA framework to handle complex arguments, and in
particular to address the needs of users of knowledge from multiple viewpoints.
Because of the generality of the system it is interesting to speculate on its application to
other uses of argumentation. Two examples of situations where argumentation is used
are decision making and education.
It is possible to imagine a decision-maker weighing up the arguments for and against
options, using a computer system based on FORA representations of these arguments.
The FORA system at the moment does not include functionality specifically geared to
such decision makers (this would include much more sophisticated user-interface
functionality such as graphical representation of argument patterns, and possibly also
support for conflict resolution techniques, if required). A current research project
coordinated by the author is looking at the requirements of environmental managers for
functionality of this sort, but it is important to emphasise that though interesting, such
functionality is not within the scope of this document.
Argumentation is also useful in education (see for example [Smith et al 81], [Suthers
etal 95]), both in understanding topics which are controversial where a student needs
to understand how competing views relate to each other, and also in developing
students' abilities to produce and develop arguments and enter into debates. Section
5.5 described an application of the FORA language to a tutoring situation in which the
computer plays the role of a devil's advocate to a student who is required to
understand issues in controversial domains. Development of other tools to support
the development of students' argumentation skills is another area of current and future
research.
2. Use of meta-meta-level relationships. The FORA relations are all between
proposition names, but there is a clear interest in stating relationships between relations
too, ie: reasoning about the meta-level. For example, we may disagree that a
reasoning step is really a justification of its conclusion, or that two propositions are
equivalent, or we may wish to claim that two justification steps are equivalent. In
addition, some of the proof steps parsed in chapter 6 demonstrated a need for
justifications in which one of the supports is itself a justification. The formal and
178
practical characteristics of meta meta level reasoning such as this would be an
interesting topic of further study. It would be particularly interesting to explore using
FORA to argue about its own arguments, thus providing the extra meta level by
applying FORA reflectively to itself.
3. Representation of debating moves or strategies. In Chapter 5, the FORA
language was used to represent many standard argumentation structures from the
literature. This gives a declarative representation of the structure of a FORA
knowledge base. Two lines of research present themselves here. Firstly, there is a
need to examine the extent to which the set of argumentation structures can be
considered 'complete'. I have argued that there are an arbitrarily large number of
ways of combining the basic FORA relations, but it may be that there is an effective
limit to the set of such structures which are meaningful or useful. Secondly, it would
also be interesting to look at a procedural approach to these argumentation structures,
in which patterns of FORA relations are used to define strategies for exploring
knowledge bases or for simulating debate. Patterns of repeated argumentation moves
may be a way of characterising the ways in which certain types of people act in a
debating situation (eg: always disagreeing with the most recent proposition could be a
characterisation of 'squabbling'). The devil's advocate strategy is an example of this
kind of extension to FORA. A closely related idea is the notion of implementing such
strategies as argumentation agents. The field of Distributed Artificial Intelligence
(DAI) is a rich source of ideas for novel applications of argumentation techniques, and
although in-depth coverage of DAI has been beyond the scope of this document, it is
clear that conflict between agents or distributed AI systems is viewed by some
researchers as an interesting opportunity for reasoning and debate (sec, for example,
[Galliers 90]).
4. Generalising mark-up. Automation of mark-up, described in Chapter 6, has been
shown to be possible for propositional and first order predicate logics using a sequent
calculus theorem prover. The question which remains is - how general purpose is this
technique? What is involved in automating mark up to FORA from a theorem provcr
using a temporal logic, a paraconsistent logic, or a frame-based expert system? In
addition, it would be interesting to provide methods for parsing proof steps to generate
the other FORA relations, ie: elaborations and equivalences and in particular, to use
elaborations to capture the reasoning carried out in object-level variable handling.
5. Improving mark-down. The semi-automated mark-down described in Chapter 7 is
limited by a small set of available schemata for mapping between FORA and the
object-level, so an obvious extension is to extend the schema library. It would also
be feasible to introduce a more sophisticated dialogue mechanism to help the user to
specify their object-level knowledge base. This process is similar to the 'idealisation'
process involved in building simulation models of real world systems, so dialogue
179
systems which support this process (see, for example, [Haggith 90b]) may be of
relevance here.
8.3 Conclusions
Aristotle devised logic more than two thousand years ago, as a way of articulating and
clarifying the debates held in the public arenas of Greek society. Logic was intended
as a useful tool to support the practical business of arguing, clarifying difficult
decisions and untangling conflicts. The existence of multiple inconsistent viewpoints
was assumed to be the starting point from which logical reasoning ensued. The
philosopher Stephen Toulmin has argued that during the past century, logic (and the
computer systems based on it) has been 'mathematised' and has become distanced
from its application to practical reasoning about conflicts. Disagreement,
inconsistency and contradiction are now generally treated as problems to be avoided,
removed or resolved.
I have argued the thesis that disagreements between multiple viewpoints are, as
Toulmin claims, opportunities for exploration and reasoning, and that it is both
possible and useful to provide computer-based support for handling disagreements
without resolving them. I have further argued that the most appropriate basis for
such support is by helping people to articulate arguments for points of view which
disagree, and I have described a framework called FORA for doing this.
Informal argument representations are problematic because it is not possible easily to
automate reasoning with them, so a formal representation language has been defined
in FORA. Most formal argumentation systems are object level extensions of one
particular logic, but I have argued that this is limiting, and instead advocated taking a
more abstract approach to argument representation. FORA representations treat
arguments as meta-level structures which describe the relationships between claims
expressed as propositions in any object-level language (including natural language
text). The usefulness of this framework has been demonstrated by showing how
FORA can support several knowledge engineering tasks, such as knowledge base
construction, maintenance and criticism.
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This appendix contains the Prolog representation of the proof parsing rules described
in section 6.3.1.
/* Rule 1 : If the hypotheses have changed, but the theory has not, then any old hypotheses which








/* Rule 2 : If the hypotheses have changed, and items have been removed from the theory, then the
hypotheses which have been removed, must have been derivable from the new hypotheses plus those
items in the theory which have been removed. */
rule_to_r?ls(Rule, Justifications)
hypothesis_change(Ru!e, Hyps, New),






/* Rule 3 : If no hypotheses have been eliminated, but new hypotheses have been generated, and the
theory has changed, then any additions to the theory must be justified by the eliminated elements in
the theory plus the new hypotheses. */
rule_to_rels(Rule, Justifications)







/* Rule 4 : If the hypotheses change and there's an addition, but no removal, from the theory, then the
old hypotheses must have been justified by a further justification - of the new hypothesis by the
additions to the theory, ie: this is a meta-meta-level relation */
rule_to_rels(Rule, Justifications)
hypothesis_change(Rule, Old, (New]), % just one new hypothesis
theory_change(Rule, Additions, (]),
rule_name(Rule, Name),
setof(justification(H, [justification(New, Additions)], Name),
member(H, Old), Justifications).
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/* Rule 5 : If the hypotheses have not changed, but the theory has changed and has not branched, any









/* Rule 6 : If the hypotheses have not changed in the proof step, and the proof branches, with the
same items removed from the theory in both branches but different additions in each branch,
then the hypotheses each have a justification consisting of the thing removed from the theory,
together with two meta-level justifications representing each branch of the proof, ie: this rule says that
the hypothesis is justified by generation of two sub proofs, or alternatively, that this is the point in
the proof where assumptions are discharged. */
rule_to_rels(Rule, Justifications)





% same set as L-branch
\+ (Hyps = Addsl ; Hyps = Adds2), !,
rule_name(Rule, Name),
setof(justification(Hyp,




/* Rule 7 : This rule is similar to rule 6, except that in the left-hand-branch of the proof tree, no new
derived propositions are generated and added to the theory, and therefore the only interesting
justification occurs in the right-hand-branch of the proof tree. In other words, the hypothesis is





% L-braneh has no interesting additions
theory_change_right_branch(Rule, Adds, Removals),







/* Rule 8 : This rule is the counter part to rule 7, in which the hypothesis is justified by generation





% R-branch has no interesting additions
theory_change_right_branch(Rule, Hyps, Removals),








Proof of the FDA policy conjecture
This appendix contains the proof described in section 6.4.2, in the syntax as produced





[all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2)) &
kind_of(aflatoxins, class)&indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)






all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, a!l(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_dctectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&









all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, cxists(path, currcnt_asscssmcnt(agcnt, path, species2))&
kind_of(agent, class)&indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)
->can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, spccies2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safc_level(compound, path, spccics)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&







[all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflaloxins, path, species2))&





kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, specics2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(palh, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2))&
kind_of(aflaloxins, class)&indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)






all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessmenl(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agcnt, path, species 1 )&can_exlrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_asscssment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_levcl(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_lcvel(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
alKagent, all(path, alKlevel, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans))&








all(agent, alKpath, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causcs(agent, path, species I )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, spccies)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2))&







all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[exists(path, current_assessment(af]atoxins, path, humans))&







all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species I, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safc_lcvcl(compound, path, specie3)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causcs(agent, path, humans)&





[all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans))&







all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species l)&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all (species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptablc_lcvel(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(lcvel, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[current_assessmenl(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_exlrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))»),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceplable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [cxistsCpath, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans))&
kind_of(allatoxins, chemicals)&indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans)]
[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_ol(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agenl, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causcs(agent, path, humans)&
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[exists(path, curTent_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans))&
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals)&indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)
->can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
currcnt_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causcs(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(spccicsl, oll(spccics2, currcnt_a3scs3mcnt(agcnt, path, spccics2)&
causes(agent, path, species I )&can_extrapo!ate(agent, species 1, spccies2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_asscssment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(spccies, all(min, no_safejcvcl(compound, path, spccies)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, spccies2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_levcl(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(spccies, all(min, no_safc_level(compound, path, spccies)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agcnt, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans))]
[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)*
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, specics2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_lcvel(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
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I- [kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals)&indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)]
Below line :
(current_assessmenl(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_deteciable_level(anatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolale(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]





[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species I )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, specics2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agenl, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_deteclable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximuin_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agcnt, level))))]
I- [current_assessmcnt(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)]
Below line :
(current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(allatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_delectable_level(al1atoxins, 2()ppb),
alKagent, all(path, all(spcciesl, all(species2, currenl_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causcs(agenl, path, species 1 )&can_exlrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agenl, all(spccies, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_sale_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(palh, all(spccies, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptablc_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
alKagent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]






[currenl_assessmcnt(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, al!(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]




[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectablc_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_levcl(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals)]
[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, spccies2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->po!icy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)]
Below line :
[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
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indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(atlatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_deteclable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(spccies2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agenl, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
a!l(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level)))))





[eurrent_assessuient(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species I )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessmcnt(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&







|cuiTcnt_asscssment(allatoxins. cancer, humans), causes)allatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicales_risk(chenucals. animals, humans), kind_ol(allaloxins, chemicals),
ininimum_deleclable_level(allaloxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, alKpalh. all(speciesl, all(species2, currcnt_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, specics2)
->causes(agent, path, specics2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_sal'e_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]





[all(path, all(speciesl, al!(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2)&
causes(aflatoxins, path, speciesl)&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflaloxins, path, species2)))),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_leve!(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safc_lcvel(compound, path, spccies)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_Ievel(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), currcnt_asscssmcnt(aflatoxin3, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)&
causes(agent, path, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)
->causes(agent, path, species2))))),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_levcl(compound, path, specics)&
minimum_detectabIe_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






(all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)&
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species l)&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2))),
can_oxtrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), currcnt_assessmcnt(aflatoxins, cancer, humuns),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(oompound, all(path, all(spccies, all(min, no_safc_lcvel(oompound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2)&
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causes(allatoxins, path, species 1 )&can_extrapoIate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, path, species2)))),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(inin, no_sal'e_levcl(compound, path, spccies)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[all(species2, current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, spccies2)&
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectabIe_level(anatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safc_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(specics, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detcctable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




(all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)&
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species 1 )&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflaloxins, cancer, species2))),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, currenl_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_sare_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(lcvol, causes(agent, path, humans)&







causes(ailatoxins, cancer, aniinals)&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)
->causes(allaloxins, cancer, humans),
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can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_Ievel(compound, min)->
maximum_acceptabIe_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)&
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectahle_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_lcvel(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agenl, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_leve!(agent, level))))]
I- (current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)&can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)]
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolatc(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
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lcurrent_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)&
can_extrapolate(analoxins, animals, humans)
->causes(aflaloxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(atlatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, currenl_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_sate_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&





[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(atlatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agcnt, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
ininimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agenl, level))))]
I- (current_assessment(ailaloxins, cancer, humans)]
[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(a!latoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_sal'e_level(agent, cancer, species))),
alKcompound, alKpath. all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detec(able_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKputh. all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acccplable_level(agent, path, humans, level)->policy_level(agcnt, level))))]
I- (causes(aflatoxins, cancer, unimuls)&can_exlrapolale(aflatoxins, animals, humans)]
Below line :
Ican_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals), indicales_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_dctectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
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all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policyJevel(agent, level))))]






[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(ariatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptablc_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->poIicy_level(agenl, level))))]




[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflaloxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_dctectab!e_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, spccics)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- lcauses(aflatoxins, cancer, animals)]
[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causcs(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)]
Below line :
[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
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all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, ali(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minirnum_detectableJevel(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causcs(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]





[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflaloxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of'(aflatoxjns, chemicals), minimum_detectable_levcl(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_asscssment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_sale_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_delectableJevel(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agcnt, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maxiinum_acceptablc_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]





|can_extrapolatc(allatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals). indieatcs_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(al1atoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent. cancer, species)
->no_sale_level(agent. cancer, species))),
alKcompound, alltpath. alKspecies, all(min. no_sale_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum ^detectable.leveltcompound, min)
->maximum_acceplable„level(compound, path, species, min))))),
alKagent, alltpath. all(level. causes(agent, path. humans)&
maximum_ucccplablc_level(agcnt, path, huinans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]




[all(specics, eurTcnt_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(aflaloxins, cancer, species)),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
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minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, alKspecies, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_cxtrapolatc(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
aII(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectabIe_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&








causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causcs(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectableJevel(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[all(species, current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species)),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(specics, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptablc_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&







(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(anatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)-
>maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(level,
causes(agent, path, humans)&maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)-
>policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)]
[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflaloxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKpalh, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&





causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, specics)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximuni_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&







lcauses(atlaloxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_asscssment(ullatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_delectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(specics, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]





[alKpath, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, path. species)&
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, path, species, min)))),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicatcs_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectableJevel(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_lcvel(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[a!l(species, all(min, no_safe_levcl(aflatoxins, cancer, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptablc_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species, min))),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(af1atoxins, animals, humans), currcnt_asscssment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_lcvel(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




(alKpath, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, path, species)&
minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptahle_level(aflatoxins, path, species, min)))),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemieals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&







[all(min, no_safe_level(aflaloxins, cancer, humans)&
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, min)),
no_safe_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflaloxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(afiatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(allatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species)&
minimum_detectable_leveI(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species, min))),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_cxtrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(allatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)& minimum_detectab!e_level(aflaloxins, 20ppb)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 2()ppb),
no_safe_level(al1atoxins, cancer, humans), causes(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolale(allaloxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(cheniicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_levcl(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, all(palh, all(levcl, causes(agent, path, hutnans)&




(allOnin, no_safc_levcl(allatoxins, cancer, humans)&
minimum_delectablc_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans, min)),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolalc(alla(oxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_ol'(anatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(a!latoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[no_safe_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(anatoxins, cancer, humans),
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causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_levcl(agent, level))))] I- [no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans)&minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]
[maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(afIatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]
I- [no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)]
[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&




[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessmcnt(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
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maximum_aeceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->poliey_level(agent, level))))]





[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(anatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(allatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))]





[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(alTatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(cheinicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&






(all(path, all(level, causes(aflatoxins, path, humans)&
maximum_acccptable_level(aflatoxins, path, humans, level)
->policyJevel(aflatoxins, level))),
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safeJevel(aflaloxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_exlrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_delectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]
I- [policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]
Below line :
(maximum_acceptableJevel(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(allaloxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(a!1atoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(agent, alKpath, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans)&







[all(level, causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, level)
->policy_level(aflatoxins, level)),
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(af!atoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapo!ate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]
I- [policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)J
Below line :
[all(path, all(level, causes(aflatoxins, path, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(aflatoxins, level))),
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(af!atoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causcs(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),





[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)
->policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_Jevel(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]
I- [policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb))
Below line :
[all(level, causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, level)
->policy_level(aflatoxins, level)),
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),





[maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]
I- [causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)J
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(policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb))
I- lpolicy_level(aflatoxins, 2()ppb)J
Below line :
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)&maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)
->policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
maximum_acceptabIe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_exlrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),





[maximum_acccptable_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_sal"e_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflaloxins, 20ppb)]
I- [causcs(aflatoxins, cancer, humans))
[maximum_acceptableJcvel(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
eauses(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(atlatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins, 2()ppb)|
I- (maximum_acceplable_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)]
Below line :
[maximum_acceptable_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(allaloxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of'(af]aloxins, chemicals), minimum_delectable_levcl(aflatoxins, 20ppb))
I- (causcs(aflaloxins. cancer, humans)&





[maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb), no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans), causes(a!1atoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins, 20ppb)]






[maximum_acceptable_level(afIatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb), no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)]





[policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), maximum_acceptable_leveI(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),





The parsed proof of the FDA policy conjecture
The result of parsing the proof (described in section 6.4.3) is the following set of
justifications. The third argument notes the inference rule from the proof from which
the justification was abstracted.
justification(all(speciesl, all(spccies2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path,
species2)) & kind_of(aflatoxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, species I, spccies2)
->can_exlrapolate(a!latoxins, species 1, species2)))),
[all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path,
species2)) & kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)
->can_extrapolate(agent, species I, species2)))))],
all_elim)
justification(all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2)) &
kind_of'(aflatoxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, animals, species2)
->can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, species2))),
[all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path,
species2)) & kind_of(allatoxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)
->can_extrapolale(aflatoxins, species 1, species2))))],
all_elim)
justification(all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(anatoxins, path, humans)) &
kind_of(aflatoxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, animals, humans)
->can_cxtrapolale(aflatoxins, animals, humans)),
[all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2)) &
kind_of(aflaloxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, animals, species2)
->can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, species2)))],
all_elim)
juslification(exists(path, currenl_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)) & kind_of(aflaloxins,
chemicals) & indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans)
->can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans),
[all(class, exists(path, currcnl_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)) & kind_of(aflatoxins,




[cxists(path, current_assessment(anatoxins, path, humans)) & kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals)
& indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path,
humans)) & kind_ol(aflatoxins, chemicals) & indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)
->can_extrapolate(anatoxins, animals, humans)],
imp_elim)
justification(exists(path, current_assessment(allatoxins, path, humans)) & kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals) & indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),








[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflaloxins, 20pph), all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2,
current_assessment(agent, path, spccies2) & causes(agent, path, species I) & can_extrapolate(agent,
species 1, species2)->causes(agent, path, species2))))), all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent,
cancer, species)->no_safc_level(agent, cancer, species))), all(compound, all(path, all(spccies, all(min,
no_sate_level(compound, path, species) & minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)-
>maximum_acceptab!e_level(compound, path, species, min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(level,
causcs(agent, path, humans) & maximum_acceptahle_lcvel(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))],
direct)
justification(kind_of(af!atoxins, chemicals) & indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
(kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)],
and_intro)
justification(kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
[current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detcctable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(agent, alKpath, all(species), all(species2,
current_assessment(agent, path, species2) & causes(agent, path, species I) & can_extrapolate(agent,
species 1, species2)->causes(agent, path, species2))))), all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent,
cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))), all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) & minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)-
>maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(level,




[current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2,
current_assessment(agent, path, species2) & causes(agent, path, species 1) & can_extrapolate(agent,
species 1, specics2)->causes(agent, path, species2))))), all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent,
cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))), all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) & minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)-
>maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))), a!l(agent, all(path, all(level,
causes(agent, path, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))],
direct)
justification(all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(anatoxins, path, species2) &
causes(aflatoxins, path, species 1) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, path, species2)))),
[all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &
causes(agent, path, species 1) & can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)->causes(agent, path,
species2)))))],
all_elim)
justification(all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2) &
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cuuscs(aflatoxins, cancer, species 1) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2))),
[all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(anatoxins, path, species2) &
causes(aflatoxins, path, species I) & can_extrapolate(analoxins, species 1, spccics2)->causcs(afIatoxins,
path, species2))))J,
all_elim)
justification(all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer,
animals) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, species2)->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)),
(all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2) &
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species 1) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species 1, species2)
->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2)))),
all_elim)
justification(current_assessment(atlatoxins, cancer, humans) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
[all(species2, current_assessment(anatoxins, cancer, species2) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer,
animals) & can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, species2)->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species2))],
all_elim)
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
(current_assessment(anatoxins, cancer, humans) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolale(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(afIatoxins, cancer, humans) &
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)->causcs(aflaloxins,
cancer, humans)],
imp_elim)
justiflcation(current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans),




(can_extrapolate(aflatuxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflaloxins, chemicals), minimum_detectableJevel(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(agent, all(species,
current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species,
min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(ievel, causes(agcnt, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, Ievel)->policy_level(agent, level))))],
direct)
justification(causes(allatoxins, cancer, animals) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans)],
and_inlro)
justirication(causes(af]atoxins, cancer, animals),
[can_exlrapolatc(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_delectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(agent, all(species,
current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))), all(compound,
all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species,
min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans) &




[can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(afiatoxins, cancer,
humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), minimum_detectablc_level(aflatoxins, 20pph), all(agent, all(species,
current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species))), all(compound,
all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species,
min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level) ->policy_level(agent, level))))],
direct)
justification(all(species, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species)
->no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species)),









(current_assessment(analoxins, cancer, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans)->no_safe_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans)],
im p_e 1 i in)
justification(current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_lcvel(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(compound, all(path, all(specics, all(min,
no_safe_level(compound, path, species) & minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min))))), all(agent, all(path, all(level,
causes(agcnt, path, humans) & maximum_acceptable_levc!(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agent, level))))],
direct)
justification(all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(allatoxins, path, species, min)))),
[all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species, min)))))],
all_elim)
justification(all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptablc_level(anatoxins, cancer, species, min))),
[all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(anatoxins, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(afiatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, path, species, min))))],
all_elim)
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justification(aII(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) &
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_accepiable_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans, min)),
[all(speeies, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species, min)))],
all_elim)
justification(no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_dctectable_level(aflaloxins,
20ppb)->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
[all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins,
min)->maximum_acceptable_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans, min))],
all_elim)
justincation(maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)
->maximum_acceptable_level(allatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb)],
imp_elim)
justification(no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_detectable_level(anatoxins,
20ppb),
[no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)],
and_intro)
justification(no_safe_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans),
lno_safe_level(afIatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent,




(no_safe_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals), minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent,
path, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)
->policy_level(agcnt, level))))],
direct)
justification(all(path, all(level, causes(aflatoxins, path, humans) &
inaximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, path, humans, level)->policy_level(aflatoxins, level))),
(all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)->policy_level(agent, level))))],
all_elim)
justification(all(level, causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins,
cancer, humans, level)->policy_level(aflatoxins, level)),
[all(path, all(level, causes(aflatoxins, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, path, humans, level)->policy_level(aflatoxins, level)))],
all_elim)]
juslification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
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humans, 20ppb)->policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
[all(levcl, causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_leve!(aflatoxins,
cancer, humans, level)->policy_level(aflatoxins, level))],
all_elim)
justification(policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans, 20ppb), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans, 20ppb) ->policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)],
imp_elim)
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans, 20ppb),




(maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb), no_safe_Ievel(aflatoxins,
cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans), kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals),
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb)],
direct)
justification(maximum_acceptableJevel(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
[maximum_aceeptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb), no_safe_level(aflatoxins,
cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), can_cxtrapolatc(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),




[policy_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans,
20ppb), no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),






The result of exhaustively merging (described in section 6.4.4) the justifications given
in Appendix C is is the following set of justifications.
justification(causes(allatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acccptablc_lcvcl(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans, 20ppb),
[all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &
causes(agent, path, species 1) & can_exlrapolate(agent, species 1, species2)->causes(agcnt, path,
species2))))),
causes(afiatoxins, cancer, animals),
all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)->can_extrapolate(agent, species 1,
species2))))),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
mininium_detectable_level(aflaloxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acccptable_level(compound, path, species,
min))))), current_assessment(allatoxins, cancer, humans),




[all(agent, all(path, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level)->policy_level(agcnt, level)))),
all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, spccies2) &
causes(agent, path, species I) & can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, spccies2) ->causes(agent, path,
species2))))),
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
all(agent, all(specicsl, all(specics2, all(class, exists(palh, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)) &
kind_of(agcnt, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2) ->can_extrapolale(agenl, species 1,
species2))))),
kind_or(allatoxins, chemicals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),
minimum_dctectuble_level(aflatoxins, 2()ppb),
all(compound, all(palh, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species,
min))))), currcnt_assessment(atlat()xins, cancer, humans),
all(agent, all(specics, current_asscssment(agent, cancer, species) ->no_safe_lcvel(agcnt, cancer,
species)))!,
merged)
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans, 20ppb) ->policy_level(anatoxins, 20ppb),
[all(agent, all(palh, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceptable_level(agent, path, humans, level) ->policy_level(agent, level))))],
merged)
justincation(all(level, causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins,
cancer, humans, level) ->policy_lcvel(aflatoxins, level)),
[all(agent, all(palh, all(level, causes(agent, path, humans) &
maximum_acceplable_level(agent, path, humans, level) ->poliey_leve!(agent, level))))),
merged)
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justification(no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_detcctable_level(aflatoxins,
20ppb),
[minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans), all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent,
cancer, species)))],
merged)
justification(maximum_acceptable_level(ariatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
[minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, 20ppb),
all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectabIe_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species,
min))))), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)->no_safe_!evel(agent, cancer,
species)))],
merged)
justification(no_safe_level(af]atoxins, cancer, humans) & minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins,
20ppb)
->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, humans, 20ppb),
[all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acceptable_leveI(compound, path, species,
min)))))],
merged)
justification(alI(min, no_safe_level(afIatoxins, cancer, humans) &
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min)
->maximum_acceptable_level(anatoxins, cancer, humans, min)),
[all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_leve](compound, path, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(compound, min) ->maximum_acceptable_level(compound, path, species,
min)))))],
merged)
justification(all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species) &
minimum_detectable_level(aflatoxins, min) ->maximum_acceptable_level(aflatoxins, cancer, species,
min))),
[all(compound, all(path, all(species, all(min, no_safe_level(compound, path, species) &




[current_asscssment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans), all(agent, all(species,
current_assessment(agent, cancer, species) ->no_safe_level(agent, cancer, species)))],
merged)
justification(current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans)->no_safe_level(aflatoxins, cancer,
humans),
[all(agent, all(species, current_assessment(agent, cancer, species)->no_safe_level(agent,
cancer, species)))],
merged)
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals), all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class,
exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)) & kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class,
species 1, species2) ->can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2))))), current_assessment(aflatoxins.
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cancer, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)),
merged)
justification(current_assessment(at1atoxins, cancer, humans) & causcs(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, humans),
[causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals),
all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path, species2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)
->can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2))»), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
kind_of(aflatoxins, chemicals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)),
merged)
justification(causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
[all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &
causes(agent, path, species 1) & can_extrapolate(agent, species 1, species2) ->causes(agent, path,
species2))))),
causes(af!atoxins, cancer, animals),
all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, currcnt_assessment(agcnt, path, spccies2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)
->can_extrapolate(agent, species I, species2))))), current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
kind_of(anatoxins, chemicals), indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans)),
merged)
justification(current_asscssment(al1atoxins, cancer, humans) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer, animals) &
can_extrapolate(allatoxins, animals, humans) ->causes(aflatoxins, cancer, humans),
|all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2,
current_assessment(agent, path, spccies2) & causes(agent, path, species 1) &
can_extrapolale(agent, species 1, species2) ->causes(agent, path, species2)))))),
merged)
justification(all(species2, current_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2) & causes(aflatoxins, cancer,
animals) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals, species2) ->causes(anatoxins, cancer, species2)),
[all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2,
currenl_assessment(agent, path, species2) & causes(agent, path, species 1) & can_extrapolate(agent,
species 1, species2) ->causes(agent, path, species2)))))),
merged)
justillcation(all(spcciesl, all(species2, currenl_assessment(aflatoxins, cancer, species2) &
causes(aflatoxins, cancer, species I) & can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, species I, species2) -
>causcs(allatoxins, cancer, species2))),
|all(agent, all(path, all(speciesl, all(species2, current_assessment(agent, path, species2) &
causcs(agent, path, species I) & can_exlrapolate(agent, species 1, species2) ->causes(agent, path,
species2)))))J,
merged)
justification(exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)) & kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals) & indicates_risk(chemicals, animals, humans),




[all(agenl, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path,
species2)) & kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)->can_exlrapolate(agent,




justification(exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)) & kind_of(aflatoxins,
chemicals) & indicates_risk(chcmicals, animals, humans)->can_extrapolate(aflatoxins, animals,
humans),
[all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path,
species2)) & kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2)->can_extrapolate(agent,
species 1, species2)))))],
merged)
justification(all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, humans)) &
kind_of(aflatoxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, animals, humans) ->can_extrapolate(aflatoxins,
animals, humans)),
[all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path,
species2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2) ->can_extrapolate(agent, species 1,
species2)))))],
merged)
justification(all(species2, all(class, exists(path, current_assessment(aflatoxins, path, species2)) &
kind_of(aflatoxins, class) & indicates_risk(class, animals, species2) ->can_extrapolate(afIatoxins,
animals, species2))),
(all(agent, all(speciesl, all(species2, a!l(class, exists(path, current_assessment(agent, path,
species2)) &
kind_of(agent, class) & indicates_risk(class, species 1, species2) ->can_extrapolate(agent, species 1,
species2)))))],
merged)
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